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[The Decision of 1789] amounted to a legislative construction of the constitution, and it has ever since been acquiesced in and acted upon, as of decisive authority in the
case.
..
[The construction given to the Constitution in
1789 has continued to rest on this loose, incidental declaratory opinion of Congress, and the sense and practice of
government since that time. It may now be considered as
firmly and definitively settled, and there is good sense and
practical utility in the construction.
James Kent'
The public ... acquiesced in [the Decision of 1789], and
it constitutes, perhaps the most extraordinary case in the
history of the government of a power, conferred by implication on the executive by the assent of a bare majority of
Congress, which has not been questioned on many other
occasions. Even the most jealous advocates of state rights
seem to have slumbered over this vast reach of authority,
and have left it untouched.
Joseph Story'
I. INTRODUCTION

The last fifteen years have seen an intense debate over the
scope of the President's power to execute the laws. Presidential
removal power, power to gather information from subordinate
executive officials, and power to bind subordinate executive officials have all been the subject of controversy. This modem debate
began with claims of executive authority advanced by President
Reagan, whose administration continually questioned the constitutionality of independent agencies and of independent counsels ap1. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 310 (Ist ed.,

0. Halsted ed.,

1826) (emphasis added).
2. 2

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Section 1543 (4th ed., Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1873).
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pointed under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 ("EIGA").
President Bush continued and intensified these claims, and (after a
slow start) President Clinton has begun to see some merit in them
as well. In retrospect, one could conclude with some irony that the
passage of the EIGA in 1978 has done much to trigger this debate
by encouraging recent Presidents to reassert vigorously their constitutional prerogatives.
As these reassertions of presidential authority began to receive
the attention of the Supreme Court and of the legal academy, two
principle camps grew up. The first camp consists of so-called unitary executive theorists like ourselves who support a broad presidential power of removal and control over law execution. The
second consists of a group of anti-unitary executive theorists who
have argued for a more limited presidential role.
To date the argument between these two camps has proceeded
mainly along three axes. First, there has been spirited debate over
whether unitarians like ourselves are right in arguing that the text3
and structure4 of the Constitution as originally understood5 created
3. For textual arguments supporting the unitary executive, see Steven G. Calabresi,
The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1377, 1378-86, 1389-1400
(1994) [hereinafter Calabresi, Power Grants]; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE LJ. 541, 559-99 (1994);
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165-68 (1992); Frank B. Cross, Executive
Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4
J. L. & POL. 483, 499-504 (1988) [hereinafter Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and
12,498]; David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers after Bowsher, 1986 SuP. Cr. REv.
19, 31-36; Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the
Court Was Wrong, 38 Am. U. L. REv. 313, 314-17 (1989); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Cr. REv. 41, 58-63; Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power
of the Presidency, 93 COLUI. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1993); Kevin H. Rhodes, A Structure
Without Foundation: A Reply to Professor Froomkin, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1406, 1408-14
(1994); J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE LJ. 1162,
1183-89; Charles N. Steele & Jeffrey H. Bowman, The Constitutionality of Independent
Regulatory Agencies Under the Necessary and Proper Clause: The Case of the Federal
Election Commission, 4 YALE J. oN REG. 363 (1987); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573, 597-99, 643-50 (1984).
4. For structural arguments supporting the unitary executive, see Calabresi, Power
Grants, supra note 3, at 1386-89; Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note
3, at 504-08; Liberman, supra note 3, at 342-58; Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional
Separa.ion of Powers, 1991 SUP. Cr. REV. 225, 228-29, 235-45 [hereinafter Merrill, Separation of Powers]; Miller, Independent Agencies, supra note 3, at 63-67; Rhodes, supra
note 3, at 1414-18; Strauss, supra note 3, at 640-69; Susan M. Davies, Comment, Congressional Encroachment on Executive Branch Communications, 57 U. Cmi. L. REV. 1297,
1314-20 (1990).
5. For originalist arguments supporting the unitary executive, see Steven G. Calabresi,
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a strongly unitary executive branch. Anti-unitarians have heatedly
disagreed with the unitarian account and have offered their own
non-unitarian accounts of the text,6 structure 7 and original history.8 Argument has been joined over this issue most recently by
Professors Lawrence Lessig, Cass Sunstein, and Martin Flaherty9
on the anti-unitarian side and by Professor Calabresi and Saikrishna
Prakash on the pro-unitarian side."0
Second, there has been some debate between unitarians and
anti-unitarians over the significance and relevance of changed circumstances. Professors Lessig and Sunstein have argued that because of changed circumstances a mostly unitary executive is compelled today where one was not compelled before, and Professor
Calabresi has argued that changed circumstances make the unitary

Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 37-47 (1995)
[hereinafter Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments]; Frank B. Cross, The Surviving Significance of the Unitary Executive, 27 HOus. L. REV. 599, 601-18 (1990); Miller, Independent Agencies, supra note 3, at 67-71; Monaghan, Protective Power, supra note 3, at 1520; P. Strauss, supra note 3, at 599-601, 603-04; Davies, supra note 4, at 1299-1306;
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the
President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE LJ. 991, 1012-15 (1993).
6. See Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. UJ. 699, 712-14 (1987) [hereinafter
Entin, Removal Power]; A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments,
88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1346, 1350-66 (1994) [hereinafter Froomkin, Imperial Presidency];
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 47-55, 61-70 (1994); Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative over Agencies
and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory
of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 649-51 (1989) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative]; Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order
12,291, 23 ARiz. L. REV. 1199, 1203-10 (1981) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Presidential Control]; Cass R. Sunstein, Article 1I Revisionism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 131 (1993); A. Michael
Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 799801 (1987) [hereinafter Froomkin, Note]; Joseph P. Verdon, Note, The Vesting Clauses,
the Nixon Test, and the Pharaoh'sDreams, 78 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1277-82 (1992).
7. See A. Michael Froomkin, Imperial Presidency, supra note 6, at 1366-76; Lessig &
Sunstein supra note 6, at 85-106; Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About
Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CoRNELL L. REV. 430 (1987); Froomkin,
Note, supra note 6, at 801-04.
8. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and
the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IowA L. REV. 1079, 1086-93 (1988); Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211, 212-24 (1989) [hereinafter Casper, Early Practices]; Abner S. Greene,
Checks and -Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123,
140-53 (1994); Froomkin, Note, supra note 6, at 804-08.
9. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 6; Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725 (1996).
10. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3.
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executive more necessary now than ever before." Professors Abner Greene and Martin Flaherty, however, disagree. They see
changed circumstances as largely pointing in an anti-unitarian direction.' 2
Third, and lastly, there has been some related debate over
whether normatively a strongly unitary executive is a good thing.
Professor Calabresi and others have argued that it is.'3 Professors
Peter Shane and Michael Fitts,' 4 among many others,' 5 have argued that it is not.
Recently, the opponents of the unitary executive have opened
up a fourth front in this struggle by placing increasing emphasis on
early American practices with respect to removal power and powers of presidential supervision. 6 Most notably, in their seminal
article The President and the Administration, Professors Lawrence
Lessig and Cass Sunstein conducted an extensive survey of our
early practices with respect to presidential control over law execution and concluded that the idea that the Framers meant to create a

11. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 93-106; Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that changed circumstances strengthen the normative
case for the unitary executive as a device to control factions).
12. See Greene, supra note 8, at 153-76; Flaherty, supra note 9,at 1810-38.
13. See Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 5, at 48-102; Harold J.
Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative
Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 70-80 (1990) [hereinafter Krent, Fragmenting]; Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizens Suits and
Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1793, 1798-1810 (1993); Miller, Independent Agencies,
supra note 3, at 56-57; Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of
Constitutional Law: The Problem of Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 201, 213-18
(1993); P. Strauss, supra note 3, at 622-25; Sidak, supra note 3, at 1202-06.
14. See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances:
The Case of Presidential of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995); Michael A. Fitts,
The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May
Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PENN. L. REv. 827 (1996).
15. See Blumoff, supra note 8, at 1151-55; Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDoZO L. REV.
273, 275-76 (1993); Greene, supra note 8, at 177-79; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at
93-102; Peter P. Swire, Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive
Branch, 94 YALE LJ. 1766, 1768-75 (1985).
16. See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561; Blumoff,
supra note 8, at 1093-1101; Casper, Early Practices, supra note 8, at 227-42; Gerhard
Casper, Executive-Congressional Separation of Power During the Presidency of Thomas
Jefferson, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395 (1995) [hereinafter Casper, Thomas Jefferson]; Kent
Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional Interpretation in the First Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REv. 79, 142-43 (1993); Froomkin, Note, supra note 6, at 805-08.

1456

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1451

strongly unitary executive is an ahistorical myth. 7 Professor Calabresi and Sai Prakash responded in The President'sPower to Execute the Laws, concluding that the text and pre-ratification history
of the Constitution strongly support the unitariness of the executive
branch and that nothing in the early post-ratification period raised
serious questions about that support.' Professor Martin Flaherty in
turn responded with an insightful article disputing Professor
Calabresi and Sai Prakash's interpretation of the constitutional text
and the pre-ratification history regarding the unitary executive.
Along the way, Professor Flaherty also chose flatly to assert that
"more than 200 years of practice under the Constitution suggest
that the inherent fluidity and the system of checks and balances
render a strict separation [of powers] impossible."' Unhappily,
little has been written on the history of the unitary executive that
would support or disprove Professor Flaherty's assertion. Prior
articles have either analyzed a small number of historical events in
isolation or have merely sketched the history of the unitary executive debate in a truncated or superficial way.'

17.
18.
19.
20.

See
See
See
See

Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 12-78.
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3.
Flaherty, supra note 9, at 1755-1810.
id. at 1816 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting FORREST MCDONALD, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 180 n.35 (1994) [hereinafter McDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY]). Flaherty also cited EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:

OFFICE AND POWERS 76-84 (1940) [hereinafter CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT (1940 ed.)];
Bloch, supra note 16, at 618-51; and, curiously enough, Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6,
at 14-22, as also supporting this proposition. See Flaherty, supra note 9, at 1816.
Professor Flaherty is hardly alone in jumping to this conclusion. See Miller, Independent Agencies, supra note 3, at 83-84 ("[TMhe executive branch has not consistently opposed independent agencies on constitutional grounds."); Paul Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies after Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE LJ. 779, 779 [hereinafter Verkuil,
Independent Agencies after Bowsher] ('[N]o administration prior to the present one directly attacked the concept of agency independence from the constitutional perspective.").
21. See Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 3, at 484-98; Entin,
Removal Power, supra note 6, at 714-24; Bruce Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the
President to Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REv. 757, 776-96 (1979); Angel M. Moreno,
Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
461, 481-88 (1994); Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 649-61; Charles
Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive
Officers, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 70-76 (1983); Froomkin, Note, supra note 6, at 805-08.
The most complete historical treatments of the unitary executive are offered by Louis
Fisher, Congress and the Removal Power, 10 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 63 (1983) [hereinafter
Fisher, Removal Power], and Charles Warren, PresidentialDeclarations of Independence,
10 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1930). Fisher's work only addresses one facet of the unitary executive: the removal power. Warren's article, while extremely helpful, omits certain key historical episodes and, based on its date of publication, necessarily does not proceed beyond
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In this Article, we want to begin the process of revisiting the
unitary executive debate from the fourth vantage point of the practice and tradition over the whole of the last 208 years. Our project
here, and in a series of three additional forthcoming Articles, is to
consider the unitary executive debate from a Burkean, common law
constitutionalist's perspective. We want to examine the claim that
we believe is implicit in much anti-unitarian scholarship that the
custom, tradition, and practice of the last 208 years amounts to a
presidential acquiescence in the existence of a congressional power
to (at times) limit the President's removal power and curtail his
other constitutionally granted mechanisms of control over law execution. We disagree that Presidents have acquiesced in the constitutionality of such limits, and we seek in this series of Articles to
prove that they have not done so.
We start with the premise expressed and defended in Professor
Calabresi's prior writings that the Framers set up a strongly unitary
executive and that this is normatively appealing. Building on that
premise, we argue here that there is no contrary longstanding custom, tradition, or practice that should cause a Burkean common
law constitutionalist to conclude that tradition and custom forecloses the adoption of what we believe is the normatively appealing
original design. Indeed, we would go further and argue that over
the past 208 years a powerful tradition has grown up whereby
Presidents have consistently defended the prerogatives the text of
the Constitution originally gave them and that public choice theory
suggests they should have.
This leads to a crucial methodological point that underlies our
analysis: our decision here to focus on prior presidential practices,
traditions, and customs. Because we are not Burkean common law
constitutionalists ourselves, we do not deem it necessary for our
purposes to prove that there is a 208-year-old three-branch consensus about these matters. Clearly, there is not. We claim only that
there is no consistent three branch anti-unitarian custom, tradition,
or practice that Presidents have acquiesced in that trumps the
constitutional text and the original design.
We believe this Article, and the three that will follow it, thoroughly establish this more limited point about the customs, practices, and traditions of the American people with respect to presidential power over the last 208 years. Congress and the Supreme

the Coolidge Administration.
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Court have vacillated over whether to recognize presidential claims
of power over removals and law execution. Sometimes they have
acknowledged the power and sometimes they have denied it. The
tradition within the executive branch, however, has been overwhelmingly and consistently unitarian. For 208 years, Presidents
have vigorously guarded the powers the Framers gave them, so
much so that today no reasonable Burkean could conclude that a
congressional easement has been established across the Executive
Power Vesting Clause of Article II by the passage of time.
Our position in this respect is very much like the one the
Supreme Court took in INS v. Chadhae when it struck down the
legislative veto on originalist constitutional grounds even though
Congress had been including such vetoes in federal statutes since
before the New Deal. The Supreme Court in Chadha said this
congressional practice was not relevant to the constitutional question, in part because most Presidents had refused to acquiesce in it
and had protested it even when signing such statutes into law.
As we hope this Article will begin to show, we think there is
if anything an even more vigorous presidential practice of asserting
power over removals and control over law execution. After briefly
surveying the practice and recent public statements of almost every
President, we conclude our four article series by arguing that, as in
Chadha, the problem of the scope of presidential power over law
execution is not one that can be resolved with reference to the
fabric of statutes that Congress has at times passed. We thus reject
approaches like the one taken by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in
Myers v. United States that seek to determine the scope of presidential power by looking at biased congressional views on the
subject expressed in a spider's web of statutory enactments.
Our historical survey will seek to trace the development over
time of all three of the mechanisms essential to any theory of the
unitary executive. These include: the President's power of removal;
the President's power to direct subordinate executive officials'
exercises of discretionary executive power; and the President's
power to nullify or veto subordinate executive officials' exercises
of discretionary executive power.' Each of the four Articles will

22. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
23. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 595-99; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note
3, at 1166; see also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1242-45 (1994); Liberman, supra note 3, at 353-54.
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focus particular attention on one of the four great crises that constitute the key moments in the development of the unitary executive. This Article will examine the development of the unitary
executive over the course of the first fifty years of our constitutional history focussing especially on the events surrounding President Andrew Jackson's removal of Treasury Secretary William J.
Duane. The second Article in the series will focus on the period
between 1837 and the end of Reconstruction with a special focus
on the attempted impeachment of President Andrew Johnson and
the rise and fall of the Tenure of Office Act. The third Article will
focus on the unitary executive during the third half-century of
American constitutional history with special attention given to
Franklin D. Roosevelt's assertions of power during the debates on
executive reorganization in 1937-1938. And, the final Article will
discuss the modem post-New Deal history with a focus on the
crisis that we believe has been triggered by the EIGA.24 We regret the need to break our book length argument up into four
pieces but believe it is essential that we do so if we are to do
justice to each historical epoch.
A close examination of the history over the last 208 years has
persuaded us that this country's historical practice regarding issues
of presidential control over removal and law execution either supports the unitary executive position or at best is inconclusive. Our
survey of the history shows that Presidents have consistently as-

So defining the scope of our work calls for several caveats. With limited exceptions,
we limit our discussion to the execution of the law directly under the Executive Power
Clause. We do not address the President's control over areas such as the military, spending, and foreign relations. These require the careful balancing of numerous and often
opposing textual provisions of the Constitution. We also do not discuss another area that,
while having strong implications for the President's ability to execute the laws, is also
governed by a specific constitutional provision (i.e., appointments).
24. Most scholars to date have mentioned the first three crises as being of critical
importance. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 78, 84 n.334. The fact that other
scholars have paid attention to these episodes appears to confirm the propriety of focusing
on these events. See Entin, supra note 6, at 720-22 (Jackson and Johnson); Ledewitz,
supra note 21, at 794 n.154 (Jackson); Miller, Independent Agencies, supra note 3, at 67,
85 (Johnson and Roosevelt); Monaghan, supra note 3, at 19-20 (Jackson); Moreno, supra
note 21, at 485 (Roosevelt); Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogatives, supra note 6, at 657 &
n.169 (Roosevelt); Itzhak Zamir, Administrative Control of Administrative Action, 57 CAL.
L. REV. 866, 875, 877 (1969) (Jackson); Steven Breker-Cooper, The Appointments Clause
and the Removal Power: Theory and Seance, 60 TENN. L. REV. 841, 898-900 (1993)
(Johnson).
We believe the modem crises over the EIGA warrants inclusion on an equal footing
with the first three.
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serted their authority to execute the laws through each of the three
mechanisms described above since the earliest days of the Republic. Thus, far from supporting the conclusions of Professor
Flaherty, the historical practice over the last 208 years tends to
confirm the textual, structural, originalist, and normative arguments
in favor of a presidential power to control the execution of the
laws.'
IX. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE DEBATE: SOME BRIEF
COMMENTS ON ITS SIGNIFICANCE, ON HISTORICAL
METHOD, AND ON METHODOLOGY

Before beginning our discussion of the Burkean argument from
practice, custom, and tradition, it is appropriate that we briefly say
a bit more about the methodology and vision of constitutional law
that underlies our analysis and about the legal significance of our
project. We will first discuss the importance of the unitary executive debate and of the claims we are developing about precedent
within the executive branch about the scope of the executive power. Next, we will comment briefly on some matters of historical
method. Finally, we will conclude with a discussion of the relationship between the claims developed in this Article and the President's role as a constitutional interpreter. With these items completed, we will then turn in Part I to our historical exegesis.
A. The Importance of the Unitary Executive Debate
It is easy today to dismiss the removal debate as being of
inconsequential importance. Clearly, many factors affect presidential
power over executive branch subordinates-the removal power is
only one among these many factors. Presidential popularity, support
in Congress, and skill in picking initial appointees all affect the
degree to which a President is able to command the loyalty of his
subordinates. Moreover, the removal power has not been exercised

25. Professor Flaherty's misassessment of the unitary executive's history is particularly
conspicuous given the sharpness of the criticisms he directed at the historical analysis of
the Founding era contained in the previous work of Professor Calabresi and Sai Prakash.
Professor Flaherty criticizes Calabresi and Prakash for supposedly failing to consider all
relevant sources, for focusing on a few historical examples in isolation, and particularly
for failing to consider a broad enough range of history to lead to sound conclusions. See
Flaherty, supra note 9, at 1750, 1774-77, 1788-1801. It appears that the same criticisms
would apply with greater justice to the 13 page discussion of changed circumstances in
Part IV of Professor Flaherty's own Article. See id. at 1816-28.
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often in recent years. At times, it even appears that presidential
appointees in independent agencies are more committed to the
administration's policy program than are the President's own Cabinet Secretaries.
While it is certainly true that presidential power over the executive branch is a complex phenomenon, it would be a great mistake to underestimate the importance of the removal power. Like
the veto power or the war power, the removal power does not
need to be exercised often to be effective. All that is needed is an
early firing or two, and a conviction that a particular President is
willing to fire again, and the removal power will have accomplished its chilling effect on insubordinate employees. The removal
power, like the power to issue binding orders to executive branch
subordinates, is a potentially powerful tool of executive branch
unitariness.
It is probably the case that the removal power is most valuable
when the President's party also controls a majority in the Senate.
Without such a majority, presidential removal power becomes politically costly because Presidents who fire subordinates will have to
endure hostile senatorial scrutiny of their replacements. Concerns of
this kind may well explain why President Clinton has recently
retained Janet Reno as the Attorney General, even though press
reports suggest he wanted to replace her. Thus, those of us who
have learned to live with opposite party control of the White
House and of the Senate may well underestimate the importance of
the removal power. It is a potent weapon at all times, and undoubtedly an even more potent weapon when the executive and
legislative branches of government are not divided as they have
been in recent times.
In developing our argument that Presidents have always appreciated the vital importance of the removal power, we intend to set
the stage for several legal claims that Presidents may want to make
in resisting congressional efforts to curtail either that power or the
parallel presidential power to issue binding orders to executive
branch subordinates.
First, as mentioned above, we want to argue that, as in
Chadha, presidential non-acquiescence to congressional claims of
power means that the Supreme Court in future litigation should
decide removal cases with reference to the text of the Constitution
as originally understood. We believe this clearly means the Supreme Court should recognize that the Constitution creates what we
have described as a strongly unitary executive.
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Second, we believe that President Clinton and all future incumbent Presidents should recognize that there exists a strong internal
executive branch precedent, established over 208 years, whereby
Presidents have always resisted serious incursions on the principle
of the unitary executive. Pursuant to this, we believe President
Clinton and his successors should view themselves as being compelled to veto any statute presented to them that violates the principles of strong executive branch unitariness. Obviously, the EIGA is
such a statute, and, not coincidentally, we note that it is soon
coming up for reauthorization. Moreover, we believe Presidents
should enforce unconstitutional statutes like the EIGA with the
greatest circumspection.
Finally, we believe President Clinton and his successors should
continue to challenge unconstitutional statutes like the EIGA in
federal court notwithstanding judicial decisions like Morrison v.
Olson and Humphrey's Executor, which are inconsistent with the
unitary executive. In doing this, they will be keeping faith with
their many predecessors who never let temporary defeats over
matters like the adoption of the unconstitutional Tenure of Office
Act deflect them from the long term project of protecting the vital
powers of the presidential office.
The removal debate, then, is of vital significance. We have
begun this four Article series because we believe that, and because
we believe that President Clinton and his successors can act upon
our historical findings in the three ways just discussed.
B. HistoricalMethod
A second introductory concern relates to matters of historical
method. While we do not wish to enter into an extended discussion
on this already much debated topic, we do believe it is necessary
that we say something about the method we have followed in this
Article and that we intend to follow in the three sequels to come.
We do not claim to be historians, and we do not claim here to
have produced original, ground-breaking historical research. Although we have canvassed many original sources, we have relied
heavily on the famous and principle secondary works that discuss
each of the presidencies or historical epochs that are the subject of
this Article. Our debts are especially great in this particular Article
to Leonard White, James Hart, Glenn Phelps, Forrest McDonald,
and Robert Remini, among many others. Their groundbreaking and
original work has been vital to the success of our project.
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The original contribution we seek to make is to pull together in
one place the entire set of presidential claims about the unitary
executive debate that have been made over the whole of the last
208 years. No one to our knowledge has done this as thoroughly
as we are trying to do it, and it is not clear to us that anyone has
even tried since Chief Justice Taft wrote his long and well researched opinion in Myers v. United States. We believe it is vitally
important for constitutional lawyers to have this information gathered together in one place in a form that has been updated since
the Myers opinion was written. We thus approach this historical
research project as constitutional lawyers and not as legal historians. We are interested in history in this project, but only in the
way that lawyers are interested in history. For these purposes it is
entirely appropriate that we rely on the sources we have chosen
and that we skip somewhat quickly over vast periods of time. In
doing this, we are no more guilty of doing "history lite" than legal
historians are guilty of doing "law lite." We consume history here
for a particular purpose, and it is a much narrower purpose than
the one that often drives historians.
C. Methodology: The Relevance of Departmental
or Coordinate Review
Lastly, and most importantly, we think it is important that our
readers understand that we undertake this massive project very
much influenced by, and in the spirit of, the recent debate that has
raged about the role all three branches of the federal government
must and do play in the interpretation and enforcement of the
Constitution.26 Ever since former Attorney General Meese's famous Tulane speech, ' many academics and judges have been
more conscious than ever of the role Presidents and congresses can
claim for themselves as constitutional interpreters alongside the
federal courts. This role was ably defended by Judge Frank
Easterbrook in an article in this law review entitled Presidential
Review," and it has been defended recently as well by Professor

26. For a helpful description and list of examples of coordinate construction, see LoUIs
FISHER, CONSTITUIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 231-46

(1988).
27. General Meese's speech is reprinted, along with other useful commentaries, in THE
FEDERALIST SocIETY, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION? THE DEBATE OVER INTERPRETrvE AUrHORITY (1992).

28. Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1990).
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Michael Stokes Paulsen29 and by Professor Gary Lawson writing
with Christopher D. Moore."
Despite the ancient vintage of this theory of departmental or
coordinate construction of the Constitution,3 the suggestion that
the Supreme Court may not have the last word on matters of constitutional interpretation seems at first to be quite jarring to modem
lawyers whose introduction to constitutional law began with Marbury's ringing declaration that "[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."32 The
declaration carries the implication that since the Constitution was
the supreme law of the land, the judiciary must have the authority
to interpret the Constitution. However, a close reading of Marbury
reveals that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in that famous case
never claimed that interpretation of the law was the exclusive province of the courts. On the contrary, Marshall reasoned that courts
may construe the Constitution because "[t]hose who apply the rule
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
'
rule."33
Thus, scholars have universally acknowledged that although Marbury firmly established the judiciary's right to interpret

29. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEo. LJ. 217 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, Most Dangerous Branch].
30. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOwA L. REV. 1267 (1996).
31. In The Federalist No. 49, James Madison declared, "The several departments being
perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is
evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between
their respective powers." THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed.,
1961). Presidential power to interpret the law was later asserted by Presidents Thomas
Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21-28 (11th ed. 1985); Gary Apfel, Whose Constitution Is It
Anyway? The Authority of the Judiciary's Interpretation of the Constitution, 46 RUTGERS
L. REV. 771, 777-82 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 85-97
(1993) [hereinafter Paulsen, Merryman Power].
For a comprehensive collection of instances of presidential constitutional construction
by numerous Presidents from Franklin Pierce to George Bush, see Christopher N. May,
Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws. Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 904-86 (1994). For an interesting discussion of examples of
constitutional construction by Congress, see DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE
CONSnTriON: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1966). For useful compilations of executive,
legislative, judicial, and scholarly materials on the subject, see THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY,
supra note 27; LouiS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLmcAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 16-26 (1992); WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONAL INTERPRETATION 195-247 (1st ed. 1986).
32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
33. Id. at 177.
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the law, it fell far short of making those interpretations binding on
the other branches. 4 Other commentators have also noted that
notions of judicial supremacy are inconsistent with the coordinacy
of the three branches of the federal government. Therefore, after
brief reflection, it comes as little surprise that, as Professor Thomas
Merrill has noted, judicial supremacy has been rejected by a veritable all-star list of constitutional scholars36 and that the list of
commentators endorsing some form of coordinate construction has
grown more impressive with each passing year. 7

34. See JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTrTUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 10407 (1984); FISHER, CONSTUTIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 26, at 242-43; LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrunONAL LAW § 3-2, at 25 (2d ed. 1988); Paul Brest, Congress
as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L.
REV. 57, 63 (1974) [hereinafter Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker]; Paul
Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 585, 587-88 (1975) [hereinafter Brest, Conscientious Legislator]; Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 43, 51 (1993) [hereinafter Merrill, Judicial Opinions]; Paulsen, Most Dangerous
Branch, supra note 29, at 241-45; William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury
v. Madison, 1969 DUKE LJ. 1, 37.
35. See Paulsen, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 29, at 228-40.
36. See Merrill, Judicial Opinions, supra note 34, at 49 n.26 (citing ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 263-64 (1962); EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER THE CONSTIrION: A STUDY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 68-69 (1939); PHILIP B.
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 116 (1970); Gerald
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 n.155 (1964); Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE LJ. 1363, 1363 A.2 (1973);
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008
(1965)).
37. For commentary generally supporting coordinate construction, see AGRESTO, supra
note 34, at 104-07; FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 1-6, 8, 10-16; Stephen Carter,
The Courts Are Not the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1989, at A24; Neal Devins,
The Constitution Between Friends, 67 TEX. L. REV. 213 (1988) (reviewing FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 26); John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and
Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1988); Rex
E. Lee, The Provinces of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1009 (1987);
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987); Walter F.
Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48
REV. POL. 401 (1986); Robert Nagel, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches
in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 380 (1988). For defenses of judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. LJ. 347 (1994); Burt Neubome, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution,
73 CORNELL L. REv. 375, 377 (1988); Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial
Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 137, 155-57 (1993).
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We do not intend here to delve into all of the many complex
and nuanced issues that are raised by applying the principals of
coordinate construction to all exercises of presidential Article II
powers." For purposes of this series of Articles, it is sufficient for

For commentary supporting the executive branch's authority to interpret the Constitution, see RAOUL BERGER, ExEcuTivE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 308 (1974);
TRIBE, supra note 34, at 34-37; William P. Barr, Attorney General's Remarks, Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law, November 15, 1992, 15 CARDOzo L. REV. 31, 39 (1993);
Easterbrook, supra note 28; Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The
Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 348-51 (1993); John
0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative,
Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375 (1993) [hereinafter
McGinnis, Opinion Function]; John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor
General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799, 80506 (1992) (reviewing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW (1991)); Merrill, Separation of
Powers, supra note 34, at 240; Merrill, Judicial Opinions, supra note 36, at 49; Paulsen,
Merryman Power, supra note 31; Paulsen, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 29; Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 735,
766-83; J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to
Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 452-60 (1990). For critiques of the President's power to interpret the Constitution, see Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381 (1986); May, supra note 31, at 889-93; Arthur S. Miller, The
President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 397-98 (1987);
Arthur S. Miller & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of
Federal Statutes, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 51 (1979); Burt Neubome, The Binding Quality of
Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TuL. L. REV. 991 (1987).
For commentary supporting the Congress's authority to interpret the Constitution, see
Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L.
REV. 199, 205-11 (1971); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985) [hereinafter Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation]; Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., The Framers' Understanding of Constitutional Deliberation in Congress, 21 GA. L. REV. 217 (1986); Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975); Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution Outside the
Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 437 (1992); Vik D. Amar, Note, The
Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111, 1116, 1123 (1988); Mark E. Herrmann,
Note, Looking Down from the Hill: Factors Determining the Success of Congressional
Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 543 (1992). Notably, even those who question whether Congress is institutionally
suited to evaluate the constitutionality of statutes agree that the government would be
better served if it tried to do so. See Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker, supra note 34, at 98-105; Brest, Conscientious Legislator, supra note 34, at 587;
Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.
L. REv. 587 (1983); Abner J. Mikva & Joseph R. Lundy, The 91st Congress and the
Constitution, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 449, 449 (1971); Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311 (1987). For commentary challenging
Congress's capacity to interpret the Constitution, see Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court
1978 Term--Forward: The Forms of Justice,.93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1979); Gerald L.
Neuman, Variations for Mixed Voices, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1851 (1989) (reviewing FISHER, CONSTITUrIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 26).
38. Some forms of coordinate construction have remained quite controversial. Vigorous
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us to note that coordinate construction is especially called for when
separation of powers matters are involved. The Supreme Court's
inconsistent resolution of separation of powers cases has led some
commentators to ask whether the judiciary is even capable as an
institution of resolving these issues. 9 Moreover, the Supreme
Court is sometimes an interested party in separation of powers
disputes; permitting it to be the final arbiter of separation of powers questions would contravene the jurisprudential rule against
permitting parties from being judges in their own causes." Other
commentators worry that giving one branch a monopoly on constitutional interpretation will stifle valuable interbranch dialogues."
debate currently rages over whether or not the President is obligated to enforce federal
court judgments. Professor Paulsen says he is not, while Professor Lawson and Christopher Moore disagree. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 29, with Lawson & Moore, supra note 30.
Moreover, to pick a different context, many commentators have questioned the Supreme
Court's deference to congressional interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment first announced in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See Stephen L. Carter, The
Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CI.
L. REv. 819 (1986); William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and
Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975); Ross, supra note 37. But see Robert A.
Burt, Miranda and Title 11: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. Cr. REv. 81, 112-18
(defending the Morgan power). The Supreme Court is apparently reconsidering the issue
as well. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (5th Cir.), cert. granted,
117 S. CL 293 (1996).
39. See Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18
PEPP. L. REV. 57. 57-62 (1990); see also Cox, supra note 37, at 204-05; Mikva &
Lundy, supra note 37, at 497-98.
40. Compare Merrill, Judicial Opinions, supra note 34, at 53 with David A. Strauss,
Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 113, 131-34 (1993).
For example, it is somewhat troubling that Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Up to that point he had been a
strong supporter of presidential power, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 147, and
just two years earlier had supported an early draft of Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986), strongly endorsing the President's right to remove all officers wielding executive
power, Bernard Schwartz, An Administrative Law "Might Have Been"-Chief Justice Burger's Bowsher v. Synar Draft, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 221, 226-27, 232 (1990). And yet,
Rehnquist authored a sweeping opinion upholding the removal restrictions in the Ethics in
Government Act as a constitutionally permissible infringement upon the executive branch.
A disturbing explanation of his position is that as Chief Justice, Rehnquist possessed the
power under the Act to select the members of the special division of the D.C. Circuit
that would control all independent counsel investigations and prosecutions. Thus, the Chief
Justice arguably had a strong interest in upholding the constitutionality of the Act. Although we in no way mean to suggest that this motivation actually underlay the Chief
Justice's authorship of Morrison, it does serve to illustrate that the Supreme Court's pronouncements about its own power relative to the other two branches may be subject to
greater skepticism than its opinions in any other area of constitutional law.
41. See AGRESTO, supra note 34, at 10, 93, 152; PAUL BATOR Er AL., THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 363 (2d ed. 1973); BICKEL, supra note 36, at 240;
MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 125-26 (1982);
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Therefore, whatever one's conclusion in other areas of constitutional law, we think the case for coordinate constitutional review is
especially powerful in the separation of powers area. We think that
in this area the concurrence of all three branches of the federal
government is necessary on the proper allocation of a particular
power before that matter may properly be regarded as settled.4'
To further elaborate, we think that the case for departmental or
coordinate review is arguably at its strongest when that power is
being asserted defensively to protect presidential powers from encroachment by Congress and the courts.43 Professor William Van
Alstyne once noted that the narrowest and least controversial understanding of the power of judicial review announced in Marbury
was its assertion as a defensive power when Congress sought unconstitutionally to alter the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.'
Similarly, here, a 208-year old presidential tradition of defensive
presidential review to protect presidential power against congressional encroachments seems especially defensible. This is particularly
the case since substantial historical evidence suggests that the
Framers gave the President major constitutional powers (like the
veto power) in part to enable and encourage him to defend the
prerogatives of his office and with them the constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
Accordingly, if one accepts any role for the policy making
branches in constitutional interpretation, and all but the most diehard judicial supremacists do,4' then this seems like an especially
Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker, supra note 34, at 103; Cox, supra note
37, at 260; Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the
Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIo ST. LJ. 175, 218-23 (1990) [hereinafter Entin, Separation of Powers]; Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 37, at 744; Merrill,
Judicial Opinions, supra note 34, at 45.
42. See FIsHER, CONSTITuTIONAL DIALoGUEs, supra note 26, at 243-44; Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 37, at 716-17, 746; Michael 1. Glennon, The Use of
Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REv. 109, 139-41 (1984).
43. We realize, of course, that many will deny that Presidents are defending turf here,
since our conclusion in that regard presumes that the Framers meant to create a strongly
unitary executive. We do presume that for reasons that have been amply explained in
prior writings, and we ask here whether any contrary practice has grown up that would
trump the original understanding. The absence of such a contrary practice suggests, if
anything, that we are right about the original history and that Professors Lessig, Sunstein,
and .Flaherty are wrong. it would be very difficult indeed to argue that for 208 years
from George Washington to George Bush presidents have always uniformly asserted a
view of presidential power that was both rejected by the Framers and that was at odds
with the constitutional text!
44. See Van Alstyne, supra note 34, at 34.
45. The most famous dicta expressing the judicial supremacy position was announced
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easy context in which to recognize that a consistent presidential
interpretation of the law execution power as including at least a
power of removal is deserving of deference. Especially since Congress and the Supreme Court have reached inconsistent resolutions
on this issue, it would seem that deference to the President's consistent and vigorous interpretation of the scope of the removal
power is appropriate.
Not every presidential claim of executive power deserves to be
given weight by all who believe in the legitimacy of three-branch
construction of the constitution. Some presidential assertions of
power are extraordinary and are associated with unusual Presidents
or unusual national crises that seemed to require an extraordinary
response. We deal here with a claim of presidential power that is
as old as the Republic and that has been asserted to one degree or
another by virtually every occupant of the presidential office. That
kind of a defensive claim about the scope of presidential power
does deserve the attention of those who believe in three-branch
constitutional review. Accordingly, the theory that underlies such
review further buttresses the relevance of the historical discussion
that follows.
Embracing the use of coordinate construction in at least some
separation of powers disputes still leaves one critical consideration
unaddressed. As Professor Gary Lawson has pointed out, all theories of constitutional interpretation must, in addition to defining the
legal standard that is being applied, also specify the amount of
evidence needed to establish when that standard is met.' The Supreme Court provided one possible evidentiary standard in United
States v. Midwest Oil Co. when it suggested that a "long-continued
practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a
presumption that the [executive actions] had been made in pursuance of its consent or of a recognized administrative power of the
'
Executive."47
As Justice Frankfurter subsequently elaborated, "a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged

in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), which proclaimed that "the federal judiciary
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution." Subsequent cases referred to
the "responsibility of this Court" as the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." See
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549
(1969); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).
46. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859, 859 (1992).
47. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915).
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in by the Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure
of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 'executive power'
vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II."
If such is the standard for evaluating congressional acquiescence to executive assertions of power, it logically follows that a
converse standard should apply in evaluating presidential acquiescence to congressional assertions of power. Presidents should not
be deemed to have acquiesced to a congressionally-imposed limitation on their power unless "a systematic, unbroken, [congressional]
practice" of limiting the President's power existed that had been
"long pursued to the knowledge of the [Presidents] and never before questioned." And since the burden of proof logically must lie
upon the party asserting the existence of such a practice, the failure
to prove the existence of such a continued, open, and unquestion- /
ing acquiescence on the part of the President would necessarily
imply that the propriety of such a congressionally-enacted limitation on the President's power would have to be regarded as an
unresolved question still subject to interpretation by all three
branches. It is in this context that the Supreme Court's statements
in Chadha referred to above are most relevant. In Chadha, the
Court declined to regard the legislative veto as an established practice because eleven of thirteen Presidents from Woodrow Wilson to
Ronald Reagan had objected to it, and the Court instead decided
the constitutional issue on purely textual, structural, and normative
grounds.
The Frankfurter "gloss on the text" standard helps resolve
several practical questions. First, Frankfurter's test requires the
existence of a "systematic, unbroken . . . practice." This suggests
that an occasional presidential failure to object to a particular infringement on the President's authority should not be sufficient to
constitute acquiescence for all time and on behalf of all future
Presidents in a particular constitutional construction. Transient
political pressures or time constraints should not be allowed to
48. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579,
610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
299, 309 (1803) ("[Plractice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years,
commencing with the organization of the judicial system . . . has indeed fixed the construction."); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163 (1926); Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 668-69, 686 (1981) (noting "the history of [congressional] acquiescence in
executive claims settlement," the Court held that "Congress may be considered to have
consented to the President's action in suspending claims").
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determine major constitutional issues49 and Presidents should not
be forced into wasting valuable time and political capital scrutinizing every piece of legislation for even the most minor incursions
on Article II prerogatives. Moreover, Frankfurter's requirement that
the practice be "long pursued" ensures that the important questions
surrounding the proper allocation of the federal powers among the
three branches is not determined by the weaknesses or idiosyncrasies of a handful of Presidents." Finally, Frankfurter's requirement
that the branch in question have full knowledge of the infringement
in question guarantees that mere inattention will not be construed
as active acquiescence.
Applying these principles, we will now examine in this four
Article series statements made by each President from George
Washington through George Bush to determine whether our
nation's Chief Executives can fairly be said to have acquiesced in
an anti-unitarian vision of the executive branch.5 We begin in
this first installment with Presidents Washington, Adams, Jefferson,

49. For example, the exigencies of World War II led Franklin Roosevelt to sign the
Lend-Lease Act even though he believed that the legislative veto provision it contained
was unconstitutional. See Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1353 (1953). Such short-term political considerations are surely a weak basis for
defining the scope of a major constitutional issue such as the separation of powers. See
JOHN R. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: UNSEPARATING THE POWERS 10-13 (1977);
Glennon, supra note 42, at 141-42; Kmiec, supra note 37, at 348. But see Rappaport,
supra note 37, at 771-76 (arguing that the President has a constitutional obligation to veto
unconstitutional laws).
50. In fact, some scholars have argued that historical acquiescence by earlier Presidents
cannot be dispositive no matter how long standing. See Kmiec, supra note 37, at 357
("Later presidents cannot be estopped from returning to the original understanding [of the
Constitution].").
51. Given this aim, this Article will primarily focus on statements made by the Presidents. Positions taken by Congress and the judiciary will be discussed only in passing, as
will the eventual resolution of particular disputes. The key to the analysis is whether the
positions taken by the Presidents asserted the unitariness of the executive branch, not
whether those assertions were opposed or were successful.
Because of space constraints, this Article will limit its discussion for the most part
to statements made by the Presidents themselves, including veto messages, signing statements, legislative proposals, and statements regarding previously enacted legislation. This is
not to say that an analysis of other executive materials would not be appropriate. See
Glennon, supra note 42, at 140. We omit extended discussion of statements offered by
lower-level executive officials (such as those embodied in the arguments offered by the
Attorneys General and the Solicitors General before the Supreme Court, the opinions of
the Attorneys General, testimony before Congress, among others) simply because undertaking a comprehensive survey of those documents would constitute another monumental
undertaking. To the extent that our research has exposed us to the views offered by subordinate executive officials, we have found that those views largely corroborated our conclusions.
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Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Jackson. The conclusion of our four Article series is that, contrary to the misconceptions of many anti-unitarians, no systematic, unbroken, long-standing practice exists of presidential acquiescence to congressionallyimposed limitations on the President's sole power to execute the
laws and remove subordinate officials. On the contrary, the historical record shows that Presidents almost always object or fight
when Congress trespasses on their constitutional power to execute
the laws free from legislative control. The few exceptions that do
exist are neither significant enough nor sustained enough to constitute Frankfurterian acquiescence. Thus, it is clear that, Professor
Flaherty's assertions notwithstanding, no reasonable Burkean common law constitutionalist could conclude that history and practice
resolves the unitary executive debate in Congress's favor. That
debate must be resolved in the President's favor on textual, structural, originalist, and normative grounds.
HI. THE UNITARY ExECuTIVE DURING THE EARLY YEARS

OF THE REPUBLIC, 1787-1837
The first half-century of the Republic was a critical time in the
development of our constitutional system. Although the Framers
chose to create an independent, co-equal, and strongly unitary
executive branch of government, many of the issues surrounding
the distribution of powers among the three branches of the federal
government were not directly addressed in the Constitution 2
Many in Congress recognized, however, from the very beginning
that the Constitution gave to the President the sole power to remove executive officials, and this recognition was reflected in the
famous so-called Decision of 1789." Thereafter, every single Pres52. For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that the Framers specifically considered and rejected proposals to divide the executive power among multiple Presidents, I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 65-66, 88-89, 96-97 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966), or between the President and a council of revision or a council of
state, 1 id. at 97-98, 138-40; 2 id. at 73-80, 298, 541-42; 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITION 159, 164,
214, 243, 257, 292 (J. Elliott ed., 1866) (photo. reprint 1941). Thus it is generally conceded that "[n]o one denies that in some sense the framers created a unitary executive;
the question is in what sense." Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 8. For a more complete analysis of the Framers' support for the unitary executive, see Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 3, at 603-35.
53. Since the Decision of 1789 represents a legislative construction of the Constitution,
it falls outside the scope of this Article. Fortunately, several definitive treatments of the
Decision of 1789 exist. See JAMES HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION: 1789,
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ident who served between 1789 to 1837 consistently objected to all
congressional attempts to limit the President's power to control the
execution of the laws. In fact, the executive branch was so successful in resisting these challenges that by 1837, both the friends
and enemies of presidential power over law execution agreed that
the matter had been conclusively settled in the President's favor by
practice.
This settled practice of constitutionally vested presidential power over removals followed importantly from the Framers' decision
to make the executive branch as independent of the legislature, and
as nearly co-equal to it, as was practicable. This decision was
manifested not only in the Framers' choice of the Electoral College
as the mechanism by which Presidents would, at least initially be
selected, but also by their decision to give the President the independence that can only come with a fixed term in office." Ideas
about how to select the President varied at the Philadelphia Convention, but there was broad support for presidential independence
buttressed by a long fixed term in office. 5 In fact, during the
155-248 (1948); CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789,
141-65 (1923). Of particular note is both Chief Justice Taft's reliance on the Decision of
1789 as establishing the President's power to remove and Justices McReynolds's, Brandeis's, and Holmes's criticism of that reliance in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926). Professor Calabresi and Sai Prakash have offered their own analysis. See Calabresi
& Prakash, supra note 3, at 642-45. For other contemporary treatments, see Casper, Early
Practices, supra note 8, at 233-43; David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The
First Congress and the Structure of Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. CH. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 195-203 (1995) [hereinafter Currie, First Congress and Structure]; Greenfield,
supra note 16, at 82-111.
Briefly stated, the initial draft of the bill to establish the Department of Foreign
Affairs provided that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was "to be removable from office
by the President of the United States." Concerned that this language suggested that the
power to remove the Secretary was conferred by congressional rather than constitutional
grant, Representative Egbert Benson offered an amendment to this language to remove this
implication. This amended language was subsequently incorporated into the statutes creating the War Department (without much controversy) as well as the Treasury Department
(by the narrowest of margins: the casting vote of Vice President Adams). Congress's
action has been thereafter regaided as recognizing the constitutional basis of the President's removal power.
54. Executive officials in parliamentary regimes lack such protections because they can
be unseated by a vote of no confidence in the legislature. For this reason, Arend Lijphart
identifies the fixed term of office as a key and sometimes advantageous feature of presidential regimes. See Arend Lijphart, "Introduction," PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL
GOVERNMENT 1, 11-12 (Arend Lijphart ed., 1992).
55. Gouverneur Morris, for example, was indifferent how the executive was chosen so
long as he had the independence that comes with a long term in office. Similarly, Dr.
McClurg favored tenure during good behavior for the President thinking "the independence
of the Executive to be equally essential with that of the Judiciary Department." 3 PHILIP
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period at Philadelphia when the Framers were contemplating legislative selection of the President, they also were contemplating
reinforcing his independence with a fixed term longer than four
years. Thus, when Theodore Lowi implies, wrongly in our view,
that the Framers expected that the Electoral College would ordinarily fail to produce a winner and that Presidents would thus be
selected in the House of Representatives, he overlooks the fact that
those selected would still be independent due to their fixed term in
office. 6 He also overlooks the unintended consequences of the
Incompatibility Clause, which in practice has greatly reinforced the
separation of powers to the great benefit of the presidency."
Presidential power and independence of the legislature were
thus critical elements of the Founders' plan, and they were reflected from the Decision of 1789 on in the practice of our first seven
Presidents, all of whom asserted a power to control law execution
and to remove officials as part of their understanding of the executive's constitutionally granted prerogatives. We turn now to an
elaboration of their views.
A. George Washington
George Washington's strong support for the unitary executive
had very deep roots and grew out of events that occurred long
before he became the first President of the United States. In particular, Washington's views were greatly shaped by his experiences
during the Revolutionary War when several committees of the
Continental Congress served as the army's plural executive head5
These ineffective multiple committees led Washington to plead
throughout the war for the creation of a single executive structure
that would have the power and the duty to "act with dispatch and
' Washington complained repeatedly about "the inconveenergy."59

B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 495 (1987).
56. See THEODORE J. Lowi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE
UNFULFILLED 33-35 (1985). Lowi argues quite wrongly that the Framers' system was

going to make the presidency "an essentially parliamentary office." Id. at 34.
57. See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of
Powers or Separation of Personnel? 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1045 (1994).

58. See

GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITONALISM

142-43 (1993); see also id. at 56 (noting that during 1779-1780, Washington supported
efforts to create a "strong executive branch, preferably with individual executives capable
of accepting and exercising political responsibility").
59. Letter from George Washington to Joseph Jones (May 14, 1780), in 18 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 356, 356-57 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939), quoted in
PHELPS, supra note 58, at 59.
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nience of depending upon a number of men and different channels"
for supplies." As Glenn Phelps notes, once Robert Morris was
appointed Commissary General in 1781, his "success in supplying
the army in those crucial months [before Washington's victory at
Yorktown] only reinforced Washington's bias in favor of strong,
independent executive leadership."'"
Washington was also greatly frustrated during the War for
Independence by the astonishing lack of a unified command structure. The Northern Army, for example, was commanded by Philip
Schuyler, a New Yorker whose strong political support from that
state allowed him, in Phelps's words, to "behave[] more like an
equal than a subordinate," forcing Washington to plead with
Schuyler to provide support for his efforts. 2 Moreover, the Continental Congress also appointed Washington' field generals, thus
effectively giving those generals some degree of independence. As
a result some of Washington's nominal subordinates spent their
time catering to the interests of their congressional patrons with the
result that they failed to follow Washington's orders promptly, if
ever.6" All of these experiences led Washington to support strongly the creation of a "strong, independent, and energetic executive"
at the Philadelphia Convention.'
Once the unitary presidency had been established, Washington
was determined as the first President to give it structure and life
both through his actions and through his public and private utterances. Washington noted during the opening months of his Administration that in his view, other executive officials existed only
because it was "impossib[le] [for] one man ... to perform all the
great business of the State," and thus the proper role for these
officials was merely "to assist the supreme Magistrate in discharg-

60. PHELPS, supra note 58, at 143 (quoting 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON:
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR SERIES 84). As Washington later noted, "wherever, and whenever one person is found adequate to the discharge of a duty by close application thereto
it is worse executed by two persons, and scarcely done at all if three or more are employed therein." Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of War (September 24,
1792), in 32 THE WRITNGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 159, 160, quoted in LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 91
(1948) [hereinafter WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS].
61. PHELPS, supra note 58, at 143; see also id. at 59.
62. Id. at 144.
63. Id. Washington's command of his forces was further undermined by the fact that
the militia officers that were part of his forces were primarily responsible to their state's
governors, not to him. See id. at 144-45.
64. See id. at 103-04.
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ing the duties of his trust." 5 As noted by Leonard White, the
preeminent administrative law historian of this period, "The President looked upon the Secretaries ... as assistants, not as rivals or
as substitutes."
Washington's determination to take control of the entire administration was demonstrated immediately after his swearing in when
he asserted control over the executive structures that were left over
from the government set up under the Articles of Confederation.
Thus, even before the new Cabinet Departments were created, and
even before Secretaries had been appointed to direct them, Washington was already personally taking control of all executive structures and entities within the government. A mere five days after
Washington's inauguration the President asked Acting Secretary of
War Henry Knox to examine and provide a summary report on
papers regarding a treaty with the Cherokee Indians that he was
forwarding to Knox.67 And, a little over one month later, Washington asked the Board of Treasury, the Acting Postmaster General,
and the Acting Secretaries of War and Foreign Affairs to prepare a
written report that would provide him with "an acquaintance with
the real situation of the several great Departments" and a "full,
precise, and distinct general idea of the affairs of the United
States" connected with their particular departments." As James
Hart has noted, these letters were notable for "the clear conception
he had of the presidential function of over-all administrative man' 69
agement.
After the great Cabinet Departments had been created, and after
the initial Cabinet Secretaries had been appointed, Washington
continued to exercise close supervision over the affairs of the executive branch. Again and again, he involved himself with the day-

65. Letter from George Washington to Elenor Francois Elie, Comte de Moustier (May
25, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 333, 334,
quoted in WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 27, and Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 3, at 637.
.66. WHrrE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 27.
67. See Letter from George Washington to the Acting Secretary of War (May 9,
1789), in 30 THE WRmNGS OF GEORGE WASHNGTON, supra note 59, at 313, 313, cited
in HART, supra note 53, at 134.
68. Letter from George Washington. to the Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs (June
8, 1789), in 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 343, 344; id. at
344 n.30 (editor noting that similar letters were sent to the Acting Secretary of War, the
Board of the Treasury, and the Acting Postmaster General); see also HART, supra note
53, at 135; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 637 & n.425, 651 n.503.
69. HART, supra note 53, at 135.
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to-day affairs of the various Cabinet Departments. Leonard White
notes that "contacts between the President and his department
heads were close and unremitting" and they included "hundreds of
written communications and records of oral consultation."7' He
describes Washington's contacts as including: the "approval of
plans or actions which had been submitted to him in writing," the
conveying of "directions concerning administrative operations," the
making of requests to his department heads (including Treasury
Secretary Alexander Hamilton) for "opinions on the constitutionality of acts of Congress," and the making of requests for his Secretaries "opinions on policy questions, foreign and domestic alike."7 '
Washington also reviewed all correspondence prepared by cabinet
officials.' "By this means," Jefferson noted, Washington was "always in accurate possession of all facts and proceedings in every
part of the Union, and to whatsoever department they related; he
formed a central point for the different branches; [and] preserved a
unity of object and action among them."'73
In fact, Washington was ever watchful for exercises of executive power outside his direct supervision. When a private citizen
named Rosencrantz participated in certain treaty negotiations,
Washington sharply inquired:
Who is Mr. Rosencrantz? And under what authority has he
attended the councils of the Indians at Buffalo Creek?
Subordinate interferences must be absolutely interdicted, or
counteraction of the measure of Governm[en]t, perplexity
and confusion will inevitably ensue. No person should
presume to speak to the Indians on business of a public
nature except those who derive their Authority and receive
their instructions from the War Office for that purpose.74
70. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 32.
71. Id. at 32-33; see also id. at 106-07; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 638 &
nn.427-428.
72. On June 4, 1789, Washington began to read and make abstracts of correspondence
between Jefferson, who was then serving as Minister to France, and Secretary for Foreign
Affairs John Jay, in the process "beginning a practice which Washington continued, more
or less throughout his presidency." 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra

note 59, at 343 n.29 (editorial note), quoted in HART, supra note 53, at 135; see also
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HAitv. L. REv. 1075, 1075 (1986); Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and
12,498, supra note 3, at 485.
73. MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 226 (quoting Memorandum
from Jefferson to the Heads of Departments (Nov. 6 1801)).
74. Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of War (Aug. 15, 1792), in 32
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Washington deployed many tools in his never-ending quest to
administer the Executive Branch of the Government in an orderly
fashion. One of the tools plainly and willingly employed was the
removal power. Washington exercised his removal power vigorously in at least seventeen civil cases, as well as removing six military officers.7' Leonard White notes that it is difficult to determine the number of removals, especially since there are no records
with respect to inferior officers, but it is clear that Washington
removed "three foreign ministers, Monroe, Carmichael, and Thomas
Pinckney (at his request)" as well as "two consuls, eight collectors,
and four surveyors of internal revenue."76 In addition, Secretary of
State Edmund Randolph's resignation under charges of misconduct
"was in effect a removal."7
Thus, Washington clearly conducted his administration in a
manner that realized the unitary vision of the executive branch. As
White so aptly observes:
All major decisions in matters of administration and many
minor ones were made by the President. No department
head, not even Hamilton, settled any matter of importance
without consulting the President and securing his approval.
All of them referred to the President numerous matters of
detail as well as large and many small issues of administrative policy .... Washington accepted full responsibility as
a matter of course, and throughout the eight years of his
service there is no indication of a tendency to consider
department heads other than dependent agencies of the
Chief Executive.7
Other historians concur with White's assessment. Rexford Tugwell
notes Washington firmly rendered the department heads "his subordinates and separated them from the Congress."79' Tugwell further

THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 115,
PHELPS, supra note 58, at 146, and WHITE, supra note 60, at 33.
75. See WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 285.

116-17, quoted in

76. Id.
77. Id. at 288; see also id. at 170-72; PAuL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CIVIL SERVICE 19 (1958) (citing CARL R. FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE
PATRONAGE 13 (1905)).
78. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 27 (emphasis added).
79. REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE PRESIDENCY 43 (1960), quoted
in Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 3, at 485 n.8 (1988).
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notes that Washington's principle of administration was "that the
Executive Branch of the government was one whole to be managed
by the President alone,"" ° and that presidential control over law
execution was to "remain the rule until . . . Andrew Johnson's
Presidency, when the Congress would assert its superiority by
seizing the removal power it had allowed Washington to exercise
without protest."8' Finally, Glenn Phelps concludes that
"Washington's presidency reflected [a] concern for administrative
centralization. There would be no divided responsibility or ambiguity as to who was the chief executive." 2
This is not to say that Washington did not place a great deal
of trust in his advisers. As James Hart observes, "As an administrator Washington made the final decisions, but only after exercising his best judgment in the light of the views of advisors."83
Whenever possible, Washington paid due respect to the prerogatives of his subordinates and avoided interfering with the details of
how each department head managed his responsibilities.84 For example, when a representative of the French government asked to
meet with Washington directly, Washington demurred, countering
that as a matter of policy governments function best when such
contacts were channeled through the appropriate department
head. Thus, as Glenn Phelps points out:
[Washington's trust in his advisers was] perfectly consistent
with his own long-held notions of administrative centralism.
No matter how much discretion he chose to delegate to his
subordinates Washington always held the reins of responsibility very tightly. Although he remained aloof from the
details of government operations he insisted that his department heads inform him of every aspect of their daily activities, especially with regard to how their actions might
affect his own authority.86

80. TUGWELL, supra note 79, at 134-35.

81. Id. at 43.
82. PHm's, supra note 58, at 145, quoted in Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at
638.
83. HART, supra note 53, at 134; see also WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60,
at 27 n.4 ("Washington . . . took full advantage of [the department heads'] counsel and
was deferential to their views.").
84. See WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 30-31.
85. See Letter from George Washington to Eleonor Francois Elie, Comte de Moustier,
supra note 59, at 334, cited in WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 31.
86. PHELPS, supra note 58, at 146; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at
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Notwithstanding Washington's clear assertion of control over
the entire executive branch, some scholars have persisted in pointing to certain congressional actions that they suggest constitute
deviations from the unitary executive. First, these scholars claim
that in establishing the Treasury Department and the Post Office,
Congress failed to designate them as "executive" departments. 7
With regard to the Treasury Department, these scholars also point
out that the statute failed to include a provision explicitly providing
that the Treasury Secretary "shall conduct the business of the...
department in such manner as the President of the United States
shall from time to time order or instruct,""t required that the Treasury Secretary submit reports directly to Congress, 9 and required
that appropriations warrants be signed by the Secretary and countersigned by the Comptroller.' Together, these factors cause some
to believe that the Treasury Department and the Post Office as
originally constituted were inconsistent with a unitary executive
branch.9
Whether Congress regarded the differences in the statutes creating the Departments of Foreign Affairs, War, and the Treasury as
being significant is far from clear.' However, it is crystal clear

638.
87. Compare An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 65,
65 (1789), and An Act for the Temporary Establishment of the Post-Office, ch. 16, sec.
1, 1 Stat. 70, 70 (1789) with An Act for Establishing an Executive Department, to be
demoninated the Department of Foreign Affairs, ch. 4, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 28, 28-29 (1789)
and An Act to Establish an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of
War, ch. 7, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 49, 49-50 (1789).
88. Cf sec. 1, 1 Stat. at 29; sec. 1, 1 Stat. at 50.
89. Sec. 2, 1 Stat. at 66.
90. See. 4, 1 Stat. at 66.
91. This thesis was first laid out over 50 years ago, and has periodically resurfaced
ever since. See Casper, Early Practices, supra note 8, at 240-42; Ledewitz, supra note 21,
at 792-93; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 27-30, 71-72; Peter Shane, Independent
Policymaking and PresidentialPower: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
596, 615-16 (1989); Tiefer, supra note 21, at 70-76.
92. The significance of Congress's failure to refer to Treasury as an "executive" department is belied by the fact that nine days after creating that department, Congress
passed the Salary Act, which established for "the Executive Officers of Government,"
including both the Secretary and the Comptroller of the Treasury. Act of Sept. 11, 1789,
ch. 13, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 67, 67; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3 at 648.
It is also far from clear that the absence of a specific provision authorizing presidential direction of the Treasury Secretary supports any negatively-implied limits on presidential control. Such silence is more properly viewed as ambiguous, Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 3, particularly in light of the fact that Washington did not hesitate to issue
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that Washington must have regarded the differences in statutory
language as inconsequential because he asserted firm control over
the Treasury Department throughout his Presidency. As noted earlier, Washington included the Board of Treasury along with the
other extant carry-over departments when requesting information
shortly after assuming office. Washington also advised Hamilton
extensively on the structure of the Treasury Department, suggesting
which positions should be established and how much the compensation for those positions should be.93
Washington effectively placed the Treasury Department under
his firm control when he nominated Alexander Hamilton to be the
first Secretary of the Treasury. Hamilton was one of the strongest
defenders of executive power, energy, and unity during the founding era.94 Equally importantly, Hamilton was personally very loyal
to Washington having served as his aide during the Revolutionary
War.' So deep was Washington's faith in Hamilton's loyalty that
Washington was later to insist during the Adams Administration
that he would only agree to serve as Commander-in-Chief of a
reactivated army if Hamilton was his second in command. After a
lengthy stalemate with Adams, who resented Hamilton as a rival,
the second president gave in and agreed to let Washington have his
most loyal and preferred aide in the number two military spot. In
sum, as a practical matter, Washington's selection of Hamilton as
the first head of the Treasury Department rendered nugatory any
independence the Treasury Department might have had. As Leonard
White notes, Hamilton's "loyal acceptance of Washington's primacy and his theoretical view of the status of a department head
precluded any attempt on his part" to assert policies independent of
Washington.' Thus, although Hamilton undoubtedly did have a

"orders" to Hamilton that Hamilton unhesitatingly followed. See id. at 651.
Finally, the fact that the Comptroller had to countersign warrants for money did not
necessarily imply independence from the Treasury Secretary and certainly did not necessarily imply independence from the President. See id. at 654 n.521.
93. Letter from George Washington to the Secretary of the Treasury (Mar. 15, 1791),
in 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 233, 234-49; see also
WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 33; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at
651 n.503.
94. See WHrrE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 89-92.
95. See RICHARD BROOKHISER, FOUNDING FATHER: REDISCOVERING GEORGE WASHING-

TON 165-66 (1996).
96. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 29; see also id. at 27. Other historians concur. See, e.g, FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 65
(1974) [hereinafter MCDONALD, PRESIDENCY OF WASHINGTON] ("In administrative matters
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direct influence on early fiscal legislation,' as Glenn Phelps
notes, "If [Washington] chose not to rein in Hamilton ... it was
because Hamilton's plans for the federal government conformed
perfectly well with his own," ' and not because the Treasury Secretary was in any way independent of the President.
It is also far from clear that Congress's failure to denominate
the Post Office as an "executive" department is in any way significant. As David Currie notes, the initial organic statute of the Post
Office was a hurriedly-created temporary measure." Moreover,
that statute explicitly made the Postmaster "subject to the direction
of the President."'" And more importantly for the purposes of
this Article, regardless of what Congress thought, Washington
never doubted that he possessed the authority to control the Post
Office. Within the opening months of his administration, after
inspecting the report he had requested from the Post Office, Washington further requested that the Acting Postmaster General send
him "in detail, the receipts and expenditures of the Post Office" for
1784 and 1788 so that Washington could "know the causes of the
decrease of the income" that had taken place during that time.''
Two weeks later, Washington wrote again, indicating that "there
still remains one point on which I would wish to have further
information": whether the annual profit of $39,985 "has been
lodged in the Treasury of the United States, or appropriated to the
use of the Post Office Department."'1 "a Washington also reviewed
contracts that the Postmaster General had negotiated regarding the
carriage of the mail, on one occasion "tak[ing] the matter into
consideration" and promising to let the Postmaster General know
"his determination upon it" at a later time. 3 And any remaining
that were clearly executive [such as] the short-range borrowing and disbursal of
funds . . . Hamilton continued to report directly as a subordinate and to act only upon
orders from [Washington].").
97. See Casper, Early Practices, supra note 8, at 241; Currie, First Congress and
Structure, supra note 53, at 190 n.196.
98. PHELPS, supra note 58, at 146.
99. See Currie, First Congress and Structure, supra note 53, at 203.
100. Act Establishing the Post Office, sec. I, I Stat. at 70, cited in Currie, First Congress and Structure, supra note 53, at 203.
101. Letter from George Washington to the Acting Postmaster General (July 3, 1789), in
30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 352, 352-53, quoted in
HART, supra note 53, at 136, and Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 657.
102. Letter from George Washington to the Acting Postmaster General (July 17, 1789),
in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59. at 356, 356, quoted in
HART. supra note 53, at 136.
103. Letter from George Washington to the Postmaster General (Aug. 29, 1791), in 31
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doubts about the extent of the control that Washington exerted over
the Post Office were eliminated when he transferred the Post Office into the Treasury Department in 1791, and subsequently declined in 1792 to support removing the Post Office into the State
Department.' °" Thus, Washington plainly asserted the power to
direct the officers of all the executive departments, including the
Treasury Department and the Post Office.
Still other scholars have pointed out that the First Congress did
not centralize the authority to control the U.S. Attorneys under any
single subordinate executive official, and that state officials were
empowered by the early statutes to conduct federal prosecutions as
well. They go on to suggest that the absence of a single, subordinate executive officer with authority to control federal litigation is
inconsistent with the unitary theory of the executive.'
This position too fails to find any support in the practices of
the Washington Administration, since Washington clearly believed
that he had plenary authority to control all federal prosecutions. On
several occasions, even though Congress had not yet at that time
centralized control of federal prosecutions under any particular
subordinate executive official,"° Washington directed various federal district attorneys in the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion. Thus, Washington wrote the United States Attorney for the
Pennsylvania District saying that he thought two individuals recently indicted for riot were innocent and that he "therefore thought fit
to instruct you forth with to enter a Nolle prose qui on the indictment aforesaid: and for so doing let this be filed as your warrant."'0 7 Washington also "[d]irected the Att[orne]y Gen[era]l [] to
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 348, 348 (emphasis added).
104. See id. in 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 349,
cited in WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 30-31; see also Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 3, at 657 & n.535.
105. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989) [hereinafter Krent, Executive Control]; Krent, Fragmenting, supra note 13; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 15-20;
Tiefer, supra note 21, at 74-75.
106. See WHrrE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 166-68; Bloch, supra note 16, at
567; Krent, Executive Control, supra note 105, at 286-87; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note
6, at 16-17; Tiefer, supra note 21, at 74-75; James R. Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Government Litigation: Department of Justice Representation of Agency Clients, 37 Wm. &
MARY. L. REV. 1569, 1578 (1996). Washington did present Attorney General Edmund
Randolph's request for supervisory authority over the district attorneys to Congress, but
the Senate rejected this proposal. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 167; Bloch,
supra note 16, at 585-88; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 658 n.542; Harvey, supra, at 1578 n.52.
107. Letter from George Washington to William Rawle (Mar. 13, 1793), in 32 WRIT-
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instruct the District Attornies to require from the Collectors of the
several Ports, within them, information of all infractions of neutrality that may come within their purview at the different ports, requiring the interposition of Government, particularly as to building
and equipping Vessels for War." ' Asking that a subordinate officer be given control over all federal litigation in no way suggested that the President lacked the authority to control all prosecutions
even if no such subordinate officer were given such powers."
Washington also sought help subject to presidential guidance
and direction from state as well as federal officials in their enforcement of federal law during the Whiskey Rebellion. u ° At first
relying on his powers of suasion, Washington invoked his duties
under the Take Care Clause in asking state courts and executives
to use their weight and influence to bring the rebels to justice."'
More specifically:
[Washington] charge[d] and require[d] all Courts, Magistrates and Officers whom it may concern, according to the
duties of their several offices, to exert the powers in them
respectively vested by law for the purposes aforesaid, hereby also enjoining and requiring all persons whomsoever, as
they tender the welfare of their country, the just and due
authority of government and the preservation of the public
peace, to be aiding and assisting therein according to
12
law."
When these efforts failed, Washington assumed command of
the state militias even though those troops nominally fell under the
jurisdiction of the states." 3 As Glenn Phelps notes, "[O]nce mobi-

INGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 386, 386 (emphasis added).
108. Journal of the Proceedings of the President (May 10, 1793), in 32 WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 455 n.35 (emphasis added). Both the Attorney
General and the Secretary of State entered numerous other requests for specific actions
with regards to prosecutions. See WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 407-08 &
n.10.
109. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 659 & n.547.
110. For a comprehensive discussion of the Framers' views on the President's ability to
direct state officials' execution of federal law, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office
Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1990-2006 (1993).
111. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 641 (citing PHELPS, supra note 58, at
131-32).
112. Proclamation by George Washington, September 15, 1792, 32 WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 150-51 (emphasis added).
113. See MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 240.
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lized, the state militias ceased to be under the jurisdiction of the
governors. Organized as state units they were nonetheless the
President's men exclusively."" 4 Washington also dramatically
intervened in the law enforcement process by making stunning and
wise use of the Pardon Power to pardon many of those involved in
the Whiskey Rebellion." 5 This set a precedent for an important
practice that has subsequently grown of post wartime presidential
pardons following such conflicts as the Civil War, the two World
Wars, Vietnam, and the Cold War. Washington's pardon in this
instance was a direct and highly personal intervention in the law
enforcement process that was designed to heal and restore social
peace. It too suggests a direct personal role in law enforcement
issues for the First President.
Washington's willingness to seek help subject to presidential
guidance and direction from state as well as federal officials was
illustrated again when Citizen Genet approached various American
citizens in an attempt to organize support for France's war with
Britain in direct violation of the Neutrality Proclamation. This time
Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin, an old political rival of
Washington's, followed Washington's request and assisted the
federal government in enforcing the Neutrality Proclamation without questioning Washington's authority to guide a state governor's
execution of federal law." 6 Washington issued similar requests for
help subject to his guidance from other governors as well.'
Phelps concludes that together these events underscore the
President's control over all officers-both state and federal-who
enforce federal laws: "Where enforcement of the laws of the federal government was concerned, Washington firmly believed that
governors were constitutionally subordinate to the president.""' 8
Washington viewed his duty to "see that the laws be faithfully
executed" as a personal responsibility that could not be delegated.

114. PHELPS, supra note 58, at 133.
115. See George Washington, Proclamation of 10 July 1795, reprinted in 4 KURLAND &
LERNER, supra note 55, at 20.
116. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 640-41 (citing PHELPS, supra note 58, at
129).
117. See id. at 641 n.442 (citing McDONALD, PRESIDENCY OF WASHINGTON, supra note
96, at 127). Thus, contrary to Lessig and Sunstein's assertions, enforcement of federal
laws by state officials during the early years of the Republic was not inconsistent with
the unitary executive. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 18-20; see also Krent,
Executive Control, supra note 105, at 303-09.
118. PHELPS, supra note 58, at 132.
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As Phelps so aptly observes, "[Riesponsibility under the Constitution for actions of the chief executive was not collective; it was his
alone. This also meant that the obligations of citizens and state
officials under the laws of the Constitution were also due to him
alone."' 19
The Neutrality Proclamation also gave rise to the first full
public defense of the theoretical and constitutional underpinnings of
presidential power. Alexander Hamilton's Pacificus letters, published to rally public support for the Neutrality Proclamation, publicly set out a sophisticated textual argument for presidential power
in the foreign policy context and over removals. Hamilton's principal thesis was that "[tihe general doctrine of our Constitution...
is, that the executive power of the nation is vested in the President;
subject only to the exceptions and qualifications which are expressed in the instrument.""' Hamilton observed that "[t]he second article of the Constitution of the United States, section first,
establishes this general proposition, that 'the EXECUTIVE POWER
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.'
[Article II, section 2] proceeds to delineate particular cases of
executive power."'' Hamilton reasoned:
It would not consist with the rules of sound construction,
to consider this enumeration of particular authorities as
derogating from the more comprehensive grant in the general clause, further than as it may be coupled with express
restrictions or limitations; as in regard to the co-operation
of the Senate in the appointment of officers and the making of treaties; which are plainly qualifications of the general executive powers of appointing officers and making
treaties."
Accordingly, subject only to "these exceptions, the executive power
''
of the United States is completely lodged in the President. 123
Hamilton bolstered this conclusion by comparing the Vesting
Clauses of Articles I and II:

119. Id. at 133.
120. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 432, 439 (Henry C. Lodge ed., 1971) (emphasis in original).
121. Id. at 437-38.
122. Id. at 438. Hamilton also noted that the Constitution established an additional express restriction on executive power when it provided for "the right of the Legislature 'to
declare war, and grant letters of marque and reprisal."' Id. at 439.
123. Id.
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The different mode of expression employed in the Constitution, in regard to the two powers, the legislative and the
executive, serves to confirm this inference. In the article
which gives the legislative powers of the government, the
expressions are: "All legislative powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States." In that
which grants the executive power, the expressions are: "The
executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Unit124
ed States.'
Given the Article I Vesting Clause's specific limitation of congressional powers to those "herein granted" and given the absence of a
similar limitation in the Executive Power Clause, Hamilton concluded that "[t]he enumeration [of Article II] ought therefore to be
considered as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of executive power; leaving the rest to flow
from the general grant of that power." This construction of the
Executive Power Clause was made all the more authoritative since
"[tihis mode of construing the Constitution has indeed been recognized by Congress in formal acts upon full consideration and debate; of which the power of removal from office is an important
instance.""
That Hamilton would write such a powerful defense of the
constitutional construction that underlies the theory of the unitary
executive and of presidential removal power is especially telling.
Although Hamilton had embraced the vision of a powerful, unitary
executive in several of The Federalist Papers,"as in The Federal-

124. Id. at 438.
125. Id. at 439 (emphasis added). See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT
209, 472 n.31 (5th ed., Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 1984) [hereinafter CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT (1984 ed.); Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT 16-17, 58 (3d ed. rev., 1991) [hereinafter FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFLICTS]; Louis FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 32-33 (1972) [hereinafter FISHER,
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS];

1 WILLIAM M.

GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL

POWER 178-82, 397-404 (1974); RICHARD LOSS, THE MODERN THEORY OF PRESIDENTIAL

POWER 17-18 (1990).
126. In The Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton argued that unity was the first ingredient of "Energy in the Executive," which Hamilton termed "a leading character in the
definition of good government" and "one of the best distinguishing features of our constitution." Plurality in the executive, on the other hand, "tend[ed] to conceal faults and
destroy responsibility." THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471, 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 11, at
37-47; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 614. Furthermore, in The Federalist No. 72,
Hamilton further indicated that all executive officers "ought to be subject to [presidential]

1488

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1451

ist No. 77, he had also clearly suggested that "[i]t has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the cooperation of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would
contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that
body would be necessary to displace as well as appoint."'" It appears that by the time Hamilton wrote his Pacificus letters, he had
completely disavowed the views expressed in The Federalist No.
77 and had fully embraced both presidential removal power and
implicitly a power to control all exercises of law execution as well.I"
Madison responded to Hamilton in letters written under the
pseudonym Helvidius,29 and he decried Hamilton's construction
of the foreign policy powers conferred by the Executive Power
Clause as being "no less vicious in theory than it would be dangerous in practice." In Madison's eyes, the only possible source of
Hamilton's broad definition of executive power in the foreign policy context was the "royal prerogatives in the British government,
[which] are accordingly treated as executive prerogatives by British
Commentators."' 30 To draw on such an antidemocratic source to

superintendence." THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 643 n.454.
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 496-97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward M. Earle ed.,
1976); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 597 n.215, 643 n.454; EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1927), reprinted
in I CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 317, 339-40 (Richard Loss ed., 1981) [hereinafter
CORWIN, PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL POWER]; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note
125, at 53; 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 181.
128. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Hamilton himself regarded the
Pacificus letters as the better reasoned statement of his views on the Constitution. See
Richard Loss, Corwin on Alexander Hamilton and the President's Removal Power, in 1
CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 131, at 373, 374-77 [hereinafter Loss, Corwin
on Hamilton]; Douglass Adair, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers, 3 WM.
& MARY Q. 97, 235 (1944), in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 27, 73 (Trevor
Colboum ed., 1974).
129. Apparently, the Helvidius letters were prompted by Thomas Jefferson who, while
generally happy with the Neutrality Proclamation, was disturbed by the implications of
Hamilton's rhetoric. Jefferson entreated upon Madison, "Nobody answers him, his doctrines
will therefore be taken for confessed. For God's sake, my dear Sir, take up your pen,
select the most striking heresies and cut him to pieces in the face of the public." Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 7, 1793), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 338, 338 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895). Madison acceded with considerable
reluctance: "As I intimated in my last, I have forced myself into the task of a reply. I
can truly say I find it the most grating one I ever experienced." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 30, 1793), in 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 588, 588 (J.B. Lippincot ed., 1865).
130. James Madison, Helvidius, in I LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 129, at 152 (emphasis deleted).
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define the scope of executive power over foreign policy in a democratic society was to him unthinkable.' In making this argument,
Madison was hampered by his own statements offered during the
Decision of 1789, in which he had argued, as did the Pacificus
letters, that the Executive Power Clause granted all executive power to the President and that any derogation from that grant should
be strictly construed.'32 Moreover, Madison was throughout his
career a staunch defender of constitutionally vested presidential
removal power.'33 In any event, Madison's protestations had little
impact, as most historians have generally agreed that Hamilton's
views on the scope of executive power have prevailed.'34
When viewed in their totality, Washington's statements and
administrative practice strongly support the view that the President
is responsible for execution of all federal law and thus may superintend all those authorized to execute it, removing those who do
not do so to his satisfaction.'35 That Washington emerged as such

131. See generally CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT (1984 ed.), supra note 125, at 210, 472
n.33; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 125, at 17; FISHER, PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS, supra note 125, at 33; 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 404; RALPH
KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON 345-46 (1971); Loss, Corwin on Hamilton, supra note 128, at
20-21. For a modem discussion, see Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 11,
at 30-31; Calabresi, Power Grants, supra note 3, at 1392-93; Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 3, at 583-84.
132. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 479-82, 499, 518 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789); see also Loss,
Co-win on Hamilton, supra note 128, at 21. Madison's attempt to distinguish these positions was less than successful, being, in the words of Edward Corwin, "more adroit than
convincing." CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT (1984 ed.), supra note 125, at 210.
133. The only exception is one brief statement made by Madison on one day about the
Treasury Department bill which was later withdrawn. Otherwise, Madison staunchly defended this view from 1789 until the waning days of his life.
134. Richard Loss has noted that such eminent scholars as Henry Cabot Lodge and
Hans Morgenthau have agreed that Hamilton's arguments have prevailed. See Loss, supra
note 125, at 23 & nn.147-51 (citing Lodge's statement in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 120, at 489 n.1; LOUIS HACKER, ALExANDER HAMILTON IN THE
AMERICAN TRADITION 198 (1957); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL
INTEREST 14 (1951); HENRY J. FORD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 288 (1920); FREDERICK
OLIVER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 335 (1927); and KETCHAM, supra note 131, at 346-47));
see also 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 404. For a prQ-Madison evaluation, see 3
IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITnTON 379 (1950).
135. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 662. There was one development during
the Washington Administration that arguably suggested that Washington did not invariably
adhere to the unitary theory of the executive. Although Congress firmly rebuffed James
Madison's proposal that the Comptroller of the Treasury be given a fixed tenure of office,
Congress did approve statutes requiring that the Comptroller countersign warrants drawn
by the Secretary, see Act of SepL 2, 1789, ch. 12, sec. 3, 1 Stat. 66, 66, and providing
that the Comptroller's decisions would be "final and conclusive," Act of March 3, 1795,
ch. 48, sec. 4, 1 Stat. 441, 442. Certain scholars have reasoned that these provisions
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a strong advocate of executive unitariness is quite telling. It is
often observed that the American presidency was created in George
Washington's image since all of the Founders knew that he was
almost certain to be the first occupant of the new chief executive
office.'36 Nor were the potential constitutional implications of the
precedents set lost on Washington. He explicitly cautioned his
advisers that "[m]any things which appear of little importance in
themselves and at the beginning, may have great and durable consequences from their having been established at the commencement
of a new general government."'37 Washington similarly wrote to
Madison, "As the first of every thing, in our situation will serve to
establish a Precedent, it is devoutly wished on my part, that these
precedents may be fixed on true principles."'3 Thuis Washington
was well aware of his unique position in this regard and his adoption of a unitary executive structure was the result of his best
constitutional judgment.
B. John Adams
President John Adams was strongly committed to the theory of
the unitary executive, and, as President, he continued Washington's
practice of asserting complete control over the execution of federal
law. Leonard White describes Adams as being "an uncompromising
friend of the executive, on theoretical as well as practical

deprived the President of the authority to direct the Comptroller's execution of the law
and thus are inconsistent with the unitary theory of the executive branch. See Tiefer,
supra note 21, at 73-74; Bloch, supra note 16, at 578 n.55; Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 6, at 27; Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 654-55 & n.155.
Professor Calabresi and Sai Prakash have already addressed the flaws in this argument. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 653-54 & n.521. And in any event, the
mere fact that Washington may have failed to object to two isolated deviations from the
unitary executive theory does not constitute the degree of acquiescence needed to resolve
the issue under the methodology of coordinate construction advanced by this Article.
136. This may generally be a phenomenon of presidential regimes. The presidency of
the French Fifth Republic was, of course, created for Charles DeGaulle, the first occupant
of that office. Similarly, the presidency of the Russian Federation was created by and for
Boris Yeltsin, the current and only occupant of that office.
137. Queries on a line of conduct to be pursued by the President (May 10, 1789), in
30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 319, 321, quoted in
PHELPS, supra note 58, at 122.
138. Casper, Early Practices, supra note 8, at 225 (quoting Letter-from George Washington to James Madison (May 5, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 131,
132 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979)); see also PETER M. SHANE &
HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 14-15 (1996).
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grounds."'39 Thus, White notes that Adams wrote to Jefferson in
the summer of 1789:
[I would] have given more power to the President, and less
to the senate. The nomination and appointment to all offices, I would have given to the President, assisted only by a
privy council of his own creation; but not a vote or voice
would I have given to the senate or any senator unless he
were of the privy council."4
Adams expanded on these views in a lengthy letter to Roger Sherman in which he adamantly expressed the view that for seven
reasons it had been a mistake even to give the Senate a role in
advising on and consenting to presidential appointments. 4' Adams
gravely predicted that a role for the Senate in confirmations would
"destroy the present form of government" and could even raise the
"danger of dividing the continent into two or three nations, a case
that presents no prospect but of perpetual war."'42 There is little
question, then, that by 1789 Adams was a stalwart defender of
greatly enhanced executive power who believed the Constitution
gave the President too little power, not too much.
During his tenure as George Washington's Vice President, and
as the very first Vice President of the United States, John Adams
had an early opportunity to play a critical role in the unitary executive debate. The key moment came when Adams cast a vital tiebreaking vote in the Senate thus participating directly in affecting
the outcome of the famous Decision of 1789."43 As James Hart
recounts:
"[A] number" of senators who had favored presidential
removal of the other Secretaries were at first against his
removal of the Secretary of the Treasury. When the House
adhered to its position, however, the vote of the Senate to
recede was a tie of 10 to 10, which the Vice President
broke in favor of presidential power.'"

139. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 92.
140. Id. at 93 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (July 18, 1789),
in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 430-31
(Charles Francis Adams ed., 1969).
141. See Letter from John Adams to Roger Sherman (July 20, 1789), in 6 THE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 432-36, reprinted in 4 KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 140, at 106-08.
142. Id. at 107.
143. See HART, supra note 53, at 217 & n.279.
144. HART, supra note 53, at 217-18; see also MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY,
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John Adams's tie-breaking vote helped resolve a critical disagreement between the Senate and the House, and it made clear the
recognition of the First Congress that the Constitution places the
Treasury Department, like the Departments of Foreign Affairs and
of War, under direct presidential control with a full presidential
power of removal. 4
As President, Adams continued to adhere to and act upon these
views. In a letter to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, written
during the first year of his administration, Adams criticized the
plural executive directory then in place in France, which he
thought could easily lead to a civil war. Adams observed:
The worst evil that can happen in any government is a
divided executive; and, as a plural executive must, from the
nature of men, be forever divided, this is a demonstration
that a plural executive is a great evil, and incompatible
with liberty. That emulation in the human heart, which
produces rivalries of men, cities, and nations, which produces almost all the good in human life, produces, also,
almost all the evil. This is my philosophy of government. 146
Thus, it comes as little surprise that, as Leonard White reports,
"John Adams held the same general view of the position of department heads as Washington"'47 and, as President, continued Washington's practice of asserting complete control over the execution
of federal law. When Adams and the Cabinet disagreed over major
issues of federal policy, it was Adams who generally prevailed."
Adams also sharply criticized a provision of the Stamp Tax that
arguably could have been construed to render the Treasury Secretary somewhat independent of presidential control. Although the

supra note 20, at 221 (citing The Diary of William Maclay and Other Notes on Senate
Debates in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (Kenneth R. *Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds. 1988)).
145. This was later confirmed again in the Salary Act, which established salaries for the
executive officers of the government including the Secretary of the Treasury. See Act of
Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 67
146. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 29 (quoting Letter from John Adams
to Timothy Pickering (Oct. 31, 1797), in 8 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note
140, at 559, 560).
147. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 29.
148. See Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 3, at 486 n.11.
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federal government's acute need for revenue in the end led Adams
to approve the bill, Adams complained:
[T]he office of the secretary of the treasury is, in that bill,
premeditatedly set up as a rival to that of the President;
and that policy will be pursued, if we are not on our
guard, till we have a quintuple or a centuple executive
directory, with all the Babylonish dialect which modem
pedants most affect.'49
Adams also followed Washington's precedent of using military
force for law enforcement purposes to subdue the so-called Fries
Rebellion in eastern Pennsylvania. After Fries was sentenced to
death, Adams intervened again in the law enforcement process,
using his pardon power to pardon both Fries and his accomplices. 5 Clearly, in practice as well as in theory, John Adams
deserves to be counted as being squarely within the pro-unitary
executive camp.
Furthermore, although Adams used the removal power sparingly, he did not hesitate to use it to maintain his control of the executive branch. Leonard White observes that Adams removed twentyone civil officers (counting two who were not reappointed) and six
army officers: among these were the Secretary of State, Timothy
Pickering, one minister and four consular officers, one marshall,
seven collectors, five surveyors, one supervisor, and one commissioner of court.'' Although removals were rare and were usually
for poor performance in office, Adams did depart from Washington's practice by making "a few changes [in personnel] in which
party differences played a part."'52 White persuasively describes
Adams's removals of Joseph Whipple, collector at Portsmouth, and
William Gardner, commissioner of loans for New Hampshire, as
being in this category, along with his removal of Tench Coxe, who

149. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 30 (quoting Letter from John Adams
to Oliver Wolcott, Jr. (Oct. 20, 1797), in 8 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note
140, at 554, 555).
150. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 422-23.
151. See id. at 285; see also VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 21. Adams also removed
James McHenry as Secretary of War. David F. Forte, Marbury's Travail: FederalistPolitics and William Marbury's Appointment as Justice of the Peace, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
349, 393 (1996); Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 3, at 485.
152. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 287.
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was discharged as Commissioner of Revenue for shifting his political allegiance from Hamilton to Jefferson." 3
Perhaps the best example of Adams's domination of his administration is his struggle with Secretary of State Pickering. A member of Alexander Hamilton's rival faction of the Federalist party,
Pickering disagreed with Adams over one of the most important
matters of public policy facing the new republic: the nation's relations with France. Pickering also provoked Adams's personal ire by
supporting Hamilton's bid to become second-in-command of the
army (after George Washington) and by galvanizing the opposition
to the nomination of Adams's son-in-law as adjutant general.' 54
After Pickering refused Adams's invitation to resign, Adams summarily removed him, flatly stating that "[d]ivers [sic] causes and
considerations, essential to the administration of the government,
[sic] in my judgment, requir[e] a change in the department of
State."'5 5 In sum, Adams used his removal powers more often
than Washington did, and he was the first President to remove an
official for political reasons. In so doing, as one historian has
noted, Adams "completed the demonstration of his supremacy in
Executive affairs."' 56
By the end of the Adams Administration the first twelve critically important years of unbroken presidential practice had firmly
established a strongly unitary vision of presidential power over law
execution. As Leonard White concludes:
When the Federalists turned over the government to Jefferson in 1801 they left behind them a clear and consistent
pattern of executive relationships. They fully accepted the
statement of the Constitution that the executive power was
vested in the President. Their representatives in the legislative branch wrote this theory into the statutes conferring
administrative authority. Their members in the Executive
branch put into practice what the Constitution and law

153. See id. at 287-89.
154. See id. at 243-52.
155. See id. at 252; see also ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
COMMISSIONS 466 (1941); 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

802 n.3 (1938). Pickering later acknowledged that he expected that his opposition to the
nomination of Adams's son-in-law would lead to his own removal. See WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 251.
156.

MARY BURKE

HINSDALE,

A

HISTORY OF THE

PRESIDENT'S CABINET 35 (1911),

quoted in Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 3, at 485-86.

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE

1495

enjoined. Washington made the decisions of executive
policy, but on the basis of regular conference with department heads. The rise of the Cabinet as an organ of consultation and advice did not obscure the single responsibility
of the President or the subordinate position of Cabinet
members. Even after the Federalists had split into factions
during Adams' administration, the leading figures on both
sides agreed in maintaining the unity of executive power
and the dominating position of the President. The power to
govern was quietly but certainly taken over by the President. The heads of departments became his assistants. In
the executive branch, according to Federalist orthodoxy, the
President was ,undisputed master.'57
C. Thomas Jefferson
Thomas Jefferson's first reaction to the office of the presidency
as described in the text of the proposed Constitution of 1787 was
the exact opposite of Theodore Lowi's. Where Lowi believes that
we originally had a weak parliamentary executive, Jefferson wrote:
[The newly proposed] President seems a bad edition of a
Polish King. He may be reelected from 4. years to 4. years
for life .... When one or two generations shall have
proved that this is an office for life, it becomes on every
succession worthy of intrigue, of bribery, of force, and
even of foreign interference.' 58
Thus, in 1787, Jefferson shared much of the widespread view of
the Anti-Federalists that the Framers had given the president a
dangerous amount of power. He adhered to this view in the 1790s
when he consistently rejected Hamiltonian and Federalist views of
Executive Power that "smelled of monarchy."'59
Jefferson hated executive tyranny, but he was not opposed to
the very different idea that a unitary and independent executive
structure should be created. Leonard White notes that while the
more extreme Republicans favored making heads of departments
independent of the President, Jefferson, Madison, Albert Gallatin,
and other, more thoughtful members of the Republican party fully

157. WHTrrE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 36-37.
158. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Nov. 13, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 349, 351 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955).
159. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 94, 95-96.
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recognized the need for a strong, unitary executive."6 Jefferson
thus supported the idea of a strong executive branch directly responsible to the President and independent of legislative control.
He opposed what he perceived as an attempt by Alexander Hamilton to insinuate himself into the legislative activities of the House
of Representatives. It was this legislative role of Hamilton's that
triggered Jefferson's ire and cause him to complain in the 1790s
that the executive was exceeding its constitutional limits and intruding upon the prerogatives of the legislature. As Jefferson wrote:
Here then was the real ground of the opposition which was
made to the course of administration. It's object was to
preserve the legislature pure and independant [sic] of the
Executive, [and] to restrain the administration to republican
forms and principles. 6'
Thus, Jefferson's concerns about executive power did not involve
the issue of executive unitariness and autonomy. As he told Washington, "[I]f the equilibrium of the three great bodies Legislative,
Executive, and judiciary could be preserved, if the Legislature
could be kept independant [sic], I should never fear the result of
such a government."' 62 Given the history in England of monarchs
bribing members of parliament to get legislation passed, 63 and
given the special need for George Washington as the Nation's first
President to be a unifying figure, Jefferson's concern about the
impropriety and impoliticness of Hamilton's hyper-aggressive legislative program was understandable. Jefferson's concern is all the
more understandable when we remember that he disagreed vehemently with many of Hamilton's policy views.
Jefferson's support for a strong, independent, unitary executive
was evident when he served as Secretary of State during the Washington Administration. In a written opinion to President Washing-

160. See id. at 95.
161. The Anas (February 4, 1818), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRTINGS 661, 670 (Merrill
D. Peterson ed., 1984), quoted in WHrTE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 95.
162. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 95-96 (quoting 1 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 236 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904)).
163. Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 57, at 1053. The Incompatibility Clause was added
to the Constitution to prevent the President from inducing Members of Congress to vote
for his legislative program by offering to appoint them to high executive and judicial
offices. English monarchs had done precisely this, and their misconduct had left Americans with very bad memories of the corruption they associated with executive monarchs
with a legislative program.
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ton, Secretary of State Jefferson specifically endorsed the notion
that the opening Executive Power Vesting Clause of Article II of
the Constitution conferred a general "grant" of the executive power
on the President of the United States."es Many years later, Jefferson's arch-foe, Alexander Hamilton, observed:
[I]t is not true .. . that [Jefferson] is an enemy to the
power of the Executive, or that he is for confounding all
the powers in the House of Representatives. It is a fact
which I have frequently mentioned, that, while we were in
the administration together, he was generally for a large
construction of the Executive authority and not backward to
act upon it in cases which coincided with his views.'"
Jefferson's conduct as Secretary of State further suggests his
recognition of the need for presidential control of all executive
matters. Even though he disagreed with Washington on a wide
variety of policy matters, Jefferson unfailingly carried all of Washington's policies into effect "as sincerely as if they had been my
own, tho' I ever considered them as inconsistent with the honor
and interest of our country."'" In a letter to William Short, Jefferson observed bluntly that "the nature of our government...
renders it's [sic] heads [i.e., the President and Senate] too responsible to permit them to resign the direction of affairs to those under
them. The public would not be satisfied with that kind of resignation, and be assured it does not exist."' 67 Finally, when Jefferson
concluded that he could no longer serve Washington in good conscience, he resigned. He never considered holding onto office and
acting contrary to Washington's wishes when doing so would fragment the unity of the executive branch."e

164. Opinion on the question whether the Senate has the right to negative the grade of
persons appointed by the Executive to fill Foreign Missions, in 7 The Complete Jefferson
138, 138-39 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943) cited in HART, supra note 53, at 178 n.105.
165. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James A. Bayard (January 16, 1801), in 10
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 120, at 412, 413, quoted in LEONARD
D. WHTE, THE JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADImSTRATIVE HISTORY 1801-1829 31
(1951) [hereinafter WHrrE, THE JEFFERSONIANS].
166. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Sept. 9, 1792), in 24 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 158, at 351, 354 quoted in WHTE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 29.
167. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Sept. 30, 1790), in 17 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 158, at 543-44, quoted in WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 27.
168. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 29.
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Jefferson assumed the presidency on March 4, 1801, and he
soon surprised many supporters and opponents alike with his robust
views about the powers of the office. In fact, however, Jefferson
had never been as opposed to presidential power as many imagined, and he did not join the most extreme members of his party
in their overly timorous view of the executive power. As President,
Jefferson continued to support strong, independent, unitary executive authority. Unlike Washington and Adams, Jefferson insisted on
complete harmony and unanimity in his Cabinet, since "the power
of decision in the President left no object for internal dissension." 69 And, with respect to supervision of law execution decisions by subordinates, Jefferson endorsed and adopted Washington's practice of reviewing the correspondence of his cabinet officials as a means of maintaining unity of action and the President's
responsibility for the affairs of the executive branch. 7" At times,
Jefferson concerned himself with even the most minute and inconsequential matters being addressed by his subordinates. Leonard
White notes:
Thus we find Jefferson instructing Gideon Granger on the
problem of post-road river crossings in the western wilderness. "I would propose that all streams under 40.f width
not fordable at their common winter tide shall be bridged;
& over all streams not bridged, a tree should be laid
across, if their breadth does not exceed the extent of a
single tree." On another occasion he approved an increase
of pay of $150 to an Indian agent. Early in his administration Gallatin authorized an expenditure of $600 to repair a
leaky hospital roof in Norfolk as an emergency matter that
would normally have gone to the President.'
Jefferson also took control of federal prosecutions, directing the
district attorneys to cease all prosecutions under the Alien and
Sedition Acts" and pardoning those already convicted under

169. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy (January 26, 1811), in
1245, quoted in McDONALD,

THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 161, at 1241,
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 258.

170. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 3 at 486; DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 74, at 1075 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON,
supra note 164, at 306-07).
171. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 71 (citations omitted).
172. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (June 13, 1809), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 129, at 253; Letter from Edwin Liv-
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them." He also took an active role in the prosecution for treason
of his first Vice President, Aaron Burr.'74 It is no wonder in light
of Jefferson's concern with matters of this kind that White concludes that Jefferson was maintaining a tight and centralized control over "the whole business of the executive branch, domestic
and foreign.' 75
Perhaps even more indicative of Jefferson's determination to
assert his control over the executive branch were his vigorous and
partisan removal policies. After twelve years of Federalist rule,
capped by Adams's "midnight appointments," President Jefferson
was faced with an executive branch filled entirely with Federalist
appointees. Although initially inclined not to remove any officers
for differences of political opinion, Jefferson quickly realized that
the removal power was the only way to consolidate his control
over the Administration. 76 However, Jefferson's previous opposition to politically motivated removals during the Washington and
Adams Administrations left him with little political room to maneuver. Particularly after stating in his inaugural address that "We are
all Republicans, we are all Federalists,"'" Jefferson faced substantial difficulties in defending purely partisan removals.
Jefferson responded with characteristic shrewdness by arguing
that his removals were in fact consistent with nonpartisanship, since
true nonpartisanship required that each party had a right to fair
representation in the government. The only way to implement his
"[d]eclarations . .. in favor of political tolerance, exhortations to
harmony and affection in social intercourse, and to respect the
equal rights of the minority" was to permit the Republicans "to

ingston (Nov. 1, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 129, at
57-58; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger (Mar. 9, 1814), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 129, at 454; see also Easterbrook, supra note
28, at 907.
173. See MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 268.
174. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 353-74 (1996).
175. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 70.
176. See MCDONAD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 254. As Jefferson
noted privately, "If a due participation of office is a matter of right, how are vacancies to
be obtained? Those by death are few; by resignation, none. Can any other mode than that
of removal be proposed?" Message from Thomas Jefferson to Elias Shipman and Others,
a Committee of the Merchants of New Haven (July 12, 1801), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS, supra note 161, at 497, 499 [hereinafter Message from Jefferson to Shipman];
see also 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 165; VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 22.
177. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801), in 1 A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 309, 310 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES & PAPERS].
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assert some rights . . . also." Since "the will of the nation, manifested by their elections," had called for a new administration, it
would be "political intolerance" to deny the Republicans the right
"to claim a proportionate share in the direction of public affairs.' 17' However, Jefferson cannily claimed that these removals
gave him no joy and pledged that he would revert back to making
merit removals:
This is a painful office; but it is made my duty, and I
meet it as such ....
It would have been to me a circumstance of great relief, had I found a moderate participation
of office in the hands of the majority. I would gladly have
left to time and accident to raise them to their just share.
But their total exclusion calls for prompter corrections. I
shall correct the procedure; but that done, return with joy
to that state of things when the only questions concerning a
candidate shall be, is he79 honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the Constitution?
The general public accepted Jefferson's justification for his
partisan removals. After exercising the power gingerly during the
first year, Jefferson expanded his program, initiating changes in
between one third and one half of all presidentially appointed
offices. 8 ' Thus, in his removals as well as his control over the
entire executive branch, Jefferson adhered to the expansive view of
presidential power established by Washington and Adams.
Another striking development during Jefferson's presidency was
his formulation of and strident advocacy for the position that the
President has a co-equal power with the Courts to engage in constitutional review. Jefferson clearly believed in the legitimacy of
co-ordinate or departmental judicial review, and he expressed that
view as eloquently and forcefully as anyone who has ever occupied

178. Message from Jefferson to Shipman, supra note 176, at 498; see also I GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 165; MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at
254-55; VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 22.
179. Message from Jefferson to Shipman, supra note 176, at 499-500; see also 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 165; MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at
254-55. Jefferson even went so far as to contend that the large number of unremovable
Federalist judges justified removing the vast majority of the marshals and district attorneys. NORMAN J. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY 127
(1932).
180. See 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 165; MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY,
supra note 20, at 255; VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 22.
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the presidential office. In his celebrated letter to Abigail Adams in
response to her letter complaining of his disregard of the Alien and
Sedition Acts, he wrote:
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on
the validity of the sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right to decide for the Executive,
more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both magistrates are equally independent in the sphere of action
assigned to them. The judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and imprisonment; because that power was placed in their hands by the
Constitution. But the Executive, believing the law to be
unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it;
because that power has been confided to him by the Constitution. That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion which
gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their
own sphere of action, but for the Legislature & Executive
also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic
8
branch.' '
Jefferson reiterated this view many years later in a letter to a
friend:
You seem ... to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the
despotism of an oligarchy ....
The constitution has erected
no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands
confided, with the corruption of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all
the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves ....
Betrayed by English example, and unaware, as
it should seem, of the control of our constitution in this
particular, they have at times overstepped their limit by
undertaking to command executive officers in the discharge
of their executive duties; but the constitution, in keeping

181. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 11 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 129, at 310, 311 (emphasis added); see also
MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 267-68.
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three departments distinct and independent, restrains the
authority of the judges to judiciary organs, as it does the
executive and legislative to executive and legislative or82
gans.

1

Jefferson believed that each of the three branches of government possessed the independent authority to interpret its own obligations under the Constitution and to exercise the authority vested
by that document free from any interference by the other branches.
Consistent with this view, Jefferson resisted an attempt by Chief
Justice Marshall, while presiding over Aaron Burr's trial for treason, to require the President to appear in court and present certain
documents. Jefferson refused to appear or present any documentary
material in court at all, instead submitting a portion of the subpoenaed documents to the district attorney.' 83 Moreover, Jefferson
was not concerned by the portion of Marbury v. Madison holding
the Judiciary Act of 1801 unconstitutional, as Jefferson recognized
that each of the three branches had the authority and the obligation
to construe the Constitution. Jefferson's primary objection was to
the opinion's dicta suggesting that the executive branch was subject
to orders from the judiciary. Courts in his view did not have any
right to interfere with the President's authority over the entire
executive branch and courts could not even issue writs of mandamus against executive officials. For Jefferson, unconstitutional
executive actions were properly addressed only in the democratic

182. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 10
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 129, at 160, 160-61. Jefferson had
originally wanted to lay out his theory of coordinate constitutional construction in his
First Annual Message to Congress, but as Forrest McDonald notes, Madison and Gallatin
dissuaded him from doing so to avoid arousing the ire of the Federalists, who still controlled the bulk of the judiciary and would likely continue to support judicial supremacy
on political grounds. MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 267 n.41.
183. See McDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 270. Similarly, Attorney General Caesar Rodney indicated to President Jefferson that courts could not issue a
writ of mandamus against an executive officer exercising discretionary functions and that
the proper remedy against officials improperly exercising their discretion was an action at
law or a criminal indictment. The contrary rule would vitiate "the controlling power in
the chief magistrate of the United States," "would necessarily have the effect of transferring the powers vested in one department to another department," would permit the courts
to exercise control over an executive function in violation of the Take Care Clause, and
would destroy "that unity of administration which the constitution meant to secure by
placing the executive power for them all, in the same head." Letter from C.A. Rodney to
Thomas Jefferson (July 15, 1808), reprinted in Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F.
Cas. 355, 358-59 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420).

1997]

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE

1503

process by the people themselves and not in litigation before judges!
This was an extraordinary claim of executive power, so extraordinary in fact that thankfully it has not been followed. Jefferson's claim in his letter to Abigail Adams that the President is
without power to execute a law that he deems to be unconstitutional in his own independent judgment, paired with Jefferson's own
views, provide a striking vision of presidential power.
Indeed, in the later years of his administration, Jefferson began
to move beyond the bounds of his initial vision of a President who
was autonomous only within his own limited sphere of law execution powers. It was at this point that Jefferson really began to
press up against the outermost constitutional limits of presidential
power. In sharp contrast to Washington, who was extremely circumspect about making any specific legislative proposals, and in
direct contradiction of his own previous criticism of Hamilton's
efforts to influence Congress, Jefferson as President began to assume the role of national political leader and in this capacity he
began to take control of Congress's legislative agenda to a greater
extent than had either of his two predecessors. As Forrest McDonald has noted:
[T]he President alone, as Jefferson put it, could "command
a view of the whole ground" as representative of the nation
and not merely of a state or a congressional district; the
concentration of authority in one disinterested servant of
the whole gave him a decisiveness as well as a vision that
84
the other branches lacked.
So much for Jefferson's earlier concerns about the threat to legislative independence posed by vigorous executive action.
Jefferson's expanding view of presidential power is also reflected in what is perhaps the most famous and consequential legacy of
his Presidency: the Louisiana Purchase. As Gerhard Casper suggests, this action raised serious separation of powers concerns as
well as federalism concerns. 8 Although Jefferson had initially

184. MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 259 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, in 1 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 177, at 324).
185. The Louisiana Purchase raised serious questions of federalism because the Constitution did not directly grant to the federal government the power to acquire additional territory. Under a strict construction of the Constitution, such an acquisition lay outside the
scope of any constitutional grant and was properly was subject to the power of the states.
To the extent that the Purchase did lie within the proper scope of federal authority, it
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opined that the Constitution would have to be amended before the
federal government would have the authority to undertake the Louisiana Purchase," 6 in a remarkable letter written in 1803, Jefferson
sought to justify the Louisiana Purchase in the absence of such an
amendment by advancing an extraordinarily broad, almost Lincolnian, view of presidential power "to act as a 'guardian' or
'steward' for the people"'' 7 even when the Constitution strictly
construed did not allow for this:
The Executive in seizing the fugitive occurrence, which so
much advances the good of their country, have [sic] done
an act beyond the Constitution. The Legislature in casting
behind them metaphysical subtleties, and risking themselves
like faithful servants, must ratify & pay for it, and throw
themselves on their country for doing for them unauthorized what we know they would have done for themselves
had they been in a situation to do it. It is the case of a
guardian, investing the money of his ward in purchasing an
important adjacent territory; & saying to him when of age,
I did this for your good; I pretend to no right to bind you;
you may disavow me, and I must get out of the scrape as
I can: I thought it my duty to risk myself for you. But we
shall not be disavowed by the nation, and their act of
indemnity will confirm & not weaken the Constitution, by
more strongly marking out its lines.' 88
As Casper goes on to note, Jefferson was defiant upon leaving
office that "[t]o lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to
written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty,
property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means."'8 9 This defense of the Louisiana Purchase suggests that Jefferson certainly cannot be ranked as

implicated the separation of powers as well, since it was unclear which branch of the
federal government was properly invested with such authority. Gerhard Casper, Thomas
Jefferson, supra note 16, at 490-96.
186. See id. at 495; McGinnis, Opinion Function, supra note 37, at 412-19.
187. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 138, at 16.
188. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckenridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRINGS, supra note 161, at 1136, 1138-39, quoted in Casper, Thomas Jefferson, supra note 16, at 496, and in SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 138, at 16.
189. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 9 THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRInNGS, supra note 161, at 1231, 1231, quoted in Casper, Thomas Jefferson, supra note 16, at 496.
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a weak President or as one who was unwilling to use the full
powers of the office when the occasion demanded it. This of
course makes sense intuitively. Jefferson was a popular and charismatic political leader, the author of the Declaration of Independence, and one of the foremost statesmen of his day. It would be
astonishing if such an individual were to act timidly in office, and
Jefferson certainly did not do so. Rather, he used the full panoply
of powers left to him by his Federalist predecessors and, as Professors Peter Shane and Harold Bruff have indicated, he "set a precedent for a strong Presidency, one which would be taken to heart
by several later executives."'"
By the time Jefferson had completed his two terms in office,
he was as enthusiastic and committed an advocate of the unitary
executive as has ever walked the earth. On January 26, 1811, as
Jefferson was preparing to hand over the reigns of power to his
best friend and neighbor, James Madison, he wrote a striking letter
to a French friend of his, A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy. Comparing the
American Presidency with the plural executive created by the
French Revolutionaries, Jefferson observed that:
One of [Montesquieu's] doctrines, indeed, the preference of
a plural over a singular executive, will probably not be
assented to here. When our present government was first
established, we had many doubts on this question, and
many leanings towards a supreme executive council. It
happened that at that time the experiment of such an one
was commenced in France, while the single executive was
under trial here. We watched the motions and effects of
these two rival plans, with an interest and anxiety proportioned to the importance of a choice between them. The
experiment in France failed after a short course, and not
from any circumstances peculiar to the times or nation, but
from those internal jealousies and dissensions in the Directory, which will ever arise among men equal in power,
without a principal to decide and control their differences.
We had tried a similar experiment in 1784, by establishing
a committee of the States .... They fell immediately into
schisms and dissensions .... This was then imputed to the
temper of two or three individuals; but the wise ascribed it
to the nature of man.' 9'
190. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 138, at 16.
191. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), in
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There can be little doubt then that Jefferson's views of presidential
power inclined strongly in an executive unitarian direction. By the
end of his Administration, Jefferson was unquestionably a strong
and effective advocate of presidential power.
D. James Madison
James Madison was, along with James Wilson, one of the key
architects of the presidency at the Constitutional convention, and he
was a vigorous advocate both of a strong presidency and of the
view that the Constitution gave the president the removal power.
As James Hart noted:
The student of our constitutional history cannot fail to be
impressed by the fact that the theory that the opening sentence of Article II of the Constitution is a grant of "the"
executive power was expressed by Madison, Jefferson and
Hamilton. Of their historic pronouncements the first in time
was that of Madison in the removal debate of 1789.192
According to Madison:
[Where the Constitution] has left any particular department
in the entire possession of the powers incident to that department, I conceive we ought not to qualify them further
than they are qualified by the constitution....
The constitution affirms, that the executive power shall
be vested in the President. Are there exceptions to this
proposition? Yes, there are. The constitution says, that in
appointing to office, the Senate shall be associated with the
President.... Have we a right to extend this exception? I
believe not. If the constitution has invested all executive
power in the President, I venture to assert that the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify his executive authority.
The question now resolves itself into this, Is the power
of displacing, an executive power? I conceive that if any
power whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power

THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 161,
192. HART, supra note 53, at 178 (footnotes

at 1243.
omitted). Jefferson's opinion on this appears in a written opinion to President Washington issued while he was Secretary of
State. See supra note 164.
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of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.'93
Thus, as a member of the first Congress, Madison placed himself
squarely on the record as an advocate of both the constitutional
grant theory of the Article II Vesting Clause and of the view that
the executive power conferred by that Clause included a power of
removal. As is well known, Madison briefly wavered in this view
in his comments one day on the House floor during the debate
over the Office of the Comptroller of the Treasury, but he swiftly
returned to the executive unitarian fold after other Members of
Congress objected to his Treasury proposal on unitarian grounds.
Between the Decision of 1789 and the Revolution of 1800,
Madison's enthusiasm for Executive Power waned as he fell into
Jefferson's opposition political camp. It was during this period that
Madison wrote his Helvidius letters, discussed above, wherein he
challenges Hamilton's argument for broad foreign policy making
powers derivable from the Article II Executive Power Vesting
Clause. Madison's argument in the Helvidius letters is in tension
with, but is not necessarily inconsistent with, his argument for a
presidential removal power derivable from the Vesting Clause. One
could perfectly well believe that the "Executive Power" conferred
by Article II included a removal power but not the unilateral presidential powers over foreign policy that Hamilton was arguing for.
Other parts of the Constitution would support this construction-the
Take Care Clause supports construing the Vesting Clause as granting removal power, while the Declaration of War and Treaty-Making Clauses support the Madisonian view of a more limited power
in the foreign policy arena. Thus, Madison's statements in the
Helvidius letters do not detract a bit from our argument that he
falls squarely in the unitary executive camp. It is perfectly consistent with the theory of the unitary executive to reject broad, unenumerated presidential powers over foreign policy.
After the Revolution of 1800, Thomas Jefferson assumed the
presidency for eight years and, as we have discussed, he became a
strong advocate of presidential power. James Madison did not
undergo a similar transformation during his eight years in office,
although more for reasons of his personality than because of his
constitutional beliefs. "James Madison ... did not exert the degree
of broad control over the executive branch as had his predeces-

193. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 481-82 (emphasis added).
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sors. ' '94 Despite his dynamic role in framing the Constitution and
in supporting the Decision of 1789, he proved to be a weak President and often found his policies frustrated by Congress. That
being said, nothing in the conduct of the Madison Administration
in any way suggested that Madison acquiesced to any dissipation
in the unitariness of the executive branch. Quite the contrary, Madison continued to exert his direct influence over the departments,
even going so far as to redraft ordinary correspondence issued by
the State Department. 95
Madison did not hesitate to exert his control over the executive
branch by using his power of removal. He called for the resignation of his Secretary of State, Robert Smith, and he also compelled
the resignation of his Secretary of War, John Armstrong." Congress did begin to resist presidential control of the department
heads in 1814 after Madison removed Gideon Granger as Postmaster General. In response to this removal, the Senate debated a
resolution calling upon the President "to inform the Senate whether
his office of Postmaster General be now vacant, and, if vacant, in
what manner the same became vacant." In the end, however, the
Senate rejected this resolution, concluding that it did not have the
right to make such an inquiry."9
Leonard White describes the general practice with respect to
removals during Madison's Administration as follows:
Madison removed twenty-seven presidential officers during
his eight years in the White House. Almost without exception they were officers collecting the revenue. Madison was
under some pressure after the War of 1812 to find civil
employment for supernumerary military officers, but declined to disturb the civil service. He was prepared to favor
meritorious and indigent officers, but only where a removal
could be justified "by legitimate causes." Crawford once
remarked that Madison could not
bear to turn men out of
98
office for "simple incapacity."'

194. See Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 3, at 486-87 (citing
HINSDALE, supra note 156, at 51).
195. See id. at 487 (citing HINSDALE, supra note 156, at 52).
196. See id. (citing HINSDALE, supra note 156, at 52-53, 56-57).
197. See 2 HAYNES, supra note 155, at 793 n.4 (citing LUCY M. SALMON, HISTORY OF
THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 44 (1886)); Warren, supra note 21, at 5.
198. WHrrE, THE JEFFERsOmANs, supra note 165, at 379.
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Clearly, then, the removal power did not lapse during Madison's
years, although it was not used very vigorously. Of course, after
eight years of Jefferson in the White House, Madison would not
have felt the need experienced by his two immediate predecessors
to make more removals.
Finally, Madison concurred, although with caution, in Jefferson's ambitiously expressed views concerning the power of the
President to engage in coordinate constitutional construction or
departmental review. Writing many years after he left office, Madison observed:
As the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of
the United States are co-ordinate, and each equally bound
to support the Constitution, it follows that each must be
guided by the text of the Constitution according to its own
interpretation of it, and, consequently, that in the event of
irreconcilable interpretations, the prevalence of the one or
the other department must depend on the nature of the
case, as receiving its final decision from the one or the
other, and passing from that decision into effect, without
involving the functions of any other.'
Madison, however, qualified the harshness of his endorsement of
the Jeffersonian view of coordinate construction, with its sweeping
implication of a presidential power to decline to enforce a law the
President alone thought was unconstitutional. He said that ordinarily the judiciary would construe the Constitution, and he pointed
out some reasons why so long as the judicial bench was "happily
filled" the public would have the most confidence in its constructions of the Constitution.'
Thus, in the end, Madison was something of a moderate on the
question of coordinate construction. In theory, he agreed that Jefferson was right, and he endorsed full fledged departmentalism as
his bedrock constitutional analysis. But, in practice, he wisely
doubted whether in ordinary times the constitutional system should
operate that way. We suspect Madison would have approved of the
practice that has actually grown up under the Constitution of reserving executive and legislative construction for those rare periods

199. Letter written in 1834 by James Madison, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 129, at 349, 349 (emphasis added).
200. Id.
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of crisis that have punctuated American constitutional history"'
and for laws that clearly encroach on core executive prerogatives.
Thus, it might be fair to conclude that Madison was enough of a
departmentalist that he would have embraced the core thesis of this
Article were he alive to read it.
In sum, Madison supported executive power throughout his
long and distinguished career particularly with respect to law execution and removals. His practice as our nation's fourth President
is fully consistent with that view even if he was sometimes an
ineffectual leader.
After he left office, in 1817, Madison remained in the unitary
executive camp for the rest of his long and productive life. Between 1817 and his death in 1836, Madison staunchly defended the
President's removal power at every turn opposing as we shall
discuss below the Tenure of Office Act of 1820 (even though it
did not limit presidential removal power), and vigorously defending
Andrew Jackson's use of the removal power (even though he did
not especially like Jackson). Thus Madison, in one letter written in
1834, observed:
The claim, on constitutional ground, to a share in the removal as well as appointment of officers, is in direct opposition to the uniform practice of the Government from its
commencement. It is clear that the innovation would not
only vary, essentially, the existing balance of power, but
expose the Executive, occasionally, to a total inaction, and
at all times to delays fatal to the due execution of the
laws.
Another innovation brought forward in the Senate
claims for the Legislature a discretionary regulation of the
tenure of offices. This, also, would vary the relation of the
departments to each other, and leave a wide field for legislative abuses. The power of removal, like that of appointment, ought to be fixed by the constitution, and both, like
the right of suffrage and apportionment of representatives,
not be dependent on the legislative will....
But apart
from the distracting and dilatory operation of a veto in the
Senate on the removal from office, it is pretty certain that
the large States would not invest with that additional pre-

201. Like the debates over Dred Scott or in 1937 over the constitutionality of the New
Deal.

1997]

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE

1511

rogative a body constructed like the Senate, and endowed,
as it already is, with a share in all the departments of
power, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary. It is well
known that the large States, in both the Federal and State
Conventions, regarded the aggregate powers of the Senate
as the most objectionable feature in the Constitution.
Madison repeated these views in other letters written during the
same period2 °3 and an interesting feature of them is that they confirm that his position on presidential removal power, taken as a
member of the House of Representatives, may have been motivated
in part by an early skepticism about the institution of the Senate.
This fits with everything we know about Madison's views,
especially during the critical formative period in 1789. Madison
had favored the Virginia Plan at the Philadelphia Convention, under which both Houses of Congress were to be apportioned by
population, and he was an ardent nationalist in the 1780s. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that he would be loath to
expand the prerogatives of the Senate over either removals or over
appointments to fill the vacancies thus created, since the Senate
was the most States-oriented institution in the national government.
To the extent the Senate represented the States and the presidency
was more nationalist, it should come as no surprise that the early
Madison would favor a broad presidential removal power given the
views he had expressed at the Philadelphia Convention. 2"
In sum, James Madison was at all times during his long and
remarkable career a defender of the unitary executive. This is clear

202. Letter from James Madison to Edward Coles (Oct. 15, 1834), in 4 LETrERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 129, at 366, 368-69 (emphasis added).
203. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Edward Coles (Aug. 29, 1834) ("claims
are made by the Senate in opposition to the principles and practice of every administration, my own included, and varying materially, in some instances, the relations between
the great departments of the government") (discussing the Andrew Jackson removal debate); Letter from James Madison to John M. Patton (Mar. 24, 1834) ("Should the controversy on removals from office end in the establishment of a share in the power, as
claimed for the Senate it would materially vary the relationship among the component
parts of the government, and disturb the operation of the checks and balances as now
understood to exist.") in id. at 354, 355 & 342, 342.
204. Thus Madison wrote in a letter to Edmund Randolph:
I think it best to give the Senate as little agency as possible in Executive
matters, and to make the President as responsible as possible in them. . . .I
see and politically feel that that will be the weak branch of the Government.
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (May 31, 1789) in 1 LETrERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 129, at 473.
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whether one considers his role in the Philadelphia Convention of
1787, his role in the Decision of 1789, his role as President of the
United States, between 1811 and 1817, or his role as a senior
statesman writing letters in 1834 a mere two years before his
death. It is difficult to imagine how someone could outdo James
Madison in consistently and vigorously defending the unitary executive.
E. James Monroe
James Monroe proved to be a stronger President than James
Madison, although he lacked the charismatic personality and leadership abilities of Thomas Jefferson. °5 He too proved to be a committed believer in the vital importance of a unitary executive structure, although regrettably he did not always follow through to act
upon his beliefs.
Monroe's support for the unitary executive and for the importance of administrative hierarchy became evident long before he
assumed the presidency. In a letter regarding the Patent Office
written in 1812 to Congressman Seybert while Monroe was serving
as Secretary of State, the future President wrote:
I have always thought that every institution, of whatsoever
nature it might be, ought to be comprised within some one
of the departments of Government, the Chief of which only
should be responsible to the Chief Executive Magistrate of
the Nation. The establishment of inferior independent departments, the heads of which are not, and ought not to be
members of the Administration, appears to me to be liable
to many serious objections." 6
Monroe had also championed presidential control in military matters when in 1815, as head of the War Department, he prepared a
report for a Senate committee championing unilateral presidential
control over the state militias once they had been called into the
service of the United States. Two state governors had challenged
presidential authority unilaterally to call forth the state militias, a
position Monroe described as being "fraught with mischief' and
"absurd."2 7
205. See WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 38.
206. Id. at 74 (quoting Letter from Secretary of State James Monroe to Congressman
Adam Seybert (June 10, 1812), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE 203 (Stanislaus
M. Hamilton ed., 1898-1903)).
207. Id. at 541 (quoting I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 605-06); see

19971

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE

1513

Monroe assumed the presidency in 1817, and his two terms in
office were quite successful with the result that the office regained
some of the luster it had lost during Madison's indecisive and
timorous eight years in office. As President, James Monroe vigorously defended and asserted executive power in a number of contexts, most famously in announcing the Monroe Doctrine which
was embodied in his Seventh Annual Message to Congress."'
The Monroe Doctrine was an important statement of American
foreign policy, analogous to George Washington's Neutrality Proclamation discussed above, and its unilateral issuance by President
Monroe thus suggests his willingness to exercise executive power
vigorously in the foreign policy context. Chief Justice Vinson,
dissenting in the Steel Seizure Case many years later, observed:
A review of executive action demonstrates that our
Presidents have on many occasions exhibited the leadership
contemplated by the Framers when they made the President
Commander in Chief, and imposed upon him the trust to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." With or
without explicit statutory authorization, Presidents have at
such times dealt with national emergencies by acting
promptly and resolutely to enforce legislative programs, at
least to save those programs until Congress could act.
Congress and the courts have responded to such executive
initiative with consistent approval....
Jefferson's initiative in the Louisiana Purchase, the
Monroe Doctrine, and Jackson's removal of Government
deposits from the Bank of the United States further serve
to demonstrate by deed what the Framers described by
word when they vested the whole of the executive power
in the President.'
Chief Justice Vinson lists the Monroe Doctrine along with other
historic unilateral exertions of the executive power because of the
important role that Doctrine was to play in defining the future of
American foreign policy. It is thus clear that James Monroe, as the

also id. at 539-45.
208. See GEORGE MORGAN, THE LIFE OF JAMES MONROE 394, 395-410 (1921). See
also James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1823), in 2 MESSAGES
& PAPERS, supra note 177, at 776.
209. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579,
683, 685 (1952) (Vinson, CJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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author of the Monroe Doctrine, was a powerful occupant of the
Chief Executive Office who knew well how to exercise vigorously
the executive power in the foreign policy sphere."'
While Monroe was more cautious with domestic policy matters,
he did on occasion assert presidential prerogatives. Leonard White
reports that Monroe on two occasions expressed the view that the
President ought to be able to control executive branch communications to Congress. First, in 1819, the House of Representatives
asked Secretary of War John Calhoun for his opinion on building
some roads and canals for allegedly military purposes. Calhoun
was known to favor such internal improvements, while Monroe
was known by the House to believe that the federal government
lacked constitutional power to undertake them. The issue thus arose
"whether department heads in making reports to Congress had a
responsibility to reflect the opinions of the President rather than
their own...21 As reported by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams:
[Monroe] expressed an opinion that the call of the House
directly upon the Secretary of War for this report was itself
irregular, and not conformable to the spirit of the Constitution of the United States, the principle of which was a
single Executive.... And as the heads of Departments
were executive officers under the President, it was to be
considered whether the President himself was not responsible for the substance of their reports.2" 2
The matter arose again in 1820 when Monroe and Adams
complained about Secretary of the Treasury Crawford's transmission of annual estimates directly to Congress without first sharing
the financial program with Monroe. This practice, which had been
followed by all the early Treasury Secretaries since Hamilton, was
viewed by both Adams and Monroe as being unconstitutional.
Leonard White reports:

210. This is consistent with Monroe's behavior as Governor of Virginia. One biographer
reports that Monroe and the Republican governor of Pennsylvania were ready in 1801 to
use military force on Thomas Jefferson's behalf if the Federalists had used the deadlock
in the Electoral College as an excuse not to let the House of Representatives elect a
Republican President. MORGAN, supra note 208, at 219-220.
211. WHrrE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 67.
212. Id. at 68 (quoting Entry for January 12, 1819, 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 217 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1874-77) (emphasis added)).
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[Adams] thought the practice "altogether inconsistent with
the spirit of the Constitution," and one that "ought immediately to be changed." Monroe asked Adams to look into
the law and expressed his own opinion that the practice
was wrong.213
For whatever reason, nothing was done to correct this practice, but
there can be little doubt that Presidents Monroe and John Quincy
Adams objected to it. Leonard White is plainly right that Monroe
was concerned that there be "left no loose ends of administration
unconnected with the departments and independent of presidential
direction."214
Monroe also asserted his belief in the hierarchy of command in
an exchange of views with then-General Andrew Jackson, who for
a time attempted to object to orders being issued directly to his
subordinates by the War Department. Monroe pointedly reminded
Jackson that the "orders of the [war] dept are ... the orders of
the President" and according "to my view of the subject, no officer
of the army, can rightfully disobey, an order from the President."
Monroe went on to agree with Jackson that the War Department
should not ordinarily communicate with Jackson's army while
bypassing him as the commanding general of it.215
Finally, Monroe maintained supremacy over the administration
by exercising the presidential removal power, albeit in a gingerly
and tepid fashion. Leonard White notes that "Monroe ... removed
twenty-seven civil officers in his eight years in the White House.
One-third were in the foreign service, all consuls with a single
exception; one-third were collectors of revenue."2 6 Although,
according to John Quincy Adams, Monroe was too hesitant to use
his power to remove," 7 and although he plainly did not exercise
the removal power often or in major cases, he did in fact exercise
the power, and an opinion issued by Attorney General William
Wirt acknowledged that "the power of the President to dis-

213. Id. at 69 (quoting Entry for January 8, 1820, 4 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams,
supra note 212, at 501); see also id. at 68-69.
214. Id. at 74.
215. Id. at 241-45 (quoting Letter from James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, 2 CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 329-31 (John Spencer Bassett ed., 1926-35)).
216. Id. at 379-80; see also McDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 255.
217. See WnrrE THE JEFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 380 (quoting 5 THE MEMOIRS
OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 212, at 158).
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miss
. , at pleasure, is not disputed." ' 8 When we remember
that Monroe reached the White House at a time when the Republi-

cans had been in office for sixteen years, it is perhaps not so surprising that there were few removals. By 1817, most federal officials in office had been appointed by Monroe's good friends and
neighbors Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.
The Monroe Administration did bear witness to the first event
that even arguably could be said to support a historical practice of
presidential tolerance of any deviation whatsoever from the theory
of the unitary executive (more than three decades after the Constitution of 1787 had been adopted), when Congress enacted the first
substantial limitation on presidential control of federal patronage:
the Tenure of Office Act of 1820. Passed without any significant
debate, the 1820 Act provided that executive officers serving outside of Washington, D.C., "shall be appointed for terms of four
years, but shall be removable from office at pleasure."2 1 9 The Act
was vigorously and firmly denounced by former Presidents Jefferson and Madison. Jefferson warned:
It saps the constitutional and salutary functions of the President, and introduces a principle of intrigue and corruption,
which will soon leaven the mass, not only of Senators, but
of citizens. It is more baneful than the attempt which failed
in the beginning of the government to make all officers
irremovable, but with the consent of the Senate. It will

218. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 67 (1828).
219. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 102, see. 1, 3 Stat. 582, 582 (1820). Specifically, the
Act applied to "all district attorneys, collectors of the customs, naval officers and surveyors of the customs, navy agents, receivers of public moneys for lands, registers of the
land offices, paymasters in the army, the apothecary general, the assistant apothecaries
general, and the commissary general of purchases." Id.
Although the Act was supposed to bring the pro-democratic benefits of "rotation in
office" to the federal government, many historians have concluded that support for the
Act was in reality driven by the presidential ambitions of Treasury Secretary William H.
Crawford. According to some historians, Crawford proposed the Tenure of Office Act
because he believed that the Act would foster his planned presidential bid by giving him
greater influence over federal patronage. The Senate went along with Crawford because,
by requiring the more frequent exercise of the Senate's confirmation power, the Act increased its power as well. 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 167. Historians are far from
unanimous in supporting this conclusion. See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 51-52 (1968) [hereinafter HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT] (comparing 7 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINcY ADAMS at 424-25 with FISH, supra note 77, at 65-70);
VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 25; WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 388-89
(comparing Carl R. Fish, The Crime of W.H. Crawford, 21 AM. HIST. REv. 545-56
(1915-16) with CHARLES M. WILTSE, JOHN C. CALHOUN: NATIONALIST 211 n.1 (1944)).
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keep in constant excitement all the hungry cormorants for
office, render them, as well as those in place, sycophants to
their Senators, engage these in eternal intrigue to turn one
out and put in another, in cabals to swap work, and make
of them what all executive directories become, mere sinks
of corruption and faction.2
Madison responded in kind: "The law . . . is pregnant with mischiefs such as you describe .... If the error be not soon corrected,
the task will be very difficult; for it is of a nature to take a deep
root."" l Furthermore, although the Act did not directly place any
limits on the President's removal power, Madison was concerned
that, if carried to its logical conclusion, it would lead to such
limits. In his view, if a law could displace an officer every four
years, "it can do so at the end of every year, or at every session
of the Senate; and the tenure will then be the pleasure of the Senate as much as of the President, and not of the President
alone."'
Moreover, Madison was concerned that in light of the
Decision of 1789, the inclusion of language providing that these
officers "shall be removable from office at pleasure"'
implied
that the removal power was conveyed by congressional, rather than
constitutional, grant.
Although Monroe signed the bill into law without objection, he
later came to share Madison's concerns. As then-Secretary of State

220. WTrrE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 388 (quoting 15 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 129, at 294-95); see also 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 125,
at 167; McDoNALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 256.
221. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 10, 1820), in 3 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRINGS OF JAMES MADISON supra note 129, at 196, qdoted in WHITE,

THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 389; see also I GOLDSMITH, supra note 129, at
192-93; VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 25.

222. Letter from James Madison to President Monroe in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 129, at 199, 200; see also Fisher, Removal Power,
supra note 21, at 65. Madison had voiced a similar view during the Decision of 1789.
See Ruth Weissbourd Grant & Stephen Grant, The Madisonian Presidency, in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 31, 53, 63 n.70 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey

Tulis eds., 1980).
223. Tenure of Office Act, sec. 1, 3 Stat. at 582; see also CORWIN, PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL POWER, supra note 127, at 345-46; 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 167-68.
However, the settled practice since the Decision of 1789 essentially foreclosed any such
an implication, and it is just as likely that this statutory language represents Congress's
recognition that the removal power was constitutionally vested in the PresidenL FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 125, at 58 (referring to the removal provision as
a "stipulation"). See generally WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 388-89;
Fisher, Removal Power, supra note 21, at 65.
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John Quincy Adams wrote in his memoirs, "Mr. Monroe unwarily
signed the bill without adverting to its real character. He told me
that Mr. Madison considered it as in principle unconstitutional....
Mr. Monroe himself inclined to the same opinion, but the question
had not occurred to him when he signed the bill." 4 These concerns led Monroe to make it his policy to renominate all honest
executive officials when their commissions expired, ensuring that
the Act would have little immediate impact.'
The significance of Monroe's initial acceptance of the first
Tenure of Office Act should not be overstated. In fact, the Act's
establishment of fixed terms for certain federal officials only implicated the removal power tangentially and did not purport to limit
the removal power in any way. 6 The fact that Monroe voiced
his objections to the bill as soon as he became aware of the threat
to the removal power, posed by the Act also indicates that
Monroe's initial silence stemmed more from inadvertence than
acquiescence. Finally, any remaining questions about Monroe's
willingness to protect the President's power to remove were erased
in 1824, when Monroe refused to comply with a House request to
provide the documents connected with the suspension of a naval
officer as an improper interference with executive functions.227
Together, these considerations effectively vitiate any inference that,
in initially failing to object to the Tenure of Office Act, Monroe
acquiesced to any infringement on the President's power to remove.
Finally, it must be noted that President Monroe's Attorney
General, William Wirt, compiled a somewhat equivocal record on
some of the other aspects of the unitary executive. Before describing that record, it should be noted in Wirt's (and Monroe's) defense that Wirt was by far the most successful and powerful Attor-

224. WHrITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 388 (quoting Entry for Feb. 7,
1828, 7 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINcY ADAMS, supra note 212, at 424-25); see also I
GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 192-93; VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 25.
225. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 389; Goldsmith, supra note 125, at
192-93; HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT, supra note 219, at 52; Carl R. Fish, Removal of
Officials by the Presidents of the United States, 2 ANN. REP. AM. HIST. ASs'N 67, 72
(1899).
226. See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 339 (1897).
227. James Monroe, Message to the House of Representatives (Jan. 10, 1825), in 2
MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 177, at 847; see also Irving Younger, Congressional
Investigations and Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 20 U. Pir.
L. REV. 755, 759 (1959).
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ney General the nation had had up until that point. Wirt created
many of the most important traditions and institutions that surround
the office of the Attorney General, and he helped to lay the
groundwork for the eventual creation of the Department of Justice
many, many decades later." A lack of resources and a cautious
personality may have prevented Wirt from doing even more, and
may have contributed to his tendency to decline power that he
lacked the resources to exercise, but William Wirt nonetheless
deserves enormous credit for putting the Attorney General on an
equal footing with the other three principle Cabinet Secretaries.'
James Monroe deserves some of this credit as well, for the elevation in stature of the Attorney General was an important development with long term implications for the theory of the unitary
executive. It could not have occurred without both Monroe's support and his selection of so able and energetic a lawyer as William
Wirt to hold the office.
Nonetheless, as indicated above, Wirt's record with respect to
the unitary executive was at times equivocal. Thus, in 1823, General Wirt issued an opinion that challenged the President's authority
to direct the actions of accounting officers in advance and to review their exercise of discretion after the fact." This opinion,
some scholars have suggested, is inconsistent with a unitarian view
of presidential power."'
228. WHrrE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 346.
229. See id.
230. Wirt argued "it could never have been the intention of the constitution, in assigning this general power to the President to take care that the laws be executed, that he
should in person execute the laws himself." While the Take Care Clause did "place[] the
officers . . . under [the President's] general superintendence," it only authorized the President to displace, prosecute, or impeach officials who fail to execute the law properly; it
did not grant to the President with the "power to interfere" with those officials' actions.
Wirt believed that requiring the President "to take upon himself the responsibility of all
the subordinate executive officers of the government" represented "a construction too absurd to be seriously contended for." Wirt continued,
If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to perform a duty, not
only is that officer bound to perform it, but no other officer can perform it
without a violation of the law; and were the President to perform it, he would
not only be not taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he
would be violating them himself. The constitution assigns to Congress the power of designating the duties of particular officers: the President is only required
to take care that they execute them faithfully.
1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624-625 (1823). Wirt relied upon the authority of this opinion to reject
summarily subsequent requests for presidential intervention in matters before accounting
officials. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 705-06 (1825); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 678 (1824); 1 Op. Att'y
Gen. 636-37 (1824).
231. See Ledewitz, supra note 21, at 799; Froomkin, Note, supra note 6, at 801 &
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It is far from clear, however, that this opinion properly constitutes a definitive disavowal of the unitary executive. First, the
opinion's reasoning is incomplete in that it only analyzed the presidential review of subordinates' actions under the Take Care Clause
without considering the impact of the Executive Power Clause.n
Furthermore, whether this record can be fairly attributed to Monroe
is certainly subject to debate. A position taken in an Attorney
General's opinion does not necessarily represent the official position of an Administration, and Presidents have often ignored positions taken by their Attorneys General and substituted their own
judgment instead. 3
But by far the biggest problem with interpreting this opinion as
a firm rejection of the unitary executive is that so interpreting it
conflicts with a number of Wirt's other opinions on executive
power. For example, just seven months before authorizing this
opinion, Wirt had issued another opinion taking a contrary position
with regard to the power of presidential review. Specifically, Wirt
opined that a law authorizing accounting officers to settle the accounts of the Vice President were "subject to the revision and final
decision of the President." Under the specific statute, "the accounting officers must act on the subject in the first instance; the power
of the President being merely in the nature of appellate power; and
that, consequently, he cannot, in the regular execution of the law,
put those officers aside, and take the whole subject at once into his
own hands." Nonetheless, Wirt emphasized that once the accounting officers had acted, their decisions remained subject to the
President's "revising power. '""4 It is even more difficult to reconcile the first opinion discussed with an opinion issued by Wirt in
1827 affirming the President's right to direct federal district
attorney's prosecution of a particular suit. Wirt "entertain[ed] no
doubt of the constitutional power of the President to order the
discontinuance of a suit commenced in the name of the United
States in a case proper for such order." In fact, if the suit lacked a
proper legal basis, the Take Care Clause "not only authorized, but

n.75, 805 & n.lll.
232. See Liberman, supra note 3, at 337 & n.156.
233. See Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 17, 27 & n.24 [hereinafter Lund, Lawyers] (citing examples when Presidents overruled their Attorneys General); Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal
Counsel, 15 CARDOzo L. REv. 437, 443-45 (1993) [hereinafter Lund, Rational Choice].
234. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 596, 597-98 (1823).
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required [the President] by his duty, to order a discontinuance of
such vexation." 5 This 1827 opinion is particularly problematic
for the critics of the unitary executive who have argued that the
Comptroller of the Treasury was independent of the Presidente 6
and that giving the Comptroller the power to prosecute certain
suits"a? was an early example of the fragmentation of the unitary
executive."' Wirt's opinion clearly suggests that the President had
full power to direct the actions of the Comptroller and that giving
the Comptroller authority over some types of cases did not vitiate
the President's control over federal prosecutions.
Wirt did not make any attempt to reconcile his various opinions,"a9 and subsequent Attorney General Opinions have vacillated
on this point ever since.' Fortunately, the methodology of coordinate construction relieves us of the need to do so. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that even if the views expressed in
Wirt's opinions are attributed to the President and are read for all
they are worth, they still fall far short of establishing an extended
pattern of presidential acquiescence to a non-unitary executive
branch.

235. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 53, 54 (1827). Wirt concluded in this particular case such a
direction would have been inappropriate since a court had granted the prosecutor's request
for an injunction in this case over two years before. Id. at 54-56. Had the matter not
been already decided by a court of law, however, there is little doubt that Wirt would
have endorsed dismissal of the suit.
236. See Bloch, supra note 16, at 578 n.55; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 27;
Tiefer, supra note 21, at 73-74.
237. In 1797, Congress gave the Comptroller the power "to institute suit for the recovery of' a "sum or balance reported to be due to the United States." Act of Mar. 3, 1797,
ch. 20, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 512, 512. In 1817, Congress gave the Comptroller the power "to
direct suits and legal proceedings, and to take all such measures as may be authorized by
the laws, to enforce prompt payments of all debts to the United States." Act of Mar. 3,
1817, ch. 45 sec. 10, 3 Stat. 366, 367.
238. See Krent, Executive Control, supra note 105, at 288; Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 6, at 17-18; Tiefer, supra note 21, at 75.
239. Wirt's two opinions concerning the direction of accounting officers may be distinguished in that the second opinion dealt with the general accounting laws while the first
involved special legislation. Thus differences in the availability of presidential review
arguably could have flowed from differences in congressional intent. See 2 Op. Att'y Gen.
625 (1834) (discussing this distinction without referring to either of Wirt's opinions). This
resolution, however, still fails to provide an adequate explanation of Wirt's opinion on the
President's power to direct district attorneys.
240. See P. Strauss, supra note 3 at 605 & n. 24.
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F. John Quincy Adams
John Quincy Adams was, like his father, a strong believer in
the value of a hierarchical, unitary executive branch. Thus, Adams
was (according to Leonard White) "temperamentally a man to
restore the presidency to its original high estate.""24 White elaborates:
[T]he last of the Jeffersonians in the White House, John
Quincy Adams, was in truth more nearly a Federalist than
a Republican. His political doctrines resembled those of
Alexander Hamilton, and his ideals of administration were
those 2 of George Washington and his father, John Ad24

ans.

Adams's support for executive unitariness surfaced long before
he entered the White House. While serving as Secretary of State
during the Monroe Administration, Adams reportedly wrote to his
wife that:
For myself I shall enter upon the functions of my office
with a deep sense of the necessity of union with my colleagues, and with a suitable impression that my place is
subordinate. That my duty will be to support, and not to
counteract or oppose, the President's administration, and
that if from any cause I should find my efforts to that end
ineffectual, it will be my duty seasonably to withdraw from
the public service.243
As noted earlier, Adams had also sided in 1819 with President
Monroe in the dispute over whether department heads could appropriately make reports to Congress which disagreed with the president's constitutional interpretations. Adams reports in his memoirs
that he thought "there would be an obvious incongruity and indecency that a head of Department should make a report to either
House of Congress which the President should disapprove."2'

241. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 41.
242. Id. at vii-viii.
243. Id. at 61-62 (quoting Letter from John Quincy Adams
1817), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JOHN QuINcY ADAMS 179,
Ford ed., 1913-17)).
244. Id. at 68 (quoting 4 THE WRITINGS OF JOHN QuINcY
217 (quoting Entry for January 12, 1819 in THE MEMOIRS
supra note 212, at 217)).

to Abigail Adams (May 16,
182 (Worthington Chauncey
ADAMS, supra note 212, at

OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
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Adams continued to adhere to these positions after he ascended
to the Presidency. After giving an inaugural address that was "Federalist in its conception,"' 45 Adams insisted on the same degree of
loyalty from his own Cabinet members that he had shown Monroe.
And in 1825 when he asked a former rival from Monroe's Cabinet,
William Crawford, to stay on as Secretary of the Treasury,
Crawford declined due to irreconcilable policy disagreements.2"
Moreover, consistent with the advice Adams had given Monroe,
Adams refused to disclose secret information to a friendly Congressman, indicating that he was forbidden from doing so by the
Constitution." 47 John Quincy Adams was clearly deeply and personally committed to the core principles of a unitary and independent executive branch.
Adams effectuated those principles by continuing the moderate
reappointment and removal practices of Monroe while echoing
Jefferson's criticisms of the Senate's attempts to influence federal
patronage. As Adams noted:
Efforts have been made by some of the senators to obtain
different nominations, and to introduce a principle of
change or rotation in office at the expiration of these commissions, which would make the government a perpetual
and unintermitting scramble for office .... A more pernicious expedient could scarcely have been devised .... I
determined to renominate every person against whom there
was no complaint which would have warranted his removal.248
The fact that Adams was reluctant to use his control of federal
patronage for political purposes, however, did not suggest that he
questioned the constitutional basis of the President's power to
remove. Indeed, Adams did remove twelve officials during his four
years in office.2 49 Adams's presidency, however, never recovered
from the circumstances of his election,"0 and his midterm con245. Id. at 41.
246. See WHrrE, THE JEFFERsONIANs, supra note 165, at 64.
247. Id. at 41 (citing Entry for March 15, 1828, in 7 MEmOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 212, at 475).
248. HARIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT, supra note 219, at 52 (citing JOHN T. MORSE,
JOHN QuINcY ADAMS, 178-79 (1898) for the Adams quote); see also 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 192-93; W=-TE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 389-90.
249. See WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 380; McDONALD, AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 255.
250. In the election of 1824, then Senator Andrew Jackson received 131 electoral votes,
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gressional elections left him without influence over Congress both
Houses of which were won for the first time by the president's
opponents." Given his lack of political support, Adams was understandably cautious in exercising his presidential prerogatives notwithstanding his firmn belief in them.
By the second half of the Administration of John Quincy Adams, however, Congress began showing renewed interest in placing
limits on the President's removal power. In 1826, a Senate select
committee on executive patronage reported a bill proposing "[t]hat,
in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill
vacancies occasioned by an exercise of the President's power to
remove from office, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the
Senate ... with a statement of the reasons for which such officer
'
may have been removed. '""a
Motivated more by the next election
than a desire to curtail presidential power, 3 the Report attempted
to evade the serious constitutional questions raised by these proposals by adopting a functionalist view of the Constitution, in which
deviating from the specific proscriptions of the Constitution was
justified so long as those deviations complied with "the spirit of
the constitution in laboring to multiply the guards and to strengthen
the barriers, against the possible abuse of power. a' ' In the
committee's opinion, this more dynamic view of the Constitution
was mandated by changed circumstances:
[T]he Committee cannot imagine that the jealous foresight
of the time, great as it was, or that any human sagacity,
could have foreseen, and placed a competent guard upon,
every possible avenue to abuse of power. The nature of a

while Adams received 99, William Crawford 41, and House Speaker Henry Clay 37.
Since no candidate received a majority of the electoral vote, under the Twelfth Amendment the President was to be selected by the House from among the top three candidates.
Although no longer able to stand as a candidate, as Speaker Clay was able to exert substantial influence over the election. In the "Corrupt Bargain," Clay was able to engineer
Adams's election. In return, Adams named Clay Secretary of State, the post then considered to be the stepping stone to the Presidency. Thus, as a minority President, Adams
always struggled against questions about the legitimacy of his election and general lack of
political support.
251. See WHrE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 42.
252. S. Doc. No. 88, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1826), reprinted in 2 CONG. DEB.
app. 133 (1826). The committee also proposed that military officers' commissions "continue in force during . . . good behaviour," and that such officers be only dismissed pursuant to a court martial or by congressional action. Id.
253. See WHIrrE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 391, 393.
254. S. Doc. No. 88, supra note 252, at 2.
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constitutional act excludes the possibility of combining
minute perfection with general excellence. After the exertion of all possible vigilance, something of what ought to
have been done, has been omitted, and much of what has
been attempted, has been found insufficient and unavailing
in practice."5
The Senate adjourned without acting on this proposal. Nonetheless,
the debate on the Benton Report foreshadowed the more6 serious
challenges to the President's removal power yet to come.25
By the end of John Quincy Adams's Administration, it was
clear that the strong, unitary presidency created by Washington,
Hamilton, and John Adams had survived the Jeffersonian period
largely intact. As Leonard White argues:
The Jeffersonian era in the field of administration was in
many respects a projection of Federalist ideals and practice.
The political differences between Jefferson and Hamilton
turned out to be much more profound and significant than
their differences in the manner and spirit of conducting the
public business. Jefferson and Gallatin, moreover, inherited
a going concern, and it developed that a brief twelve years
had been enough to set patterns that persisted throughout
the next thirty. The Federalists disappeared as a political
party, but their administrative system was adopted by their
political rivals.'
White concludes:
[N]o doubt arose in the minds of the Jeffersonians concerning the administrative supremacy of the President. The
department heads were responsible to him. The executive
power remained where the Constitution had placed its

255. Id. Curiously, the Report's reliance on dynamic constitutional theory is inconsistent
with its proposal of two constitutional amendments to create the proper balance between
executive and legislative control of federal patronage, which recognizes that the proper
way to adapt the Constitution to contemporary exigencies is by amending it. As the Report emphasizes, "The people made the Constitution, and they can amend it. They are the
only constitutional triers of the amendment. They alone have the power to adopt it. . .
Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
256. See WHrrE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 165, at 393.
257. Id. at vii.

258. Id. at 76.
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Thus, by 1829, exclusive presidential power over law execution
had already been firmly established, even as one of the strongest
presidencies in American history was getting ready to begin.
G. Andrew Jackson
Andrew Jackson was one of the most powerful presidents in
American history, and he clearly in some respects transformed and
enhanced the high office he held. In his development of the President's role as the leader of a political party and in the vigor with
which he pressed the President's claim to be a direct representative
of the people, Jackson clearly trod new ground. He also trod new
ground in the energy with which he used the veto power, especially in cases where he disapproved of bills on policy grounds rather
than for constitutional reasons. Finally, he used the president's
removal power and powers over law execution much more vigorously than they had ever been used before, and he endorsed a new
principal of the desirability of rotation in office that was clearly
contrary to the policy views held by his predecessors who had
favored stability in administration as a core value. From the point
of view of many political scientists and historians, then, the Jackson administration marks not the end of the Founding period but
rather a new beginning-the start of a period that culminates in the
strong modem presidencies that have characterized much of the
twentieth century.
We do not disagree with the view that Jackson greatly enhanced the office of the presidency by providing people with an
example of the leadership role that strong presidents can play. We
adamantly disagree, however, with the entirely different claim,
advanced most recently by Professors Lessig and Sunstein," 9 that
the Jackson Administration marked the advent of some new legal
role for the president where for the first time presidents acquired
power over law execution by the whole of the executive branch,
including the Treasury Department and the Post Office. From the
perspective of a constitutional lawyer, the Jackson Administration
was not a new beginning: it was a reaffirmation of the victories
won by James Wilson and James Madison at the Philadelphia
Convention-victories that were acknowledged by the First Congress in the Decision of 1789 and by all of Jackson's six predecessors in the White House.

259. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 78.
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It was for this reason that James Madison himself agreed with
Andrew Jackson's legal claims during the Bank War even though
he disliked Jackson and disapproved of many of his policies. Madison, of course, wrote in 1834 that "[t]he claim, [of the Senate] on
constitutional ground, to a share in the removal, as well as appointment of officers, [is] in direct opposition to the uniform practice of
the government from its commencement." He also described the
Senate's position as being "in opposition to the principles and
practice of every administration, my own included."2 6' Presumably, former President James Madison was in a better position to
judge the prior presidential practice in 1834 then are Professors
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein writing today, especially in a
situation where his political views were hostile to the administration in power.
The key error, then, committed by those anti-unitarians who
view the Jackson presidency as transformative is to confuse the
separate issues of whether Jackson's presidency was transformative
legally or politically. With respect to the legal matters we have
been discussing in this Article, Jackson's presidency was a reaffirmation of claims made and settled long before: Old Hickory broke
no new legal ground in his assertions about presidential control
over law execution.
In discussing the relevance of the Jackson presidency for the
unitary executive debate, we think it is useful to divide our analysis into three sections: the first section focusses on Jackson's
claims about the role of the president and his place in our constitutional system; the second section describes Jackson's views and
practice on presidential powers of removal and supervision of law
execution; and the third section illustrates the points discussed in
the first two sections by describing briefly the history of Jackson's
famous and successful war to kill the Bank of the United States.
1. Jackson's Claims about the Role of the President
in Our Constitutional System
Andrew Jackson vigorously articulated and defended what
Leonard White has called the Doctrine of Direct Representation. 2 He argued that the President is the direct representative
260. See Letter from James Madison to Edward Coles (Oct. 15, 1834) in 4 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 129, at 368 (emphasis added).
261. Letter from James Madison to Edward Coles (Aug. 29, 1834) in 4 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 129, at 355 (emphasis added).
262. See LEONARD B. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
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of the whole people of the United States and that the Cabinet
Secretaries are not.263 Presidential power over the Cabinet Secretaries follows easily from this point as does some degree of presidential authority relative to Congress. Obviously, the president ordinarily has something of an electoral mandate from the people,
while members of Congress in 1829 had a mandate only from their
districts and Senators from the legislature of their home state.
Jackson's theory built upon solid antecedents. James Wilson
had argued during the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention that the
method of electing the president made him "'the MAN OF THE
PEOPLE,"' as McDonald describes, "the one governmental official
who was elected to represent the entire country." 2" Similarly,
Washington and Jefferson had emphasized the president's independent electoral connection with the people. Nonetheless, Jackson
stressed this aspect of presidential legitimacy more heavily and
more publicly than had anyone before him, no doubt because of
his loss to John Quincy Adams in the House of Representatives in
1825, and he repeatedly called for a constitutional amendment
providing for direct election of the President.2"
Jackson's emphasis on the president's role as direct representative of the people reinforced every other claim of presidential
power he asserted. Vetoes for policy reasons, removals of recalcitrant Cabinet Secretaries, arguments for a presidential power of
constitutional interpretation-all of these claims of presidential
power were buttressed by the claim of democratic legitimacy that
Andrew Jackson advanced once he gained the office that had been
"stolen" from him in 1825.
The net effect of Jackson's claims of presidential power was to
bring together his opponents into a new political party called the
"Whig" party. The name was adopted to signify the party's "opposition to concentrated power in the hands of the chief executive"
(the similarly named Whig Party in England having
helped to lead the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and having opposed royal prerogatives). The newly formed Whigs adopted oppo-

1829-1861 23-28 (1954).
263. See id.
264. MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 201.
265. See WiTE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 23.
266. ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR 129 (1967) [hereinafter REMINI, BANK WAR].
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sition to executive power as a core plank of their program,267 and
it was the Whigs who for the first time in the 1830s and 1840s
adopted the view (as do Lessig and Sunstein) that the power of the
sword and the purse ought to be entirely separate" 5 and that the
Treasury Department should be independent of presidential control.
Indeed, William Henry Harrison, the first Whig president, said in
his inaugural address that "the framers of the Constitution committed a great error in not making the head of the Treasury Department 'entirely independent of the Executive'[, and he] accepted the
Clay-Calhoun doctrine that a President should communicate the
reasons for making removals, at least of the Secretary of the Treasury." ' Leonard White describes the Whigs as being so opposed
to Jackson and to executive power "that they outdid the most timorous Republicans of earlier years. 2 70
Andrew Jackson's Democratic Party triumphed over the Whig
opposition at almost every turn during the period between 1829
and 1837. Indeed, during the entire period between 1829 and 1861
the Jacksonian Democrats won the presidency six times and the
Whigs won only twice. Both of the two Whigs who won the presidency died in office and one was succeeded after only one month
in office by a man, John Tyler, who was "an old-school Democrat."27 ' The Whigs were completely ineffectual politically as a
presidential party and, during the brief periods they held the presidency, they tended to abandon their anti-executive power
views.' The main significance, then, of the Whig opposition to
"King Andrew I" (Jackson's nickname) was that it had no success
with the public during Jackson's administration or at any point
thereafter.
In defending presidential power, Andrew Jackson argued vehemently for a presidential role in constitutional interpretation. Like

267. See WHrTE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 46-49.
268. Leonard White observes: "The specific Whig reaction to Jackson's removal of the
deposits from the United States Bank was to demand 'the separation of the purse from
the sword."' WHinm, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 43. White goes on to quote
John Tyler, William Henry Harrison's Vice President and successor, as saying that "I
deem it of the most essential importance that a complete separation should take place
between the sword and the purse" Id.
269. Id. at 47.
270. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).

271. Id. at 6.
272. We will discuss and defend this point in the second Article in our four part series,
which will discuss the unitary executive debate during the second half-century of American history.
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Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George Washington before
him, Jackson believed that the President was a co-equal constitutional interpreter to the Supreme Court with an obligation independently to assess questions of constitutionality. He expressed his
views eloquently in his Veto Message of July 10, 1832 wherein he
vetoed the attempt to renew the Charter of the Bank of the United
States:
It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought to be considered as
settled by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme
Court. To this conclusion I cannot assent. Mere precedent
is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except
where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be
considered as well settled.
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for
itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution.
Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it,
and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the
duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of
the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any
bill or resolution which may be presented to them for
passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it
may be brought before them for judicial decision. The
opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress
than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on
that point the President is independent of both.27
Jackson's defense of the presidential role in constitutional interpretation is obviously sweeping. It is also of great importance because
it was made in so important (and fateful) a Veto Message. His
position may have manifested itself again in his failure to take any
action to enforce Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Worcester v.
Georgia,' which sought to give the Cherokee Indians the benefit
of the treaty rights they had negotiated with the federal govern-

273. Veto Message of July 10, 1832, in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 177, at
1139, 1144-45.
274. 6 Peters 515 (1832).
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ment 7 It was 'with respect to this case that Jackson was reputed
to have said, "Well, John Marshall has made his decision now let
him enforce it."'276
Jackson also defended presidential power in two other ways
that bear on the unitary executive debate. First, his Protest, delivered during the Bank War and discussed below, specifically endorses the view that the Executive Power Vesting Clause of Article II
was a grant of power and not a mere designation of office and
title. This, of course, puts Jackson squarely in the same camp with
Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison, all of whom as we have seen
took that position. Second, Jackson's vigorous use of the veto
power on both constitutional and policy grounds left little doubt
that the President would forcefully defend the prerogatives of his
office from congressional attempts to impair them by, for example,
curtailing presidential removal power.'l Such proposals were advanced by the Whigs in 1834 and actually passed in the Whigcontrolled Senate, only to be killed off in the 7House
of Representa8
tives, which was then held by the Democrats
2. Jackson, the Removal Power, and the President's
Power to Execute the Laws
Andrew Jackson vigorously defended presidential power in the
direct context of removal authority and authority to control the
execution of the laws by his subordinates. His legal position on
these matters was uncompromising and was founded upon the
generally shared understanding at the time of the powers that text
and practice had recognized as presidential prerogatives. As Leonard White reports:
To the constitutional argument against ... free use of the
removal power, Jackson's friends said flatly that the issue
was settled; [Daniel] Webster himself had said it for them,
indeed, better than they, although he proposed to reopen
what he believed to be an erroneous interpretation of the

275. See SMITH, supra note 174, at 516-18.
276. Id. at 518. Smith agrees with the received view that Jackson probably did not
make the statement at least in this form, and he notes that at this point Jackson did not
have a responsibility to enforce the Court's judgment.
277. See WHrrE, TnE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 28-33. Jackson used the veto far
more often than his predecessors, and he greatly expanded the use of the veto for pure
policy reasons. Jackson also originated the use of the pocket veto. Id.
278. See id. at 40-42.
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Constitution: an interpretation, he admitted "settled by
constriction; settled by precedent; settled by the practice of
'
the Government; and settled by statute."279
Jackson had no doubt about his legal power to remove subordinate
officials, and all of the individuals he removed (including Treasury
Secretary Duane) complied readily with his orders dismissing them.
The Whig opposition sought to change matters, but Jackson prevailed in his removal policy at every turn.
Jackson vigorously exercised the full legal powers that text and
practice conferred. Indeed, he exercised his legal powers of removal in a genuinely new and aggressive way." ° In doing this, Jackson was guided by a firm belief in what he called the benefits of
"rotation in office'""-what we would call term limits. Jackson
believed that "rotation in office" would democratize the government and improve the quality of the administration by limiting
opportunities for corruption and laziness in public life. 2 He thus
rejected the Federalist and Jeffersonian preference for a permanent
and professional civil service.8 Unfortunately, the consequences

279. Wnrra, THE JAcKsoNIANS, supra note 262, at 33 (emphasis added).
280. See id. at 33-34.
281. Id. at 300-324.
282. As Jackson noted in his First Annual Message, "I can not but believe that more is
lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their
experience." He elaborated:
There, are, perhaps, few men who can for any great length of time
enjoy office and power without being more or less under the influence of feelings unfavorable to the faithful discharge of their public duties. Their integrity
may be proof against improper considerations immediately addressed to themselves, but they are apt to acquire a habit of looking with indifference upon
the public interests and of tolerating conduct from which an unpracticed man
would revolt. . .. Corruption in some and in others a perversion of correct
feelings and principles divert government from its legitimate ends and make it
an engine for the support of the few at the expense of the many...
In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the
people no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another. . . . No individual wrong is, therefore, done by removal, since neither appointment to nor continuance in office is matter of right. . . . It is the people,
and they alone, who have a right to complain when a bad officer is substituted
for a good one. He who is removed has the same means of obtaining a living
that are enjoyed by the millions who never held office.
Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8,1829), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra
note 177, at 1005, 1011-12; see also I GOLDSMrrH, supra note 125, at 175-77; VAN
RIPER, supra note 77, at 31, 36-37.
283. See wHrrE, THE JACKsoNiANS, supra note 262, at 300-301.
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of the Jacksonian system were less than benign, 4 and the net
result was to set in motion a train of events that would only end
in the 1880s with the adoption of the civil service laws, which
helped to restore some degree of quality control to the lower levels
of the bureaucracy. (After a momentous fight, Presidential removal
power was retained for policy-making positions when the second
Tenure of Office Act was finally repealed in 1887.85)
Although Jackson firmly endorsed the principle of rotation in
office, his actual exercise of the removal power was not quite as
sweeping as his opponents sometimes seemed to think. Leonard
White reports:
The shock was undoubtedly great, but the statistics show
that the number of removals, although unprecedented, was
small in terms of percentage.... [During the first eighteen
months of Jackson's term, the] figures showed a total of
919 removals out of 10,093 officeholders or somewhat less
than 10 per cent. 6
White reports that another study suggests that during the rest of
Jackson's Administration "less than 20% of all officeholders were
removed, and ... probably the figure was nearer 10 per cent," 7
and, if one looks at presidential offices only, 252 officers out of
612 were removed during Jackson's two terms."5 Thus, although
Jackson clearly used the removal power much more broadly and
for different reasons than had his predecessors, his use of that
power was not quite so extraordinary as his political opponents
claimed. Jackson removed more officers than all of his predecessors combined, 9 but in percentage terms he made fewer removals than Jefferson. 2'

284. See id. at 325-46.
285. These developments are discussed in the second Article of our four part series,
forthcoming from this law review.
286. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 307-08.
287. Id.
288. See id. at n.24 (citing FISH, supra note 77, at 125).
289. See FISH, supra note 77, at 74; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFL.IcTs, supra note
125, at 58; 2 HAYNES, supra note 155, at 793; GEORGE W. PEPPER, FAILY QUARRELS:
THE PRESIDENT, THE SENATE, THE HOUSE 110-11 (1931); Fisher, Removal Power, supra
note 21, at 65.
290. See VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 30, 34-36; see also Fisher, Removal Power,
supra note 21, at 65 (citing Erik M. Eriksson, The Federal Civil Service under President
Jackson, 13 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REv. 517 (1927)); FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS,
supra note 125, at 58 (same); I GOLDSMITH, supra note 125, at 177; WHITE, THE JACK-
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Jackson's most important and extraordinary removal came in
1833 with his firing of Treasury Secretary Duane during the Bank
War. Even before that momentous event his removal policy had the
political opposition up in arms.29 In 1830 and 1833, a series of
unsuccessful resolutions were put forward all of which were aimed
at limiting the President's removal power.2' Although these initial resolutions were rejected,293 in 1835 the Senate finally passed
a resolution asking the President to communicate the charges that
had led to the removal of Surveyor General Gideon Fitz, a com-

SONIANS, supra note 262, at 307-08.
291. See WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 40.
292. In 1830, Senator Barton introduced resolutions calling upon the President to "inform the Senate of the cause or causes that existed for the removal[s]" of Theodore Hunt
and William Clark. 6 CONG. DEB. 367 (1830) (Theodore Hunt); id. at 457-70 (William
Clark); 8 Cong. Deb. 165-66 (1830); see also 2 HAYNES, supra note 155, at 793. Barton
also introduced resolutions challenging the constitutionality of Jackson's removals. See S.
Doc. No. 103, 21st Cong., 1st Sess. (1830); see also DARRELL H. SMITH, THE UNITED
STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

3 (1928)

[hereinafter SMITH, CIVIL SERVICE].

In

support of these resolutions, Barton charged that Jackson's unfettered exercise of the removal power constituted "an absolute despotism and right of dark and ex parte inquisition" that was inconsistent with democratic government: "It fell upon my ear like the
anathema of the minority pronounced from the modem Vatican! It sounded like the knell
of our constitutional liberties!" 6 CONG. DEB. 459 (1830).
Shortly thereafter, Senator Holmes offered another series of resolutions criticizing
Jackson's removal policies and requesting information on the reasons for all of his removals. See 6 CONG. DEB. 385 (1830); see also 2 HAYNEs, supra note 155, at 794. Holmes
admonished, "A President, with unlimited discretion in removals and appointments, ...
has only to will it, and he is the tyrant. It is done, it is finished, and the liberties of the
people are gone forever." 6 CONG. DEB. 396 (1830).
Two years later, Senator Thomas Ewing introduced the most sweeping resolution of
all:
That the practice of removing public officers by the President for any other
purpose than that of securing a faithful execution of the laws, is hostile to the
spirit of the Constitution, was never contemplated by its framers, is an extension of executive influence, is prejudicial to the public service and dangerous to
the liberties of the people;
That it is inexpedient for the Senate to advise and consent to the
appointment of any person to fill a supposed vacancy in any office, occasioned
by the removal of a prior incumbent, unless such a prior incumbent shall appear to have been removed for a sufficient cause.
S. Doc. No. 41, 22d Cong., 1st Sess. (1832); see also SMITH, CIVIL SERVICE, supra, at
3.
293. See 6 CONG. DEB. 374 (1830) (tabling Barton's resolution regarding Hunt); id. at
396 (voting to postpone the Holmes's resolutions by a vote of 24 to 21); 2 HAYNES,
supra note 155, at 794 & n.2 (noting that Barton's resolution regarding Clark failed 22 to
26); SMITH, CIVIL SERVICE, supra note 292, at 3 (noting failure of Ewing resolutions).
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munication the Senate claimed was needed for it to act on the
nomination of his successor.294
Jackson bluntly refused to comply, charging that the resolution
"either related to the subjects exclusively belonging to the executive department or otherwise encroached on the constitutional powers of the Executive." Jackson reasoned, "The President in cases of
this nature possesses the exclusive power of removal from office."
Senate interference in removals could not be tolerated, because
"[s]uch a result, if acquiesced in, would ultimately subject the
independent constitutional action of the Executive in a matter of
great national concernment to the domination and control of the
Senate."295 Therefore, Jackson concluded:
[Although I have complied with previous requests] [i]t is
now ... my solemn conviction that I ought no longer...
to yield to these unconstitutional demands. Their continued
repetition imposes on me, as the representative and trustee
of the American people, the painful but imperious duty of
resisting to the utmost any further encroachment on the
rights of the Executive.296
The Senate retaliated by rejecting Jackson's choice to succeed
Fitz, which had been pending for three months. Jackson tried to
force the issue the following year by renominating the same person
to the same post.2" The Senate again refused to confirm him by
a vote of nearly two to one, but this did nothing to blunt the force
with which Jackson defended his removal powers.

294. See Warren, supra note 21, at 11.
295. Andrew Jackson, Message to the Senate (Feb. 10, 1835), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 177, at 1351, 1351-53.
296. Id. at 1352; see also 2 HAYNES, supra note 155, at 796-97; Warren, supra note
21, at 11; Younger, supra note 227, at 759-60. The following year, Treasury Secretary
Levi Woodbury expressed a similar view in refusing a request by Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John Davis for information regarding the removal of David Melvill as
weigher and gauger in the custom-house at Newport, Rhode Island. Woodbury stated:
Nor is it the practice of the Department, even under the injunction of secrecy
in transacting Executive business as to appointments, where the Senate is, by
law, a co-ordinate power, to forward communications on those subjects, unless
they relate to nominations by the President, then under advisement before the
Senate.
Letter from Levi Woodbury to John Davis (May 5, 1836), in S. DoC. No. 430, 24th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 30 (1836).
297. See 2 HAYNES, supra note 155, at 797.
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The Jackson Administration also vigorously defended presidential powers to supervise exercise of law execution. While not completely consistent on the issue, Jackson's Attorneys General began
challenging Wirt's conclusion that the President could not interfere
with the decisions of accounting officers.29 Jackson's conduct

298. Jackson's first Attorney General, John MacPherson Berrien, concluded that a decision of the Second Comptroller of the Treasury "could only be set aside by the Secretary,
acting by the direction of the President." Berrien even suggested that the Secretary of
War could overturn a decision of the Second Comptroller even without explicit authorization from the President, reasoning that "the Secretary must possess this power, or Congress would have placed him at the head of the Department of War to be subjected to
the control of a subordinate officer of the Treasury." 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 302, 303-04
(1829).
Jackson's second Attorney General, future Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, at fist also
strongly supported the President's power to direct all subordinate officers, including both
district attorneys and accounting officers. As Taney concluded:
Upon the whole, I consider
tion of the President . . .
President to direct him to
point out to him, his duty,
ly or indirectly concerned.

the district attorney as under the control and direcand that it is within the legitimate power of the
institute or to discontinue a pending suit, and to
whenever the interest of the United States is direct-

[Even if Congress were to delegate prosecutorial discretion to some other executive official,] it would not, and could not, deprive the President of the powers
which belong to him under the constitution. The power conferred on the [subordinate executive official], by the law of Congress, would be merely in aid of
the President, and to lighten the labors of his office. It could not restrain or
limit his constitutional powers.
2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482, 489, 492 (1831). And if a district attorney refused to follow the
President's directions, the President would be entitled to remove him. Id. at 489. Consistent with Berrien's opinion, Taney also concluded that a Secretary of War's confirmation
of an accounting officer's decision was appealable to the President. Taney did conclude
that once one Secretary had confirmed such a decision, that successor's Secretaries could
not reopen that decision. That this bar to subsequent reconsideration by the Secretary in
no way precluded subsequent presidential review is implicit in Taney's statement that
"[tihe party may carry his appeal from the Secretary of War before the President." 2 Op.
Att'y Gen. 463, 464 (1831).
A subsequent Taney opinion issued the following year wavered from this position
somewhat. Taney still maintained that the President had "the legal power to order the
dismissal of a suit instituted in the name of the United States" or to "compel the officer
to prepare for trial and proceed to trial without delay." 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 507, 508, 510
(1832). However, the laws governing the settlement of accounts "seem to regard the decision of the Comptroller as final" and "appear . . . not to contemplate any appeal to the
President." Therefore, Taney thought "that the decision of the Comptroller in this case is
conclusive upon the executive branch of the government" and was not subject to subsequent presidential review. Id. at 509; see also 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 544 (1832). An opinion
issued in between the two principle opinions clearly advised the President against overturning a decision of the accounting officers, but it is not clear whether Taney's advice
was based on policy grounds or a belief that the President lacked the authority to inter-
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makes it clear that he personally harbored no doubts about his
power to control all parts of the executive branch. Jackson dominated his cabinet secretaries, treating them, as one historian has
noted, "more like a General's orderlies than high civil officials."' 9 Like Jefferson, he took direct control over federal criminal prosecutions, ordering a district attorney to terminate condemnation proceedings then pending over jewels owned by the Princess
of Orange." Moreover, when Attorney General Berrien resisted
Jackson's early efforts to subdue the Bank of the United States,
Jackson bluntly told Berrien, "[Y]ou must find a law authorizing
the act or I will appoint an Attorney General who will," after
which Berrien resigned and was replaced with Roger Taney.3"'
But as we shall see, these initial assertions of presidential control
of the executive branch, strong as they were, paled in comparison
to Jackson's subsequent actions during his war with the Bank of
the United States. Jackson's resounding victory in that struggle, a
victory in which he was fully supported by a mobilized and envene. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 515 (1831).
Taney's successor (and one of the future House managers of Andrew Johnson's
impeachment), Benjamin F. Butler, returned to the position espoused by Berrien, relying
squarely on Berrien's opinion for the proposition that a Cabinet Secretary could either
direct the Comptroller's resolution of any account that had not yet been finalized or revise the decision upon reviewing the Comptroller's report. See 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 652
(1834). And since the Secretaries were clearly subject to presidential direction, this logically implied that nothing prohibited the President from directing the actions of the accounting officers. In fact, Butler went so far as to suggest that, despite the statutory language indicating that the decisions of the accounting officers were to be conclusive, "the
Comptroller, or the head of the department, may be authorized to interfere for the purpose
of correcting errors of frauds which may have been discovered after the action of the
Auditor." 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 625, 630 (1834). Thus, although Jackson's Attorneys General
did waver on the issue, on balance they tended to support the President's power to direct
all subordinates.
299. HINSDALE, supra note 156, at 313-14, quoted in Cross, Executive Orders 12,291
and 12,498, supra note 3, at 488.
300. See Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 3, at 488; Zamir,
supra note 24, at 877; see also 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482, 489 (1831). Like Washington,
Jackson also asked Congress to concentrate all legal authority in a newly formed department. See Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message to Congress, in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS,
supra note 177, at 1005, 1016-17. Jackson only succeeded in effecting the creation of a
Solicitor of the Treasury who was given the authority to control the United States Attorneys. See Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 153, sec. 5, 4 Stat. 414, 415; see also Bloch, supra
note 16, at 618 n.184; Harvey, supra note 106, at 1578 & n.52. Jackson's direction of
this prosecution clearly indicates that Jackson believed that his authority to control federal
prosecutions did not depend on the creation of such a department.
301. Harvey, supra note 106, at 1679 (quoting ARTHMU S. MILLER, The Attorney General as the President's Lawyer, in ROLES OF THE ATORNEY GENERAL 41, 51 (1968))
(quoting Senator George H. William's account of events)).
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gaged public opinion, constitutes one of the truly great moments in
the 208 year history of the unitary executive.
3. Jackson's Battle with the Bank and the Removal
of Treasury Secretary Duane
The conflict between Andrew Jackson and Congress over the
Second Bank of the United States began in 1832 when Jackson
vetoed the bill to recharter the Bank, 3 and won reelection in a
campaign in which the Bank had been a major issue.3 3 Jackson
hated the Bank with an almost irrational vehemence, and he described it at times as a hydra-headed monster that impaired the
morals of the American people, corrupted their leaders, and threatened their liberty."M Jackson's disdain for the Bank was further
enhanced by the active role the Bank played in opposing his reelection in 1832,"°s and by the proud and difficult personality of
the Bank's stubborn and vain president, Nicholas Biddle."r After
Biddle's foolish and unsuccessful involvement in several political
disputes with Jackson, 3 7 and particularly after his reckless opposition to Jackson in the 1832 election, the outraged and hot-tempered
President resolved to destroy the Bank as soon as possible rather
than waiting for its charter from the federal government to expire

302. In what is now widely perceived as a blunder, the Bank's President, Nicholas
Biddle, pressed for its recharter four years before its initial charter was to expire. Jackson
took the recharter proposal both as a challenge to his independence and as an indication
of the Bank's intention to meddle in electoral politics. The Bank's political machinations
only hardened Jackson's resolve to destroy it so as to end its involvement in politics. At
the height of the Bank War, Jackson is said to have remarked to his Vice President,
"The Bank, Mr. Van Buren, is trying to kill me, but I will kill it." WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HIsToRIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND
PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 252 (1992) (citing ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE

OF JACKSON 89 (1946)). See generally RICHARD B. LATNER, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JACKSON 165 (1979); REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 75- 80; ROBERT V.
REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 1833-1845, at

143 (1984) [hereinafter REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY]; WALTER B. SMITH, ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 149-154 (1953) [hereinafter
SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS].
303. See RALPH C.H. CATTERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 285

(1902); THOMAS P. GOVAN, NICHOLAS BIDDLE 242 (1959); LATNER, supra note 303, at
165; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 45-46, 99-100; SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS,
supra note 303, at 149, 156.
304. See REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 15.
305. See id. at 98-99.
306. See id. at 32-35, 176.
307. See id. at 74-75.
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in 1836.2"8 The mechanism that Jackson settled upon to accomplish this feat was to remove the federal money deposited in the
Bank. After some investigation and study, Jackson and his close
aide Amos Kendall resolved that the federal money would be
placed instead in a consortium of politically friendly state banks,
later known as "pet" banks, as had been done previously in
9

1819.30

The Bank's charter authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
remove the federal deposits so long as the Secretary transmitted his
reasons for doing so to Congress."' Because Jackson's first Treasury Secretary, Louis McLane, had previously opposed removing
the deposits, Jackson reshuffled his Cabinet, promoting McLane to
Secretary of State and naming William J. Duane, who up to that
point had been an ardent opponent of the Bank, as the new Treasury Secretary in June of 1833.2" However, when Jackson
pressed Duane to remove the deposits, Duane was surprisingly
312

reluctant to do so.

308. See id. at 109.
309. See LATNER, supra note 302, at 171; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 125;
REMIN, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 108-111. For a reprint of Treasury
Secretary William Crawford's 1820 report regarding the removal of the deposits, see 10
CONG. DEB. app. 131-46 (1834).
The President's power to remove the deposits essentially vitiates the suggestion offered by Lessig and Sunstein that the Second Bank of the United States constituted "the
first truly independent agency in the republic's history." Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6,
at 30; see also Froomkin, Note, supra note 6, at 808. Although only five of the Bank's
twenty-five directors were presidential appointees, the President always retained the power
eliminate the Bank's role in federal fiscal policy by ordering the removal of federal moneys from the Bank. Thus, as subsequent events would soon demonstrate, nothing about the
Bank's structure prevented the President from asserting complete control over the execution of federal policy. Once all federal funds were removed from the Bank, it became in
essence a wholly private entity with no governmental role of any kind. At that point, it
ceases to be relevant that only five of the twenty-five directors were presidential appointees.

310. See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, sec. 16, 3 Stat. 266, 274; see also Lessig &
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 79 & n.312.
311. See REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 115.
312. Unfortunately, Jackson and his friends mishandled Duane almost from the beginning. Shortly after Duane was appointed, lower-level Treasury officers and Kitchen Cabinet members Reuben M. Whitney and Amos Kendall both bluntly told Duane that he was
expected to remove the deposits immediately. Being ordered around by his subordinates
wounded Duane's pride and, in Duane's mind, reduced him "to a mere cypher [sic] in
the administration." William J. Duane, Address to the People of the United States (Dec.
2, 1833), reprinted in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 305 (1834). When Duane, confronted Jackson
with their statements, Jackson assured Duane that he did not authorize Whitney and Kendall's visit, but did admit that he wanted the deposits removed. Duane indicated his opposition to such action, but agreed to resign if unable to comply with Jackson's wishes.
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The conflict between Duane and Jackson came to a head during a series of Cabinet meetings held in September 1833. Jackson

polled his Cabinet on the issue and discovered that support for
removing the deposits was tepid at best.313 Undeterred by his
Cabinet's lack of enthusiasm, the very next day Jackson directed
his Attorney General Roger B. Taney to read an "Expos6" that he
had prepared for the President. It began with a strong exposition of
the President's mandate to proceed against the Bank by virtue of
his recent reelection, calling it "a decision of the people against the
bank." Since Jackson "was sustained by a just people .... he
desires to evince his gratitude by carrying into effect their decision
so far as it depends upon him."3 4 It then detailed several actions
by the Bank as evidence of the Bank's corruption. First, the
Expos6 cited the Bank's failure to redeem the national debt in
accordance with law.3"5 Second, the Expos6 described the Bank's

Duane's pride suffered another blow on the following month when Jackson ordered Duane
to appoint Amos Kendall as an agent for recruiting state banks to serve as depositories
for federal funds in place of the Bank. When Duane temporized, Jackson overruled Duane
and instructed Kendall to draw up any orders he saw fit. Armed with his own instructions, Kendall quickly enlisted a group of state banks willing to risk the Bank's wrath
and serve as depositories for the federal government See CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE PARTY BATTLES OF THE JACKSON PERIOD 295-96 (1965); CATrERALL, supra note 303, at
292-93; GOVAN, supra note 303, at 236-39; MARQUIS JAMES, THE LIFE OF ANDREW
JACKSON 649 (1938); LATNER, supra note 302, at 174-75; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra
note 266, at 114-17; REMmI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 65, 86, 94
n.47, 116-17.
313. See BOWERS, supra note 312, at 303; CATrERALL, supra note 303, at 295-96;
LATNER, supra note 302, at 180; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 118; REMINI,
COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 95-96.
314. Andrew Jackson, Removal of the Public Deposits (Sept. 18, 1833), in 3 MESSAGES
& PAPERS, supra note 177, at 1224, 1226 [hereinafter Jackson, Expos6]. As Jackson further noted:
The object avowed by many of the advocates of the bank was [in
asking for a recharter] to put the President to the test, that the country might
know his final determination relative to the bank prior to the ensuing election ....
Can it now be said that the question of a recharter of the bank was
not decided at the election which ensued? . . . On that ground the case was
argued to the people; and now that the people have sustained the President, ..

. it is too late . . . to say that the question has not been decided.

Id. at 1225-26 (emphasis in original); see also REMwI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at
118-19; REmINi, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 97.
315. See Jackson, Expos6, supra note 314, at 1229-30. In March of 1832, the government notified the Bank that it intended in July of that year to redeem half of the $13
million in three-percent bonds it had issued, and it later informed the Bank that it intended to redeem the other half on January 1, 1833. However, when the scheduled redemption
dates arrived, the Bank did not have the cash to redeem the bonds. Even the three-month

1997]

THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE

1541

reprehensible conduct when the French government refused to
honor a draft given to the United States under a treaty for reparations for the spoliation of American-owned property destroyed
during the Napoleonic Wars." 6 Third, the Expos6 pointed out that
the Bank had refused to seat the government-appointed Bank directors on any committees and frequently had conducted business
without them even though the board then lacked a working quorum." 7 Finally, the Expos6 pointed out that the Bank had become
improperly involved in politics, openly campaigning against Jackson in the previous presidential election." 8 Jackson clearly believed, and with some justification," 9 that the Bank was a renegade institution and that it absolutely had to be stopped.3"
The Cabinet reacted to the Expos6 with a stunned silence.
Several Cabinet members who had previously opposed removing
the deposits worried that their positions had been compromised and
offered their resignations. Reluctant to initiate a Cabinet shakeup,
Jackson worked hard to persuade them to remain in office. He
assumed full responsibility for removing the deposits, and he suc-

extension negotiated by Biddle for the first redemption was insufficient to allow the Bank
to repay the debt. This enraged Jackson, whose conservative fiscal policy made him a
strong advocate for repaying the debt. To make matters worse, the envoy Biddle sent to
Europe to obtain relief from foreign holders of the bonds negotiated an agreement that
violated the Bank charter's prohibition against purchasing the public debt.
Biddle cavalierly brushed off the resulting hubbub, stating that he did not see how
the delay in redeeming of the bonds for a few months or the violation of the charter was
material so long as the interest had stopped accruing and the federal government retained
the use of its funds. The ensuing public outcry eventually forced Biddle to repudiate the
agreement with the foreign debt holders, and the national debt was not retired until late
1833. See BOWERS, supra note 312, at 304; LATNER, supra note 302, at 165; REMINI,
BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 119-21; REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note
302, at 97-98; SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS, supra note 302, at 150, 156-58.
316. See Jackson, Expos6, supra note 314, at 1231-32. The draft was returned unpaid
because the French Chamber of Deputies had failed to appropriate the funds for those
reparations. When payment of the draft was refused by the French government, Biddle
charged the federal government fifteen percent of the principal in interest, costs, reexchange, and damages. When the federal government refused to pay these charges, Biddle
deducted it from the government's Bank dividends. See CATrERALL, supra note 303, at
299-300; GOVAN, supra note 303, at 233-34; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at
119-20; REMtaN, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 98; SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS, supra note 302, at 159-60.
317. See Jackson, Expos6, supra note 314, at 1232-33; see also LATNER, supra note
302, at 165.
318. See Jackson, Expos6, supra note 314, at 1233-35, 1237.
319. See REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 176.
320. See GOVAN, supra note 303, at 248; JAMES, supra note 312, at 649; LATHER,
supra note 302, at 181.
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cessfully entreated his Cabinet Secretaries to stay in office.32'
Treasury Secretary Duane asked Jackson if he was being directed
by the President to remove the deposits, and Jackson answered
affirmatively.3 2 The next day, Jackson sent a message asking
Duane if he had made his decision. When Duane asked for a delay
until September 21, Jackson informed Duane that the removal of
the deposits would be announced by the newspapers on September
20 with or without Duane's consent.3"
When the announcement appeared in the Washington Globe as
indicated,3 24 Duane obstinately dug in his heels, asking that the
removal be delayed ten weeks until Congress was back in session.
Jackson remained adamant, insisting, "Not a day, not an hour. ''3
""
Duane persisted, sending Jackson a puerile series of letters attempting to justify his actions and rescinding his previous promise to
resign.3 26 Not wanting to argue further with Duane, Jackson returned Duane's letter describing it "as a communication which I
cannot receive," and this time he requested that Duane adhere to
his previous promise to resign. 27 After Duane continued to refuse
to remove the deposits, Jackson sent Duane a curt letter on September 23 dismissing him as Secretary of the Treasury.32 Shortly
321. See LATNER, supra note 302, at 182; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 12425; REMINi, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 99, 103-04.
322. See REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 122; REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRAcy, supra note 302, at 99.
323. See BOWERS, supra note 312, at 306; GOvAN, supra note 303, at 243; REINI,
BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 122; REMIm, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at
99-100
324. See WASH. GLOBE, Sept. 20, 1833, reprinted in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 306 (1834);
see also BOWERS, supra note 312, at 306; REMiNI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 122.
325. REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 124; REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY,
supra note 302, at 101.
326. See Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the President of the United States
(No. 2, Sept. 21, 1833), in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 306, 306-07 (1834); Letter from the
Secretary of the Treasury to the President of the United States (No. 4, Sept. 21, 1833), in
10 CONG. DEB. app. 307, 308 (1834); Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the
President of the United States (No. 5, Sept. 21, 1833), in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 308, 308
(1834); Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the President of the United States
(No. 6, Sept. 21, 1833), in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 308, 309 (1834); see also BOWERS,
supra note 312, at 307-08; CATrERALL, supra note 303, at 293-94; REMINI, COURSE OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 100-01.
327. Letter from the President of the United States to the Secretary of the Treasury
(No. 3, Sept. 21, 1833), in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 307, 307 (1834) (returning Duane's first
letter). Jackson later returned Duane's subsequent letters as "inadmissible" along with his
letter removing Duane. See Letter from the President of the United States to the Secretary
of the Treasury (No. 7, Sept. 23, 1833), in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 309, 309 (1834) [hereinafter, Jackson, Duane Removal Letter].
328. Jackson's letter read as follows:
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after Jackson appointed Taney as Duane's successor, Taney announced the removal of the deposits.329
Taney's actions triggered a battle between Congress and the
President of a magnitude the country had never before witnessed.
The conflict led to the creation of the Whig Party during the winter of 1833-34, and it was in the Whig-controlled Senate that the
conflict was sharpest as some of the greatest orators in the history
33
of Congress spoke out against the actions of "King Andrew v1 0
The opposition was led by the famous triumvirate of Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, and Henry Clay. It fell to Clay, a long-time
Bank supporter, defeated by Jackson in the election of 1832, to
call for an immediate investigation into the removal of the deposits
that would be conducted by the entire Senate rather than by a
committee. As a part of this investigation, on December 10, 1833,
Clay introduced a resolution requesting that Jackson lay a copy of
the Expos6 before the Senate in order to ensure that the newspa-

[F]rom all your recent communications, as well as your recent conduct, your
feelings and sentiments appear to be of such a character that, after your letter
of July last, in which you say, should your views not accord with mine "I will
from respect to you and for myself, afford you an opportunity to select a successor whose views may accord with your own on the important matter in
contemplation," and your determination now to disregard the pledge you then
gave, I feel myself constrained to notify you that your further services as Secretary of the Treasury are no longer required.
Jackson, Duane Removal Letter, supra note 327, at 309; see also LATNER, supra note
302, at 181; REMIN, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 124; REMINt, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 102.
329. See Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting a Report upon the
Subject of the Removal of the Public Deposits from the Bank of the United States (Dec.
3, 1833), in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 59 (1834). Interestingly, Taney accepted the Treasury
portfolio even though he owned stock in one of the state banks recruited to hold the
federal funds in place of the Bank of the United States. This, of course, placed Taney in
a direct conflict of interest. Taney's position worsened further when that state bank's
financial troubles led it to balance its own accounts by improperly drawing on funds that
the federal government had given to it to protect against any future retaliation by the
Bank of the United States. See CATrERALL, supra note 303, at 303; GOVAN, supra note
303, at 245; JAMES, supra note 312, at 651; REMINi, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note
302, at 105-06.
330. Claude Bowers aptly entities his chapter discussing this debate as "The Battle of
the Gods." BOWERS, supra note 312, at 322. Thomas A.R. Nelson similarly observed in
his closing argument during the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, "There were giants
in those days." 2 THE TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 161 (Washington, Gov't Printing
Off. 1868) [hereinafter TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON]; see also REMINI, BANK WAR, supra

note 266, at 130; GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE LIFE OF HENRY CLAY 278 (1937).
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pers had reported it accurately. This resolution carried by a vote of
twenty-three to eighteen.33 ' Even though the Expos6 had been
widely published and was eventually even reprinted in the Register
of Debates,332 Jackson refused to comply, exclaiming:
The executive is a coordinate and independent branch of
the Government equally with the Senate, and I have yet to
learn under what constitutional authority that branch of the
Legislature has a right to require of me an account of any
communication ...
made to the heads of Departments
acting as a Cabinet council.333
Clay retaliated on December 26 by introducing a series of four
resolutions to censure Jackson. The first three resolutions addressed
whether the circumstances justified the removal of the deposits.
The fourth resolution condemned Duane's removal:
[B]y dismissing the late Secretary of the Treasury because
he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty, remove the money of the United States in deposite [sic] with
the Bank of the United States and its branches, in conformity with the President's opinion; and by appointing his
successor to effect such removal, which has been done, the
President has assumed the exercise of a power over the
treasury of the United States, not granted to him by the
constitution and laws, and dangerous to the liberties of the
people.3 4

331. See 10 CONG. DEB. 23-37 (1833).
332. See 10 CONG. DEB. app. 284 (1834).
333. Andrew Jackson, Message to the Senate (Dec. 12, 1833), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 177, at 1255, 1255; see also BOWERS, supra note 312, at 323; JAMES,
supra note 312, at 655-56; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 137; REMINI, COURSE
OF DEMocRAcY, supra note 302, at 123; Younger, supra note 227, at 759.
334. 10 CONG. DEB. 58 (1833). The resolution was subsequently amended so that the
final version read: "That the President, in the late executive proceedings in relation to the
public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority not conferred by the constitution and
laws, but in derogation of both." Id. at 1187 (1834); see also REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 124-25. For the various versions of the resolutions, see
Senator Benton's statements at 10 CONG. DEB. 637-38, 1699 (1834).
In debating these resolutions, Clay charged, "We are . . . in the midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless, but rapidly tending towards a total change of the pure republican
character of the Government, and to the concentration of all power in the hands of one
man." 10 CONG. DEB. 59 (1833).
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Despite the best efforts of Jackson's supporters, these resolutions
passed the Senate on March 29, 1834, by a vote of twenty-six to
twenty.335
Passage of this censure resolution enraged Jackson. In response,
he submitted a "Protest" in which he condemned the Senate's
actions.336 Since Jackson had been compelled to swear an oath to
"preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution," it was his "imperative duty to maintain the supremacy of that sacred instrument and
the immunities of the department intrusted to my care by all means
consistent with my own lawful powers, with the rights of others,
and with the genius of our civil institutions." Therefore, because
the censure resolution was "not only unauthorized by the Constitution, but in many respects repugnant to its provisions and subversive of the rights secured by it to other coordinate departments,"
Jackson concluded that he had no choice but to offer his "solemn

335. See 10 CONG. DEB. 1187 (1834); see also BOWERS, supra note 312, at 330, 337;
CATrERALL, supra note 303, at 346; GOVAN, supra note 303, at 266; JAMES, supra note
312, at 674; REMImN, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 137-41; REMNI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 149-52; VAN DEUSEN, supra note 330, at 284.
Clay also took other actions to oppose Jackson. He considered fomenting impeachment proceedings against Jackson based on Jackson's removals and vetoes, but -vas dissuaded by his colleagues. VAN DEUSEN, supra note 330, at 297. Clay later submitted
additional anti-Jackson resolutions providing:
1. Resolved, That the constitution of the United States does not vest
in the President power to remove at his pleasure officers under the Government
of the United States, whose offices have been established by law.
2. Resolved, That, in all cases of offices created by law, the tenure
of holding which is not
prescribed by the constitution, Congress is authorized by the constitution to prescribe the tenure, terms, and conditions on which
they are to be holden.
3. Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to
inquire into the expediency of providing by law that in all instances of appointment to office by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, other than diplomatic appointments, the power of removal shall be
exercised only in concurrence with the Senate, and, when the Senate is not in
session, that the President may suspend any such officer, communicating his
reasons for the suspension to the Senate at its first succeeding session; and, if
the Senate concur with him, the officer shall be removed, but if it do not
concur with him, the officer shall be restored to office.
10 CONG. DEB. 834-36 (1834). These resolutions were made the order of the day on
April 7, 1834, but were never debated in the Senate. See id. at 1260; see also VAN
DEUSEN, supra note 330, at 297-98.
336. Andrew Jackson, Protest (Apr. 15, 1834), 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 177,
at 1288 [hereinafter Jackson, Protest]; see also BOWERS, supra note 312, at 330, 339;
GOVAN, supra note 303, at 266; JAMES, supra note 312, at 674; REMINI, BANK WAR,
supra note 266, at 142-43; REmiNm, COURSE OF DEMocRAcY, supra note 302, at 152-53.
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protest" to the censure resolution as an unconstitutional action on
the part of the Senate.337
Jackson began his Protest by decrying the Senate's use of
resolutions as a means of declaring presidential actions unconstitutional. Aside from a few, explicit deviations clearly mandated by
the Constitution, the Vesting Clauses had established a formal
separation of powers. As Jackson noted:
The legislative power is, subject to the qualified negative
of the President, vested in the Congress of the United
States . . ; the executive power is vested exclusively in
the President, except that in the conclusion of treaties and
in certain appointments to office he is to act with the advice and consent of the Senate; the judicial power is vested
exclusively in the Supreme and other courts of the United
States, except in cases of impeachment.338
The tripartite structure created by these Vesting Clauses should be
strictly followed unless contradicted by an express constitutional
provision. Admittedly, for the enumerated "special purposes," such

337. Jackson, Protest, supra note 336 at 1289 (emphasis in original). Jackson's Protest
also included a sweeping claim of executive power over the public treasury. According to
the Protest, "The custody of the public property, under such regulations as may be prescribed by legislative authority, has always been considered an appropriate function of the
executive department." Since "[plublic money is but a species of public property," the
Protest concluded that "its custody always has been and always must be . . . intrusted to
the executive department." Id. at 1301. Jackson later recanted this position in his so-called
Codicil to his Protest, in which he averred that "it was not my intention to deny in the
[previous) message the power and right of the legislative department to provide by law
for the custody, safe-keeping, and disposition of the public money and property of the
United States." Andrew Jackson, Message to the Senate (Apr. 21, 1834), in 3 MESSAGES
& PAPERS, supra note 177, at 1312, 1312. The Codicil further conceded:
I admit without reserve, as I have before done, the constitutional power of the
Legislature to prescribe by law the place or places in which the public money
or other property is to be deposited, and to make such regulations concerning
its custody, removal, or disposition as they may think proper to enact. Nor do
I claim for the Executive any right to the possession or disposition of the
public property or treasure or any authority to interfere with the same, except
when such possession, disposition or authority is given to him by law. Nor do
I claim the right in any manner to supervise or interfere with the person intrusted with such property or treasure, unless he be an officer whose appointment under the Constitution and laws, is devolved upon the President alone or
in conjunction with the Senate, and for whose conduct he is constitutionally
responsible.
Id. at 1313.
338. Jackson, Protest, supra note 336, at 1290.
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as the President's veto power over legislation, Congress's impeachment power, and the Senate's participation in treaties and appointments, "there is an occasional intermixture of the powers of the
different departments, yet with these exceptions each of the three
great departments is independent of the others in its sphere of
action." 39 These limited departures, however, constituted the only
ways in which the Constitution authorized a particular branch to
interfere in the affairs of any other branch:
In every other respect each of them is the coequal of the
other two, and all are the servants of the American people,
without power or right to control or censure each other in
the service of their common superior, save only in the
manner and to the degree which that superior has prescribed.3"
"Tested by these principles," Jackson concluded, "the resolution
of the Senate is wholly unauthorized by the Constitution, and in
derogation of its entire spirit." Although "[t]he high functions assigned by the Constitution to the Senate are in their nature either
legislative, executive, or judicial," the censure resolution did not
represent a proper exercise of any of those functions. In passing
the censure resolution, the Senate could not have been acting in its
legislative capacity, since the resolution "asserts no legislative
power, proposes no legislative action, and neither possesses the
form nor any of the attributes of a legislative measure." Moreover,
Jackson noted that the Senate's executive powers "relate exclusively to the consideration of treaties and nominations to office, and
they are exercised in secret session and with closed doors." Since
"[t]his resolution does not apply to any treaty or nomination, and
was passed in a public session," Jackson thought it "manifest that
the resolution was not justified by any of the executive powers
conferred on the Senate." And although "the whole phraseology
and sense of the resolution seem to be judicial," the only judicial
power possessed by the Senate was the power to try impeachments.34' The Senate, however, could not have passed the resolution pursuant to its judicial power to try impeachments, since "[t]he
Constitution makes the House of Representatives the exclusive
judges, in the first instance, of the question whether the President

339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1291-92.
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has committed an impeachable offense," and the House had instituted no such proceedings.3 42 Therefore, Jackson concluded that
the Constitution did not authorize the Senate to "take up, consider,
and decide upon the official acts of the Executive" simply "for the
purposes of a public censure, and without any vie to legislation or
'
impeachment."343
Jackson did not simply denounce the form of the Senate's
action. He attacked its substance as well. In one of the most powerful statements ever offered in favor of the theory of the unitary
executive, Jackson declared that there was nothing improper in
removing Duane for his failure to follow the President's wishes.
Because the Executive Power and the Take Care Clauses made him
"responsible for the entire action of the executive department, it
was but reasonable that the power of appointing, overseeing, and
controlling those who execute the laws-a power in its nature
executive-should remain in his hands." 3" Jackson elaborated:
The whole executive power being vested in the President,
who is responsible for its exercise, it is a necessary consequence that he should have a right to employ agents of his
own choice to aid him in the performance of his duties,
and to discharge them when he is no longer willing to be
responsible for their acts. In strict accordance with this
principle, the power of removal, which, like that of appointment, is an ... executive power, is left unchecked by
the Constitution in relation to all executive officers.345
342. Id. at 1295; see also id. at 1292 ("[U]nder the provisions of the Constitution it
would seem to be equally plain that neither the President nor any other officer can be
rightfully subjected to the operation of the judicial power of the Senate except in the
cases and under the forms prescribed by the Constitution."). Jackson also complained that
the resolution could not represent a proper impeachment because it did not specify which
laws or parts of the Constitution had been violated. ld. at 1296-98.
Interestingly, Jackson also challenged the censure resolution as an improper infringement upon the prerogatives of the House of Representatives as well as upon the
President's:
The Constitution makes the House of Representatives the exclusive judges, in
the first instance, of the question whether the President has committed an impeachable offense. A majority of the Senate, whose interference with this preliminary question has for the best of all reasons been studiously excluded,
anticipate the action of the House of Representatives, assume . . . the function
which belongs exclusively to that body.
Id. at 1295.
343. Jackson, Protest, supra note 336, at 1291.
344. Id. at 1298.
345. Id. at 1298-99. As Jackson further noted in his private memorandum book, only
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And even "if there were any just ground for doubt on the face
of the Constitution whether all executive officers are removable at
the will of the President, it is obviated by the cotemporaneous [sic]
construction of the instrument and the uniform practice under
it."3" As Jackson noted:
The power of removal was a topic of solemn debate in the
Congress of 1789 while organizing the administrative departments of the Government, and it was finally decided
that the President derived from the Constitution the power
of removal so far as it regard that department for whose
acts he is responsible.347

through the exercise of the appointment and removal powers can the President ensure
"that the laws are faithfully executed and those measures adopted which are best calculated to promote the public interest." REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at
102.
Jackson also contrasted the treatment of the removal power under the Constitution
with the regime established by the Articles of the Confederation. Jackson noted that "[i]n
the Government from which many of the fundamental principles of our system are derived
the head of the executive department originally had power to appoint and remove at will
all officers," including judges and that "[i]t
was to take the judges out of this general

power of removal, and thus make them independent of the Executive, that the tenure of
their offices was changed to good behavior." Jackson, Protest, supra note 336, at 1299.
The fact that no similar provision limited the President's power to remove executive officers logically implied that the Constitution granted to the President the full removal power
over executive officers wielded by the executive under the Articles of the Confederation.
See id.
346. Id. at 1299.
347. Id. Although this debate at first focused on the State Department, its principles
were subsequently extended to the Treasury Department as well, and "it appears never to
have occurred to anyone in the Congress of 1789, or since until very recently that [the
Secretary of the Treasury] was other than an executive officer, the mere instrument of the
Chief Magistrate in the execution of the laws, subject, like all other heads of Departments, to his supervision and control." Id. at 1299-1300. Furthermore, Jackson noted:
[A]t the time of the organization of the Treasury Department an incident occurred which distinctly evinces the unanimous concurrence of the First Congress
in the principle that the Treasury Department is wholly executive in its character and responsibilities. A motion was made to strike out the provision of the
bill making it the duty of the Secretary "to digest and report plans for the
improvement and management of the revenue and for the support of public
credit," on the ground that it would give the executive department of the Govemnment too much influence and power in Congress. The motion was not opposed on the ground that the Secretary was the officer of Congress and responsible to that body, . . . but on other ground, which conceded his executive
character throughout. The whole discussion evinces an unanimous concurrence
in the principle that the Secretary of the Treasury is wholly an executive officer. . .
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As Jackson concluded:
Thus was it settled by the Constitution ... that the entire
executive power is vested in the President of the United
States; that as incident to that power the right of appointing
and removing those officers who are to aid him in the
execution of the laws, with such restrictions only as the
Constitution prescribes, is vested in the President; that the
Secretary of the Treasury is one of those officers . . . ; that
in the performance of these duties [the Secretary of the
Treasury] is subject to the supervision and control of the
President, and in all important measures having relation to
them consults the Chief Magistrate and obtains his approval

and sanction."
Permitting the Senate "to interfere with this exercise of Executive power," Jackson warned, would inevitably lead to the complete
destruction of executive independence:

Id. at 1300-01.
348. Jackson, Protest, supra note 336, at 1304 (emphasis added). Similar statements
appear throughout the Protest
Here, then, we have the concurrent authority of President Washington, of the
Senate, and the House of Representatives, numbers of whom had taken an
active part in the convention which framed the Constitution and in the State
conventions which adopted it, that the President derived an unqualified power
of removal from that instrument itself, which is "beyond the reach of legislative
authority." Upon this principle the Government has now been steadily administered for about forty-five years, during which there have been numerous removals made by the President or by his direction, embracing every grade of executive officers from the heads of Departments to the messengers of bureaus.
Id. at 1299-1300. Jackson later stated:
Nearly forty-five years had the President exercised, without a question as to his
rightful authority, those powers for the recent assumption of which he is now
denounced. .. . [A]nd yet in no one instance is it known that any man,
whether patriot or partisan, had raised his voice against it as a violation of the
Constitution.
Id. at 1305. Still later, a sarcastic Jackson jibed:
[O]n this occasion it is discovered for the first time that those who framed the
Constitution misunderstood it; that the First Congress and all its successors
have been under a delusion; that the practice of near forty-five years is but a
continued usurpation; that the Secretary of the Treasury is not responsible to
the President, and that to remove him is a violation of the Constitution and
laws for which the President deserves to stand forever dishonored on the journals of the Senate.
Id. at 1306.
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If the principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to perceive where it may end. If by a mere denunciation like this
resolution the President should ever be induced to act in a
matter of official duty contrary to the honest convictions of
his own mind in compliance with the wishes of the Senate,
the constitutional independence of the executive department
would be as effectually destroyed and its power as effectually transferred to the Senate as if that end had been accomplished by an amendment of the Constitution. . . . It
has already been maintained... that the Secretary of the
Treasury is the officer of Congress and independent of the
President. . . . Followed to its consequences, this principle
will be found effectually to destroy one coordinate department of the Government to concentrate in the hands of the
Senate the whole executive power, and to leave the President as powerless as he would be useless-the shadow of
authority after the substance had departed.349
In short, if "the practice by the Senate of the unconstitutional
power of arraigning and censuring the official conduct of the Executive" were permitted to continue, it would "break down the
checks and balance by which the wisdom of its framers sought to
3 '
insure its stability and usefulness""
And perhaps most importantly for the future contours of presidential power, Jackson invoked the President's unique role as the
only "direct representative of the American people" as supporting
his authority to control of the entire affairs of the executive
branch."' Jackson maintained that "[i]f the Secretary of the Treasury be independent of the President in the execution of the laws,
then is there no direct responsibility to the people in that important
branch of this Government to which is committed the care of the
national finances." Permitting the Secretary of the Treasury to
decide for himself all issues pertaining to the Bank of the United
States would effectively allow the Bank "to control ... the whole
action of the Government ... in defiance of the Chief Magistrate

349. Id. at 1305.
350. Id. at 1309.
351. Id.; see also id. at 1290 (noting that the President was properly held accountable
by "the bar of public opinion" as well as by the Constitution "for every act of his Administration"); Jackson, Expos6, supra note 314, at 1237 (maintaining that his opposition
to the Bank had been authorized by "the suffrages of the American people").
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elected by the people and responsible to them" so long as "a Secretary shall be found to accord with them in opinion or can be
'
induced in practice to promote their views."352
Jackson also admonished that permitting the Senate to sanction the President for
purely executive acts threatened to undermine "the confidence of
the people in [the President's] ability and virtue . . . , and the real
power of the Government will fall into the hands of a body holding their offices for long terms, not elected by the people and not
'
to them directly responsible."353
Moreover, Jackson cautioned that
congressional interference in executive affairs exacerbated the problems of faction and regionalism:
[AIll the independent departments of the Government, and
the States which compose our confederated Union, instead
of attending to their appropriate duties and leaving those
who may offend to be reclaimed or punished in the manner
pointed out in the Constitution, would fall to mutual crimination and recrimination and give to the people confusion
and anarchy instead of order and law, until at length some
form of aristocratic power would be established on the
ruins of the Constitution or the States be broken into separate communities.354
Therefore, Jackson regarded it as his solemn duty to oppose any
effort so "calculated ... to concentrate in the hands of a body not
directly amenable to the people a degree of influence and power
dangerous to their liberties and fatal to the Constitution of the
'
choice."355
Only by permitting the President to assume responsibility for the entire executive branch, including the Treasury Department, through the unrestricted exercise of the removal power
could the normative benefits of energy, accountability, and faction
control envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution be guaranteed.
Upon the reading of the Protest in the Senate, George
Poindexter immediately denounced it, declaring, as Remini describes, that "it could not be considered an. executive message" in
that it proposed no legislation and "did not pertain to any of the
public occasions in which the President is ... authorized to ad-

352.
353.
354.
355.

Jackson, Protest, supra note 336, at 1309.
Id. at 1310.
Id.
Id. at 1311.
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dress himself to the Senate." 56 Poindexter charged that it was an
"unofficial paper" signed by one "Andrew Jackson" which should
"not be received."3 " Clay seconded Poindexter, objecting specifically to Jackson's claim as the representative of the people:
The President speaks of a responsibility to himself....
Thus, every thing concentrates in the President. He is the
sole Executive; all other officers are his agents, and their
duties are his duties. This is altogether a military idea,
wholly incompatible with free government. I deny it absolutely. There exists no such responsibility to the President.
All are responsible to the law, and to the law only, or not
responsible at all.35
Clay was backed up by the immense oratorical skills of John
C. Calhoun, who was still embittered about being passed over as
Jackson's heir apparent,359 and who called the protest a "tyrant's
plea."3" Calhoun thundered:
Infatuated man! blinded by ambition-intoxicated by flattery and vanity! Who, that is the least acquainted with the
human heart-who, that is conversant with the page of
history, does not see, under all this, the workings of a
dark, lawless, and insatiable ambition; which, if not arrested, will
finally impel him to his own, or his country's
1
ruin?

36

Daniel Webster, after also flirting with the Democratic Party,362

356. REMInI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 155.
357. Id.
358. 10 CONG. DEB. 1575 (1834).
359. Calhoun's bitterness over his falling out with Jackson is perhaps best illustrated by
his role in blocking Martin Van Buren's nomination as Minister to England. Not only did
Calhoun orchestrate the defeat of Van Buren's confrmation; he even arranged that the
vote would end in a tie, so that he himself, as Jackson's first Vice President, could cast
the vote against Van Buren's nomination. Calhoun's joy over the outcome was short-lived,
as Van Buren's defeat galvanized his support for the Vice Presidential nomination. Thus,
soon after Van Buren was forced to return ignominiously from England, he was tapped as
Calhoun's replacement as the person whom Jackson would support to be his successor.
See BOwERs, supra note 312, at 178-82; HARRIS, ADvICE AND CONSENT, supra note 219,
at 55; 2 HAYNES, supra note 155, at 768; VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 38; WHit, THE
JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 108-09.
360. 10 CONG. DEB. 1645 (1834).
361. Id.
362. See GOVAN, supra note 303, at 261-62; REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra
note 302, at 110, 128.
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returned to the Whig fold -and offered a scathing denunciation of
the Protest: "Again and again we hear it said that the President is
responsible to the American people! that he is responsible to the
bar of public opinion! For whatever he does, he assumes accountability to the American people! ... And this is thought enough for
a limited, restrained, republican government!"363 To Webster, the
doctrines of Jackson's protest were tantamount to dictatorial rule:
"[I]f he may be allowed to consider himself as the sole representative of all the American people ... then I say ... that the Government (I will not say the people) has already a master."'3
The Senate voted twenty-seven to sixteen not to receive the
Protest on May 8, 1834,365 and Senator Benton's motion to expunge the Senate's refusal to receive the Protest from its Journal
failed on the last day of the session.3" The Senate also refused 3to
67
confirm four of Jackson's five nominees for Bank directorships.
Jackson resolutely resubmitted their nominations along with a message defending their candidacies.36 A Senate report acknowledged
"that a right of renomination exists," but opposed the practice
'
except for "in very clear and strong cases."369
The Senate proceeded to reject the nominations by even wider margins than before.37 As a final gesture of defiance, the Senate summarily re363. 10 CONG. DEB. 1687 (1834).
364. Id. at 1688. Webster may have been less than statesman-like in his advocacy for
the Bank, since like Taney, he was embroiled in a conflict of interest. In the midst of
this conflict over the Bank, Webster wrote to Biddle complaining that his annual "retainer' had not been "renewed or refreshed as usual." Webster warned ominously, "If it be
wished that my relations to the Bank should be continued, it may be well to send me the
usual retainers." BOWERs, supra note 312, at 324; JAMES, supra note 312, at 657-58;
REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 313, at 128; VAN DEUSEN, supra note 330,
at 278.
365. See 10 CONG. DEB. 1711-12 (1834); see also VAN DEUSEN, supra note 330, at
284.
366. The Senate tabled Benton's motion by a vote of 29 to 27. See 11 CONG. DEB.
727-28 (1835); see also REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 177; VAN
DEUSEN, supra note 330, at 284.
367. See 10 CONG. DEB. app. 310-11 (1834) (rejecting the nominations of Peter Wager
by a vote of 20 to 25, Henry D. Gilpin by a vote of 20 to 24, John T. Sullivan by a
vote of 18 to 27, and Hugh McElderry by a vote of 20 to 25).
368. See Andrew Jackson, Message to the Senate (Mar. 11, 1834), in 3 MESSAGES &
PAPERS, supra note 177, at 1260; see also BOwERs, supra note 312, at 324; CATTERALL,
supra note 303, at 308-09; HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT, supra note 219, at 57-59;
REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 175; SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS,
supra note 302, at 167-68.
369. S. Doc. No. 333, 23d Cong., IstSess. 11-14 (1834), reprinted in 10 CONG. DEB.
app. 314, 315 (1834).
370. See 10 CONG. DEB. app. 316 (1834) (rejecting the renominations by a vote of 30
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jected Taney's nomination as Secretary of the Treasury.3 7'
The debate would have been less rancorous in the Democratically-controlled House of Representatives but for a procedural
blunder by one of Jackson's closest friends and allies, James K.
Polk. Jackson had hoped that Taney's report would be referred to
the Committee on Ways and Means, which Polk chaired. However,
Polk failed to object when another Member of Congress, at Clay's
behest, moved that Taney's report be considered by the Committee
of the Whole, which opened the issue to unlimited debate on the
House floor. When Polk tried to undo the damage by passing the
previous question and reconsidering its decision, the motion failed
by three votes.3 Consequently, Jackson's removal of Duane was
subjected to a lengthy debate in the House of Representatives as
well.3"
Throughout this tumult, Jackson only became more resolute.374
He was aided greatly by Nicholas Biddle's foolish decision to
trigger a financial panic during the winter of 1833-34."75 Biddle
believed that the panic would scare the public into supporting
recharter of the Bank, but its effect was in the opposite direction.
Ultimately, it angered the public and gave Jackson and the Democrats a new complaint that could be used against the Bank. Jackson
responded with great skill and made several deft political moves to
deflect pressure from himself onto the Bank. First, he infused the
debate with moral overtones, portraying the conflict as pitting
honest working people against the moneyed aristocracy. Second, he
deflected all criticism away from himself and towards the Bank,

to 11); see also HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT, supra note 219, at 259; 2 HAYNES,
supra note 155, at 771; SMrrH, ECONOMIC AsPECTs, supra note 302, at 167-68; WHITE,
THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 109. Jackson subsequently stood by his defeated
nominees, designating them for other positions with mixed success. See id. James A.
Bayard, the one nominee who was confirmed by the Senate, declined to serve. See 2
HAYNES, supra note 155, at 771; SMrH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS, supra note 302, at 167-68.
371. See 2 GoLDSMIrT, supra note 125, at 978; REHNQUIST, supra note 302, at 255
REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 142; REMnI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra
note 302, at 170-72; VAN DEUSEN, supra note 330, at 279; WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS,
supra note 262, at 108-10.
372. See REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 123-24.
373. One House member even considered initiating impeachment proceedings. See id. at
150.
374. Benton observed of Jackson, "I . . . never saw him appear more truly heroic and
grand than at this time. He was perfectly mild in his language, cheerful in his temper,
firm in his conviction." See id. (quoting I THoMAS H. BENTON, THIRTY YEARS VIEW
424 (1865)).
375. See REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 127-28.
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responding to all those asking for relief from the monetary contraction, "What do you come to me for? . . . Go to Nicholas Biddle.
We have no money here, gentlemen. Biddle has all the money."'376 Lastly, in a political coup de grace, in January 1834 he
revoked the Bank's authority to serve as the federal government's
agent in paying pensions to Revolutionary War veterans and directed Secretary of War Lewis Cass to recover the funds and accounts
relating to those pensions. When Biddle refused, Jackson suspended
the pension payments altogether and referred the matter to Congress, complaining that the Bank "not only defied the government
but inflicted needless misery on the nation's patriotic heroes. ' 3 7
The public, unable to believe that "Jackson, the Hero of the War
of 1812, would withhold funds from veterans," proceeded to blame
the entire matter on Biddle.378
By mid-February of 1834, public opinion had turned on the
Bank.379 The Governor of Pennsylvania, previously a strong bank
supporter, condemned Biddle in his annual message to the state
legislature.38 0 With the chief executive of the Bank's home state
openly opposed to the Bank, Pennsylvania's congressional delegation and officials in other states quickly followed suit.38' Buoyed
by the turn in public opinion, the House Democrats finally closed
off debate on the removal of deposits by a scant four votes. 8 2
Taney's report was referred to the Ways and Means Committee,
which subsequently returned a report blaming Biddle for precipitating the Panic." 3 The House then promptly passed resolutions declaring (1) that the Bank ought not to be rechartered, (2) that the
deposits ought not to be restored, (3) that state banks ought to be
376. REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 114.
377. Andrew Jackson, Message to the Senate and House of Representatives (Feb. 4,
1834), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 177, at 1258.
378. See REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 160; see also CATrERALL, supra note
303, at 305-07; ; REMII, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 130-31; SMrrH,
ECONOMIC ASPECrS, supra note 302, at 168.
379. See CATrERALL, supra note 303, at 348; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at
163; REMIN], COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 164; VAN DEUSEN, supra note
330, at 283.
380. See BOWERS, supra note 312, at 318, 329; CATrERALL, supra note 303, at 339-40;
GOvAN, supra note 303, at 257; JAMES, supra note 312, at 672; REMINI, COURSE OF
DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 164.
381. See CATrERALL, supra note 303, at 339-40; JAMES, supra note 312, at 672;
REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 163-64.
382. See REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 165.
383. See 10 CONG. DEB. app. 156-76 (1834); see also REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY,
supra note 302, at 166.
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continued as federal depositories, and (4) that a special committee
should examine the Bank's role in the Panic." 4 The House later
summarily tabled two Senate resolutions which disapproved of
Taney's action and called for the restoration of the deposits to the
3 85
Bank.
With the House's actions effectively overriding the previous
action in the Senate, the Bank was doomed. Biddle quickened the
end by refusing to allow the House investigators to examine the
Bank's books or correspondence and refusing to testify before
Congress." 6 Although Biddle attempted to save face by requesting an alternate investigation by the more Bank-friendly Senate, the
Senate Finance Committee's report approving of the Bank's actions
in refusing to cooperate with the House's investigation was filed
after the congressional elections and thus was too late to have any
effect politically. 7
The following year, Senator Calhoun reported a bill to limit the
President's removal power, the third section of which provided:
[I]n all nominations made by the President to the Senate,
to fill vacancies occasioned by the exercise of the
President's power to remove ... the fact of the removal
shall be stated to the Senate, at the same time that the
nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for
which such officer may have been removed.388
The ensuing debate was a more measured and reasoned discussion
of the removal power than was possible the previous session, when
all positions taken on the removal power were offered in the political shadow of the great Bank War. 9 Calhoun's bill passed the

384. See CATrERALL, supra note 303, at 341-42; GOVAN, supra note 303, at 266;
LATNER, supra note 302, at 184; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 165-66;
REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 166-67; VAN DEUSEN, supra note
330, at 283.
385. See REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 167; VAN DEUSEN, supra
note 330, at 284.
386. See JAMES, supra note 312, at 675; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 167;
REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 167.
387. See CATIERALL, supra note 303, at 306, 356-58; REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note
266, at 168.
388. S. DOC. No. 109, 23d Cong., 2d Sess. (1835), reprinted in 11 CONG. DEB. app.
219-31 (1835); see also id. at 468 (statement of Sen. Webster) (quoting the bill); SMrIH,
CIVIL SERVICE, supra note 292, at 4.
389. As Clay pointed out, it was "extremely fortunate that this subject of executive
patronage came up, at this session, unencumbered by any collateral question," unlike in
the previous session when "[t]he bank mingled itself in all our discussions." I1 CONG.
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Senate on February 21, 1835, by a vote of thirty-one to sixteen.3" House Speaker John Quincy Adams had prepared a long
speech opposing Calhoun's bill. However, he never got the chance
to deliver it, as the bill was never considered by the House and
died. The Senate exacted some measure of revenge by indefinitely
postponing action on his nomination to the Supreme Court, but
confirmed Taney as Chief Justice the following year. 9' Finally,
on January 16, 1837, the Senate erased the last vestige of its opposition to the President's power to remove, expunging the resolution
censuring Jackson for his actions from its Senate Journal.3rs In
discussing this vote, Leonard White writes:
Jackson earned a personal triumph, and thus symbolically
his reading of executive powers gained political confirma"has
tion. "Never before and never since," wrote Corwin,
3 93
President.
a
before
itself
the Senate so abased
Thus, Jackson's victory over the Senate was made complete.
The Senate triumvirate of Clay, Calhoun, and Webster, each
driven by presidential ambition, proved far more unified in criticizing Jackson than in supporting the Bank. In considering Webster's
bill to recharter the bank, the three splintered over the length of
the recharter term, and in the end, the recharter failed. 94 The
Bank obtained a charter from Pennsylvania to keep its Philadelphia
branch alive when its federal charter expired in 1836, but this
extension was to be short lived. The Bank ignominiously collapsed
in 1841, the victim of wild speculation and fiscal mismanagement.395 In the final analysis, even critics of unitary executive
theory have been forced to concede that Jackson's removal of
Duane represents a monument to the development of the unitary

DEB. 513 (1835).
390. See id. at 576.
391. See REHNQUIST, supra note 302, at 255.
392. See 13 CONG. DEB. 504-05 (1837) (passing expungement resolution by a vote of
24 to 19); see also REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 174; LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 16 (1975); VAN DEUSEN, supra note 330, at 285.
393. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 44 (citing CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT
(1940 ed.), supra note 20, at 267).
394. Webster offered a compromise recharter term of six years, but Clay, obstinately
refusing to concede anything to Jackson, declined to support anything but a full twentyyear term, while Calhoun favored 12. See BOWERS, supra note 312, at 332-35;
CATrERALL, supra note 303, at 336-38; GovAN, supra note 303, at 265-66; REMINI,
BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 165.
395. See REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 174.
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executive."l Jackson's unflagging advocacy of the President's
power to supervise federal administration and to remove executive
officials invalidates any suggestion that the executive branch acquiesced to any congressional interference with executive functions.
IV. CONCLUSION

When the first half-century of presidential practice under the
Constitution is viewed as a whole, it is crystal clear that the first
seven Presidents did not by their words or their deeds undermine
the unitary executive structure created in Philadelphia in 1787. No
reasonable Burkean common law constitutionalist could describe the
whole of the presidential practice between 1789 and 1837 as constituting a long-standing, consistent presidential acquiescence to
congressional efforts to limit the unitariness of the executive. Even
the Virginia dynasty of Presidents, whose constitutional views
favored a weak chief executive,3" consistently opposed such congressional incursions. And as Jackson's successful removal of Treasury Secretary Duane demonstrated, no one could doubt the President's constitutional power to control the entire executive branch
(including the Treasury Department) and the actions of all of his
subordinates.
Perhaps the clearest proof of this point comes from the writings of the most eminent constitutional commentators of that era,
James Kent and Joseph Story, who clearly did not believe that the
President had so acquiesced; in fact, if any established practice
existed, they thought it indicated Congress's inability to fragment
the unitary executive. Kent claimed that the Decision of 1789
"amounted to a legislative construction of the constitution, and it
has ever since been acquiesced in and acted upon, as of decisive
' Kent further noted:
authority in the case."398
It is supported by the weighty reason, that the subordinate
officers in the executive department ought to hold at the
pleasure of the head of that department, because he is
invested generally with the executive authority, and every
participation in that authority by the Senate was an exception to a general principle, and ought to be taken strictly.
The President is the great responsible officer for the faith-

396. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 78-83.
397. See REHNQUIST, supra note 302, at 252.
398. 1 KENT, supra note 1, at 310.
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ful execution of the law, and the power of removal was
incidental to that duty, and might often be requisite to
fulfill it.
This question has never been made the subject of judicial discussion; and the construction given to the Constitution in 1789 has continued to rest on this loose, incidental
declaratory opinion of Congress, and the sense and practice
of government since that time. It may now be considered
as firmly and definitely settled, and there is good sense
and practical utility in the Construction.3
Kent offered a similar observation in a letter to Daniel Webster: "I
heard the question debated in the summer of 1789, and Madison,
Benson, Ames, Lawrence, etc., were in favor of the right of removal by the President, and such has been the opinion ever since,
and the practice." Although Kent generally agreed with the views
Hamilton expressed in The Federalist No. 77, he nonetheless concluded:
[I]t is too late to call the President's power in question
after a declaratory act of Congress and an acquiescence of
half a century. We should hurt the reputation of our government with the world, and we are accused already of the
Republican tendency of reducing all executive power into
the legislative, and making Congress a national convention.
That the President grossly abuses the power of removal is
manifest, but it is the evil genius of Democracy to be the
sport of factions.'
Likewise, Joseph Story, although critical of the Decision of
1789's outcome, conceded the fact that Congress had acquiesced
and indicated that constitutionally unlimited presidential removal
power should be regarded as a settled constitutional point:
The public ... acquiesced in this decision, and it constitutes, perhaps the most extraordinary case in the history of
the government of a power, conferred by implication on the
executive by the assent of a bare majority of Congress,
which has not been questioned on many other occasions.

399. Id. (emphasis added).
400. Letter from James Kent to Daniel Webster (Jan. 21, 1830) (emphasis added), in I
THE PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE oF DANIEL WEBSTER 486, 487 (Fletcher Webster ed.,
1857), quoted in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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Even the most jealous advocates of state rights seem to
have slumbered over this vast reach of authority, and have
left it untouched ...
....
If there has been any aberration from the true constitutional exposition of the power of removal [during the
Andrew Jackson Administration] (which the reader must
decide for himself,) it will be difficult, and perhaps impracticable, after forty years experience, to recall the practice
to the correct theory."'
Story's and Kent's views in this respect were also held, as we
have seen, by James Madison and Daniel Webster, both of whom
thought that settled practice had conferred the removal power on
the President. All four of these early and justly famous constitutional commentators reject the Lessig and Sunstein argument about
our early constitutional practices.
Although Kent's and Story's observations were limited to the
removal power, it is just as clear that the early Presidents of the
Republic vigorously exercised their right to direct and review the
actions of their subordinates. Although some (but not all) opinions
of Attorney General Wirt suggest otherwise, Presidents throughout
this period often exerted their control over the execution of the
laws and did not hesitate to direct lower-level executive officials.
And in the end, Wirt's views were subsequently disavowed during
the Jackson Administration. Thus, the first half-century of presidential practice under the Constitution provides little support for the
claim that any President accepted any limitations whatsoever on
the law execution power, including with respect to the Treasury
Department. On the contrary, the vigor with which the first seven
Presidents defended that power suggests, if anything, a fifty year
founding tradition of constitutionally mandated presidential control
over the executive branch.

401. 2 STORY, supra note 2, Section 1543-44; see also 2 HAYNES, supra note 155, at
791 n.2.

